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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased,
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Latah

)
) ss.
)

John Block, upon oath, deposes and says:
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)
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV09-02219
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN
BLOCK

1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal
knowledge.
2.

I am a Plaintiff in the within action and am competent to testify to the matters stated

3.

I make this my Second Affidavit to supplement my July 13, 2010 Affidavit.

4.

Based on my review of the City's records and its responses to discovery,

herein.

improvements required under SP No. 4 and SP No. 8 other than the 1993 grading permits and the
public right-of-way subdivision approvals, Streibick's grading and fill activities, drainage
improvements, detention pond removal and reconstruction activities on 153, 155, and 159 were
unpermitted and unapproved by the City.
5.

When I purchased Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset

Palisades No. 8 ("SP No. 8") in December 2005 from Defendants Streibick I had knowledge that
SP No. 8 had been improved by Streibick with public street, water and sewer; I had no
knowledge and was unaware that other stormwater drainage pipes, previously failed stonnwater
detention facilities and uncontrolled fill had also been constructed on this site.
6.

The SP No.8 plat was recorded by the City on November 7, 2005. The City

recorded the Canyon Greens plat approximately three months later on February 15, 2006.
7.

During Streibick' s subdivision of SP No. 8 in 2005, during my subdivision of

Canyon Greens in 2006, and during my subdivision of Canyon Greens No. 2 in 2006-2007,
during my efforts to obtain building permits for the lots within Canyon Greens in 2006, and
during my efforts to obtain building permits for the lots within Canyon Greens No. 2 in 20072008 the City failed to disclose to me its knowledge of the 1999landslide in the vicinity of 153,
155, and 159.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK- 2

8.

The homes I constructed at 153, 155 and 159 were ofhigh quality construction and

listed for sale near $600,000 each.
9.

In late 2006, I made application to the City to resubdivide the remainder of SP No. 8

then designated as Lots 1-3, into eight lots, and such resubdivision application was reviewed and
approved by Cutshaw and by the City as Lots 1 through 8 of Canyon Greens No. 2 to the City of
Lewiston, a resubdivision of Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades
No. 8 (collectively "Canyon Greens No. 2") commonly known as 161 Marine View Drive
("161"), 101 Canyon Greens Court ("101"), 102 Canyon Greens Court ("102"), 103 Canyon
Greens Court ("103"), 104 Canyon Greens Court ("104"), 105 Canyon Greens Court ("105"),
106 Canyon Greens Court (" 106"), and 107 Canyon Greens Court (" 107").
10. In part, because the City's review and approval of the Canyon Greens subdivision
occurred three months after its review and approval of SP No. 8 and the City did not raise any
major issues with SP No. 8, I assumed that all grading and fill on the Canyon Greens property,
other than the new storm drain I was required to dedicate, had been properly placed and installed
under pennit from the City and under its supervision and inspection.
11. In the spring of2007, I began constructing homes on the Canyon Greens No. 2lots. I
began with 161, which was completed in fall2007. Additionally, in fall2007, I began
construction ofhornes on 104 and 107, with 104 being completed in May 2008 and 107 being
completed in fall 2008. Also in the fall 2008, I began constructing homes on 103 and 105, with
105 being completed in May 2009 and 103 being sold unfinished in April 2011. I began
constructing a horne on 102 in April 2009 and that horne was completed in April 2011.
12. I conducted considerable due diligence as part of my efforts to purchase the lots
within SP No. 8 as well as resubdivide Lot 4 of SP No. 8 in the Canyon Green subdivision and

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK- 3

resubdivide Lots 1-3 ofSP No.8 in the Canyon Greens No.2 subdivision. I met and talked with
City staff regarding the existing and required sewer, water, and drainage systems. I explained to
the City that I intended to construct three homes on the three newly created lots of Canyon
Greens. I inquired about easements. In regards to the Canyon Greens subdivision, I attended a
pre-application meeting with City staff to learn about any issues with the property with the intent
and understanding that City staff would inform me of any requirements and that City staff would
bring the relevant files to the meeting. I expected and relied on the City to be prepared and to
attend the meeting and to follow up with any relevant additional meetings or correspondence.
The City issued building permits for all lots on Canyon Greens No. 2, and all seven (7) homes I
constructed, I sold 108 to a builder, were constructed in compliance with all applicable codes,
including all required compaction testing.
13. None ofthe information about the landslide or the filling of the 40-foot deep canyon,
the unengineered drainage system and the unengineered destruction of the detention pond had
been disclosed to or known to me when I purchased SP No. 8 and developed Canyon Greens and
Canyon Greens No. 2.
14. If the City had disclosed its knowledge of the 1999 landslide or provided me copies
of the documents and photographs describing the 1999 landslide and the severity of such, I may
have decided not to purchase the property, or may have decided to conduct a geotechnical
investigation prior to purchasing the property, and may have decided to purchase the property
and have altered my construction plans to avoid problems with the landslide area. If the City had
notified or warned me at any time before constructing my homes that a landslide had occurred on
the site where I was preparing to construct three homes, I could have determined for myself
whether there was a potential problem.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK- 4

15. I purchased 159 from its ovroer in December, 2007 to appease their dissatisfaction. I
ended up demolishing 153 and 159, the latter after moving the upper level of 155 to 106 at great
expense. 155 is rented from time to time but is not saleable as the landslide continues to cause
structural and cosmetic problems. In all, I used $1,000,000 in retirement savings, $500,000 from
my parent's estate, $300,000 of proceeds from the sale of four of my rental properties, and
proceeds from the sale of my personal residence to attempt to remedy and resolve the problems
associated with the landslide.
The above statements are true and cmTect to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this

day of July, 2011.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
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day of July, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

fil

I hereby certifY that on this
day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
BRIAN K. JULIAN
STEPHEN L. ADAMS
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. MOORE PLAZA
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700
POST OFFICE BOX 7426
BOISE, ID1\HO 83707-7426

CLINTON 0. CASEY
DANIEL J. SKIJ\TNER
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 TYRELL LANE
P.O. BOX359
BOISE, ID 83701

[ £;('] U.S. Mail

[
[
[
[
[

] FAX (208) 344-5510
) Hand Delivery
] FedEx Overnight Delivery
] email to sadams@ajhlaw.com
] email to bjulian@ajhlaw.com

[ti] U.S. Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 345-7212
[ ) Hand Delivery
[ ] FedEx Overnight Delivery
[ ] email to CCasey@cssklaw.com
] email to danskinner@cssklaw.com
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RONALD J. LAN'DECK
DANELLE C. FORSETH
LANDECK & FORSETH
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
Landeck ISB No. 3001
Forseth ISB No. 7124
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, L~ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased,
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation
of the State of Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL
J. CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and
DOES 1-20

'

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
County of Nez Perce )
Eric Hasenoehrl, upon oath, deposes and says:

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL- 1

Case No. CV09-02219

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
ERIC HASENOEHRL

1.

I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal

knowledge.
2.

I am a licensed civil engineer in the State ofldaho. I am qualified to render the

testimony and opinions expressed in this affidavit.
3.

I am employed by Keltic Engineering, Inc., an Idaho professional services

corporation ("Keltic"), as a civil engineer and am a principal of that business and its President.
4.

I make this my Second Affidavit to supplement my July 13, 2010 Affidavit.

5.

Keltic has calculated that the amount of fill placed within a 40-foot canyon prior to

1995 within SP No.8 to be approximately 63,350 cubic yards. In addition to the 63,350 cubic
yards of soil placed to fill in the canyon on SP No. 8, between 1995 and 2005, an additional 976
cubic yards of fill was placed and approximately 564 cubic yards of soil was cut within the area
presently known as Canyon Greens that the City failed to approve, supervise or inspect.
6.

The latent defects associated with Lot 4 of SP No. 8, including, that approximately

63,350 cubic yards of uncontrolled fill had been placed on the site, that a landslide had occurred
on the site, that a storrnwater detention pond had failed on the site, that various concealed
storrnwater drainage systems existed on the site and contributed water to fill placed on the site,
were not discoverable by reasonable inspection in the latter half of2005.
7.

The onus to make a geotechnical evaluation ofthe property encompassed by SP No.

8, cannot be placed by the City on Block, a party who had no knowledge of the 1999landslide,
had no records within his possession of the 1999 landslide, had no knowledge of the previous

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL - 2

topography and prior 40-foot deep canyon that had been continually filled \Vith uncontrolled
material and had no knowledge of the previous installations of unengineered drainage features.
8.

In conducting Block's due diligence in regard to developing Canyon Greens, it was

reasonable for Block to assume that he could rely on the recency of the City's previous approval
and recordation of SP No. 8 which occurred approximately three months before the City
approved and recorded Canyon Greens since it was the exact same property at issue, that being
Lot 4 of SP No. 8.
The above statements are true and conect to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this

ZIR..J day of July, 2011.

Eric Hasenoehrl

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
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day of July, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

%"

I hereby certify that on this
day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
[~] U.S. Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 344-5510
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] FedEx Overnight Delivery
[ ] email to sadarns@ajhlaw.corn
[ ] email to bjulian@ajhlaw .corn

BRIAN K. JULIAN
STEPHEN L. ADAMS
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. MOORE PLAZA
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700
POST OFFICE BOX 7426
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426

CLINTON 0. CASEY
DANIEL J. SKINNER
CANTRILL, SK.Il\TNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 TYRELL LANE
P.O. BOX 359
BOISE, ID 83701

[J.(] U.S. Mail
[ ]FAX(208)345-7212
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] FedEx Overnight Delivery
[ ] email to CCasey@cssklaw.corn
( ] email to danskinner@cssklaw.corn
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LANDECK & FORSETH
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(208) 883-1505
Landeck ISB No. 3001
Forseth ISB No. 7124
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV09-02219
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R.
("HANK") SWIFT

JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
)
)
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased,
)
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation )
ofthe State of Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL)
J. CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and
)
DOES 1 20.
)
'
)
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Latah

)
)

)
) ss.
)

John R. ("Hank") Swift, upon oath, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. ("HANK") SWIFT- 1

1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal
knowledge.
2.

I am a licensed civil engineer in the State of Idaho. I am qualified to render the

testimony and opinions expressed in this affidavit.
3.

I am employed by HKS Engineers, PLLC, an Idaho professional services limited

liability company ("HKS"), as a civil engineer and am a principal of that business.
4.

Changes in groundwater and surface water can increase the moisture content and the

weight of soil and if saturation occurs, the particle interaction may also be adversely impacted,
lessening the frictional resistance between individual soil particles. In the case of the subject
properties, the soil moisture content may have been increased due to leaking storm drains. This
increased moisture content can destabilize sensitive slopes such as those on the subject
properties.
5.

The City's failure to require a geotechnical evaluation and implement the

recommendations of that evaluation for earthwork and storm water drainage facilities in an area
where a known landslide had occurred, the City's failure to supervise and/or inspect
development that concealed a landslide, the City's failure to require proper abatement of a
landslide, the City's failure to prevent, restrict or regulate development in the area of a landslide,
the City's failure to act with ordinary care to protect against the risks of a landslide, and the
City's failure to warn of a landslide at the time of subdivision of property encompassing such
landslide area and/or at the time the City issued building permits for the affected property in
2006 and thereafter, contributed to the instability of the property Block purchased and which
instability ultimately caused his damage.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. ("HANK") SWIFT- 2

6.

Significant amounts of earthwork (grading and filling) had taken place on what is

now Block's property before Block's purchase in late 2005 and there are scant, if any, City
records of such work and because of the City's lack of monitoring and supervision of a
significant alteration being made to property within a platted subdivision, such work was
performed without complying with essential code requirements and, therefore, not performed in
a workmanlike manner which contributed significantly to the later earth movement events.
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 26th day ofJuly, 2011.

( ohn R. ("Hank'") Swift

/

~-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this W day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
BRIAN K. JULIAN
STEPHEN L. ADA..MS
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. MOORE PLAZA
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700
POST OFFICE BOX 7426
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426

CUJ\TTON 0. CASEY
DANIEL J. SKINNER
CANTRlLL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 TYRELL LAI\TE
P.O. BOX 359
BOISE, ID 83701
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[ .P(] U.S. Mail
[ ] FAX(208) 344-5510
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] F edEx Overnight Delivery
[ ] email to sadams@ajhlaw.com
[ ] email to bjulian@ajhlaw.com

[}.(]U.S. Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 345-7212
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ J FedEx Overnight Delivery
[ ] email to CCasey@cssklaw.com
[ ] email to danskinner@cssklaw.com

Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360
Stephen L. Adams, ISB No. 7534
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone:
(208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
bjulian@ ajhlaw .com
sadams@ ajhlaw .com
Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Case No. CV 09-02219
Plaintiff,
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY
OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the
State of Idaho, and its employee LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and
DOES 1 20,
Defendants.

COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw,
by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and hereby submit this Reply
in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1

INTRODUCTION
In reply to Plaintiff's voluminous brief, Defendants will attempt to address the issues of

why summary judgment is appropriate as concisely as possible. Generally, there are a number of
misstatements and improperly cited references to the record. Plaintiff relies significantly on outof-state law to support contentions for which there are Idaho cases directly on point. There is no
evidence that Defendants assumed a duty, nor was there any duty owed as a matter of law to
Plaintiff. Even if there a duty did exist, the immunities under the Idaho Tort Claims act apply,
and the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claims.
Because of the size of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition (referred to hereinafter as
"Response"), Defendants will address each issue in the order outlined in Plaintiff addresses it in
the Response. Throughout this Reply, Sunset Palisades No.4 will be referred to as "SP4", Sunset
Palisades No. 8 as "SP8", Canyon Greens as "CG", and Canyon Greens No.2 as "CG2"

II.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

PLAINTIFF'S MISCHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO
NOT CREATE ISSUES OF FACT THAT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
There are a number of mischaracterizations in Plaintiff's statement of facts which

Defendants believe should be corrected in the record. First, Plaintiff alleges that the City has not
produced records of fill being placed in Sunset Palisades No. 4. Response, p. 4. As Plaintiff
points out, the City has produced the records it has with regard to fill placement. Id. Mr.
Morrison testified that compaction testing was done on that work. Morrison Dep., pp. 25- 26. If
additional fill was placed without permitting, then the City would not have record of it, and
obviously could not turn it over during discovery. The City does not and cannot babysit
developers, who are known, in an effort to save costs, to avoid steps during the development

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2

process. If the City finds out about such discrepancies, including undocumented fill, it addresses
them.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that the Tim Richards memorandum was never placed in the SP8,
CG, or CG2 files. Response, pp. 5-6. Defendants admit this, but contend that the memo was
also never taken out of the SP4 file, which is where Plaintiff found it when he finally decided to
look at the City files. Plaintiff also contends that he "could not have discovered evidence of the
1999 landslide by simply reviewing the City's files on the lots he purchased." Response, p. 12.
This is not an assertion that is grounded in fact. Admittedly, the purchase agreement between
Streibick and Block lists that the purchase was for "Lots 1-4, Sunset Palisades No. 8." Skinner

Aff., Ex. 3. The purchase agreement was signed August 10, 2005. Id; Complaint, 1 11. The
Administrative Plat for Sunset Palisades No.8 was recorded on August 18, 2005. Cutshaw Dep.,
Ex. 45. Until that plat was approved and recorded, the property purchased by Plaintiff was
actually part of SP4, and if Plaintiff had searched any files (which he admits he did not), the
proper files to have searched would have been the SP4 files. Plaintiff knew that SP8 was a
resubdivision of SP4, and so it is extremely disingenuous to say that had he searched the
available files at the time he purchased the property, he would not have found the Tim Richards
memo. This does not create an issue of fact which precludes the entry of summary judgment.
Next, Plaintiff argues that "if the City had disclosed its knowledge of the 1999 landslide
or provided Block copies of the documents and photographs describing the 1999 landslide and
the severity of such, Block may have forgone purchase of the property." Response, p. 13. This
assertion does not work temporally. As discussed above, Block entered a contract for purchase of
the property on August 10, 2005. Skinner Aff., Ex. 3. Block's application to subdivide SP8 into
CG was filed on December 2, 2005. Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 47. There is no evidence before the
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Court that Mr. Block informed the City in August, 2005 that he was purchasing the property (the
City certainly isn't listed as a party on the purchase agreement, see Skinner Aff., Ex. 3)), and
therefore there was no opportunity or reason for the City to inform Block of anything prior to his
purchase of the property. This allegation is not supported by any evidence, does not create an
issue of fact, and is not a grounds to avoid the entry of summary judgment.

B.

THE CITY OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO BLOCK BEFORE HE OWNED THE
PROPERTY.

Plaintiff alleges that the City owed a duty of reasonable care to Mr. Block. Response, pp.
15 - 18. "[D]uty is a question of law to be determined by the court." Summers v. Cambridge
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955 (2004). Contrary to Plaintiff's allegations, in the
context of a governmental entity, the duty owed to a citizen is limited. In discussing a duty,
Plaintiff cites Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399 (1999) (discussing the
elements to consider when a duty arises). See also Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297,
300 (1990); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 (1980). The fact that foreseeability (an
element of whether a duty arises) is often a question of fact reserved for juries, see Stoddart v.
Pocatello Sch. Dist. # 25, 149 Idaho 679, 686 (2010), Idaho case law makes it clear that
summary judgment is still available for governmental entities on the issue of whether a duty
exists. See Stoddart, 149 Idaho at 687. Further, where the duty imposed upon the governmental
entity will be excessive, burdensome, and expensive, Courts will not impose such a duty.
In Summers v. Cambridge ]oint Sch. Dist., 139 Idaho 953 (2004), the Supreme Court

indicated that the duty owed by a School District to a student was limited to the time that the
student was in the District's custody. Summers, 139 Idaho at 956. The same logic should be
applied in this case; the City only owes a duty to Plaintiff related to actions taken while Plaintiff
owns the property. To extend the City's duty beyond that time frame would impose a duty
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against the City for every potential owner of the property, creating an almost unlimited and
debilitating burden upon the City. The Courts only engage in the balancing of the harm outlined
in Sharp and other cases when "called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously
imposed, or when a duty has not previously been recognized." Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846
(1995). If, in Rife and Summers the Supreme Court found that the burden upon school districts
would be debilitating if a duty was owed by them to students off school property after school
hours, see Rife, 127 Idaho at 847, then surely it would be even more debilitating a burden on
cities to impose a duty owed to every future landowner for an action taken at a given time.
Therefore Defendants ask that as a matter of law the Court find that no duty was owed to Block
before he purchased the property.
In this section, Plaintiff blatantly violates the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Plaintiff states

"the City has insurance coverage for its liabilities, a factor that also argues for the imposition of
this duty." Response, p. 18. Regardless of whether availability of insurance is a factor in
determining whether a duty arises, Plaintiff may not use evidence of insurance to show that a
person acted negligently. I.R.E. 411. By attempting to use evidence of insurance to establish a
duty, this is exactly what Plaintiff is doing. Therefore, this evidence and statement should be
stricken from Plaintiff's briefing.

C.

THERE WAS NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BLOCK AND THE
CITY THAT CREATED A DUTY.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that the City owed a duty of care to Block because of a special

relationship between Block and the City. Response, pp. 19 - 22. Plaintiff fails to cite a single
Idaho case showing that there is a special relationship between a citizen and a City that creates a
duty. In fact, the opposite is quite true. The Idaho Supreme Court has already found that there is
no special relationship between a citizen and a governmental agency with regard to inspection of
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property. See Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1008 (1995) (there
must be evidence that the governmental entity sought to induce reliance on the part of the citizen
to create a special relationship). As there is no evidence that the Defendants in any way sought to
induce Block to rely on them, there is no special relationship, and no duty arising.
Plaintiff cites only out-of-state cases addressing this issue, which are not applicable to the
facts of this case. In Rogers v. Toppenish, 23 Wn. App. 554, 555 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), a
property owner asked a City employee a specific question with regard to possibility of building
an apartment on a property, and the City employee incorrectly stated that the property owner
could do so. This set of facts does not apply to this case. Plaintiff did not specifically ask about
the history or zoning of the properties. Instead, he filed a subdivision application. There was
nothing preventing Plaintiff from subdividing SP8 into CG, and thus approving the subdivision
application is not negligent. Plaintiff never requested specific information, and so the City never
had a reason to look up specific information. No duty was created.
The only duty that arose (after Plaintiff purchased the property) was the duty under the
Lewiston Subdivision Code, and that code did not create any obligation of the City to search its
existing, publicly available records to determine every potential problem with the property. It did
not create a duty of the City to uncover every potential problem with the property. It did not
require the City to mandate that Plaintiff have a geotechnical evaluation (specifically giving the
City engineer discretion to require such an evaluation). See Lewiston City Code, §§ 32-9, 32-20,
32-21. There is no evidence that the City did not comply with the requirements of the
Subidivision Code. Plaintiff's only argument is that, in hindsight, the City should not have let
him build on the property. However, based on what was actually known at the time, the City
concluded that both Mr. Streibick and Mr. Block had properly developed the property, and that
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development could proceed. Neither City Engineer Shawn Stubbers nor Lewiston Building
Official Smith knew about the landslide, and there was no obligation in the City code for them to
search the City files to protect Mr. Block against every eventuality. Their decisions were
appropriate under the circumstances.

D.

THE CITY HAS NOT ASSUMED A DUTY TOWARD BLOCK.
Plaintiff alleges that the City assumed a duty toward Block. Response, pp. 22 - 23.

Defendants only admit that there was a duty owed to Block after he purchased the property as
required by City code, and Defendants argue that they complied with that duty. Beyond that,
there was no assumption of duty.
Liability for an assumed duty ... can only come into being to the extent that there
is in fact an undertaking. Although a person can assume a duty to act on a
particular occasion, the duty is limited to the discrete episode in which the aid is
rendered. In other words, past voluntary acts do not entitle the benefited party to
expect assistance on future occasions, at least in the absence of an express
promise that future assistance will be forthcoming.

Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389-390 (2001). The only facts Plaintiff can point to that
tend to show the City assumed a duty was a statement by former City Engineer Tim Richard
made in a newspaper article in 1999. Response, p. 23. Looking at the statement actually made,
no duty toward Plaintiff was created, and even if a duty was created, there was no breach. The
comment made in in the 1999 newspaper article, allegedly by Tim Richard, is not even a quote.

See Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 29. All Tim Richard allegedly said was that the situation would be
documented (there is no doubt that it was documented in the SP4 file), and addressed in the
future (there is no doubt that it was, as Block had to go through the subdivision process in 2005,
and the City complied with the requirements of the City code). Defendants contend that Tim
Richard did not have authority to bind the City to a specific act in the future, and therefore there
was no duty. Assuming the City assumed a duty, it was limited to only what Tim Richard "said".
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The City has complied with what Tim Richard said (documenting and addressing the situation).
Therefore there is no breach.
Plaintiff also alleges that former Public Works Director Bud Van Stone showed that the
City assumed a duty by statements he made during his deposition. Response, p. 23. However,
Bud Van Stone was no longer the Public Works Director after April, 1999. 1 Van Stone Dep., pp.
6

7. It isn't clear that he was the City Public Works Director at the time notice of the slope

movement was provided to the City. There is no evidence that he made any comment or had the
authority in 1999 to bind the City to a course of action. Certainly a comment made by Mr. Van
Stone in his deposition in 2011 cannot bind the City to a duty in 1999 or 2005. Further, Mr. Van
Stone has never been identified as an expert witness in this case, so it is improper to rely on his
testimony as to what the City should have done in 2005, when he quit his job in 1999.
Based on the foregoing, there was no assumed duty toward Mr. Block, and Defendants
request that the Court grant summary judgment on this issue.

E.

THE CITY HAD NO DUTY TO REQUIRE A GEOTECHNICAL EVALUATION.
Plaintiff next alleges that the City was negligent in failing to require a geotechnical

evaluation. Response, pp. 23 - 25. As there was no requirement in the City code that the City
mandate Plaintiff obtain a geotechnical evaluation. The only reason Plaintiff suggests that there
was a duty to require a geotechnical evaluation was because after Lowell Cutshaw retired,
Shawn Stubbers required a geotechnical evaluation on a different property (the "Medley
Subdivision"). Response, p. 24. First, the fact that a later City engineer, under different
circumstances, at a different time, and at a different location, utilized his discretion to require a
geotechnical evaluation does not mean that the City had a duty to require such for Plaintiff in
Mr. Van Stone also worked as interim Public Works director for a short period of time in 2000. Van Stone
Dep., pp. 6-7.
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2005 - 2006. Second, this argument clearly violates I.R.E. 407, as subsequent remedial measures
may not be used to prove liability, which is exactly what Plaintiff is attempting to do. If Mr.
Stubbers was a bit apprehensive as a result of John Block suing the City and required later
developers to perform geotechnical evaluations, it does not mean a duty automatically arose in
Mr. Block's circumstances. Even Plaintiff's expert, Warren Watts, who provided the engineering
work on the Medley Subdivision, stated that he wondered why the City was picking on him and
this development. Watts Dep., pp. 14- 15. Mr. Watts could only think of two times, in all of the
work that he had done within the City of Lewiston, where a geotechnical analysis had been
required. Watts Dep., pp. 12- 13.
As stated above, there is nothing in the Lewiston Subdivision Code that required the City
to mandate that Block perform a geotechnical evaluation. Similarly, there was nothing
preventing Block from getting a geotechnical evaluation on his own, and he chose not to.
Therefore, there is no duty, there has been no breach, and there is no liability for this action.

F.

THE CITY HAD NO DUTY WITH REGARD TO THE OTHER ALLEGATIONS
IN BLOCK'S COMPLAINT.
Plaintiff's Response next address a number of various allegations. Response, pp. 25

32.

Again, Plaintiff relies on the testimony of Bud Van Stone to show that the City violated a duty
with regard to Mr. Block. Response, p. 26. As stated above, Mr. Van Stone was not the City
Public Works Director after April, 1999 (with the exception of an interim period in 2000), and
has no idea what the City's current policies are or were in 2006 with regard to subdivision
review, and so his statements are of no value. He doesn't get to say whether the City did
something wrong in 2005 and 2006, particularly where he is not an expert witness. His
comments do not create an issue of fact, because they are not binding on the City, and created no
assumed duty.
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Next, Plaintiff discusses concerns regarding CG2. Response, p. 28. This property should
not be part of this discussion, as the slope movement did not physically affect that subdivision or
cause any structural damage. Even if there is a duty owed regarding those houses, the only loss
on those houses is economic (loss of value), and this is an issue which will be discussed in more
detail below.
The remainder of the issues brought up in this section relate to actions which occurred to
prior to Block purchasing the property (such as allegedly improperly placed storm water systems,
Response, pp. 28

29, improper fill, id., pp. 29, 31 - 32, improperly placed or constructed

detention ponds, id., pp. 30 - 31 ), which are discussed above. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges
the City should have notified him of these issues, if they were unknown by the City, it couldn't.
If they were known by the City, the issues were properly documented in the files which Plaintiff

chose not to peruse.
Plaintiff relies on the opinion testimony of John Swift to show that each of these actions
contributed to the slope movement. Response, p. 29. Mr. Swift's testimony in his affidavit is
directly contrary to his deposition testimony, in which he said "[W]ithout doing a detailed
investigation, I could not tell you exactly what caused everything that's happened out there."
Swift Dep., pp. 23

24. His current affidavit violates the sham affidavit rule and should be

stricken. In any case, as he has not done a detailed geotechnical investigation, he can't say
exactly what caused the slide, and his affidavit testimony should be disregarded.
Finally, Plaintiff again makes an impermissible argument, stating that "although in
response to 'the John Block issue', the City has begun to identify lots with large amounts of fill
and put the information pertaining to that fill in 'property jackets for future reference."'
Response, p. 31. This argument is a violation of I.R.E. 407, as subsequent remedial measures
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may not be used to prove liability.

G.

PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE WHAT CAUSED HIS DAMAGES.
Plaintiff next alleges that the Defendants caused him damages, as shown by Mr. Swift's

testimony. Response, pp. 32 - 33. Plaintiff argues that an inference must be made that the
Defendants' actions caused him damages because Defendants acted tortiously. Id. However, that
is not how it works; the Court cannot simply "infer" one of the essential elements of Plaintiff's
claims. There must be some evidence of causation, or else an essential element of a negligence
claim is not met. See Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 831 (1997); Nation v. State,
144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007) (essential element of negligence claim is causation); Esterbrook v.

State, 124 Idaho 680, 683 (1993) (burden of proof for negligence is on Plaintiff). The damages,
if any, were caused by the slope movement. The City did not cause the slope movement.
Plaintiff's expert does not know what caused the slope movement. See Swift Dep., pp. 23- 24.
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot prove causation. Absent a scintilla of evidence regarding causation,
no inferences would be appropriate. Fields v. State, 253 P.3d 692 (Idaho 2011). Because
Plaintiff cannot connect the cause of the slope movement with the City's actions, Plaintiff's
negligence claims should be dismissed.

H.

THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants have misunderstood the discretionary function

immunity. Response, pp. 34 - 38. This shows that Plaintiff has misunderstood Defendants'
argument. "In order for an act to be immune under the discretionary function theory, the act must
be discretionary, and must be a planning or policy formation decision. See Dorea Enters. v. City

of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425 (2007). Plaintiff argues that Defendants had a duty to require
him to perform a geotechnical evaluation. Response, pp. 23 - 25. This simply isn't true, and
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there should not be any liability related to claims arising out of the fact that the Defendants did
not require a geotechnical analysis. Defendants contend that prior to 1997, the City did have
mandatory requirements in the subdivision code for geotechnical evaluations. With the passage
of Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, the duty to mandatorily require geotechnical evaluations was
eliminated. See Defendants Statement of Facts,

<J[

5. The passage of Ordinance 4177 was a

discretionary function of the Lewiston City Council, which falls under the exception in I. C. § 6904(1 ). Plaintiff's allegation that this discretionary decision fails to apply to the case is incorrect,
as Plaintiff's main argument is that the City failed to require the geotechnical analysis. Clearly,
the City determined in 1997 that it was the policy of the City to no longer mandatorily require
geotechnical analysis. Therefore, this immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims.
Next, the discretion of the Lewiston Engineer to require a geotechnical analysis is also a
discretionary decision. As Mr. Stubbers points out, he had to consider a large number of factors
in determining whether a geotechnical analysis was worth requiring. See Stubbers Dep., pp. 3738 (type of sewer system at issue, potential failure of fill, discussion with other experts in the
area, review of the PUD agreement, etc.). The fact that the City only required Warren Watts to
do two geotechnical analyses in the time he had been working in the City showed that it was not
the type of decision that was made without significant consideration. Further, the amount of time
that could be spent reviewing a subdivision was limited statutorily, and Mr. Stubbers indicated
that what could be reviewed was limited by staff availability and training, budgetary concerns,
and time. Stubbers Dep., pp. 52. See Dorea Enters. v. City of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 426
(2007). These factors applied to the determination of whether to require a geotechnical analysis
as part of the subdivision review process. Therefore, this was the type of decision to which the
discretionary immunity applies.
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Next, the evidence shows that the decision not to search past files was a discretionary
decision by the City. Plaintiff relies on a statement by Laura Von Tersch that "there is 'very little
traffic in subdivisions"' as a reason why the City acts in an ad hoc way toward subdivision
development. Response, p. 36. This quote by Plaintiff is a gross misstatement of Ms. Von
Tersch's testimony. She is the head of the Community Development Department, which has
relatively little to do with subdivision development. Subdivision development is handled almost
exclusively by the Public Works Department. The person in the Community Development
Department who does address subdivisions is not Ms. Von Tersch. Therefore, her quote, when
read in context, shows that the Community Development Department as a whole has little
involvement in the development process. Von Tersch Dep., pp. 12- 13.
The Public Works Department, on the other hand, has a very straightforward procedure.
Sarah Redenbaugh opens the files, and sends the applications to the appropriate people. Sherri
Kole only puts PUD agreements, previous subdivision plats, and easements in the new file, if any
exist. Kole Dep., pp. 16- 17. They don't copy everything to put it in a new file to avoid having
multiple copies of documents. This practice is not ad hoc, and is the result of the City's policy to
avoid creating too many duplicates.
Each of these actions is a discretionary function. There is no gross negligence exception
to the discretionary function immunity. Defendants and Plaintiff do not disagree about the facts.
Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on this issue.

I.

THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
UNDER I.C. 6-904(7).
Plaintiff's only contention that the immunity under§ 6-904(7) does not apply is because

he contends that there is no "public project" involved. Response, pp. 38 - 40. Plaintiff is
incorrect. This immunity arises whenever there is a plan related to improvements to "other public
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property." Each one of the cases cited by Plaintiff shows that there is public property involved.

Response, p. 39. In this case, there is no doubt that public property is involved. Plaintiff
complains that his damages are related to storm water drains, detention ponds, drainage
improvements, etc. Response, pp. 28- 30. A brief look at the subdivision plats involved shows
that these are all public improvements, easements, dedications, and rights of way. The
Administrative Plat for SP 8 contains roads, storm sewer easements (the same ones complained
of by Plaintiff), a storm drain easement connected to a public easement for a detention pond, and
stream easements. Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 45. The Amended Administrative Plat for SP 8 shows the
same, with additional public easements. Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 46. The Administrative Plat for CG
shows the same, with additional public easements, and specifically shows the detention pond,
which is labeled as "Storm Drain Pond Easement". Cutshaw Dep., Ex. 49. This is the same
detention pond which Plaintiff's expert now alleges should not have been placed at the bottom of
the slope beneath the houses, and yet it was Plaintiff expert Eric Hasenoehrl who requested that
it be moved to its current location, and who put it on the subdivision plats. Id. It is difficult to
comprehend how Plaintiff can conclude that the plats and plans at issue do not contain public
property. A subdivision plat is clearly a "plan or design for construction or improvement to ...
other public property". I.C. § 6-904(7). An easement is a property right, and the easements at
issue are with regard to the storm drains, sewer lines, detention ponds, etc. These are the same
storm drains, sewer lines, and detention ponds that Plaintiff alleges have caused the problems to
his land. The fact that the public easements are over private property does not make the
easements any less public property. Plaintiff does not dispute that all of these plats, with the
public easements clearly marked on them, were approved in advance by the City Counsel.
Plaintiff also fails to dispute that these plats were prepared in substantial conformance with
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engineering or design standards.
As there is no gross negligence exception to § 6-904(7), Defendants request that
summary judgment be granted on all of Plaintiff's negligence claims that arise out of approval of
the plats.
J.

THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IMMUNITY
GROUNDS PURSUANT TO I.C. § 6-904B.
Plaintiff's arguments as to why immunity does not apply under§ 6-904B miss the mark.

Response, pp. 40- 43. Immunity only applies if there is no gross negligence or reckless, willful

and wanton conduct. I.C. § 6-904B. Plaintiff alleges that there is gross negligence because the
City should have been aware that it was its duty to notify Block of the landslide in 1999.
Response, p. 41. As discussed above, no such duty exists. The City does not and cannot warn

every developer of every known and unknown problem with property. The City does not take
upon itself to give notice to a potential property purchaser of every defect with the property; that
is the duty of the seller. It is unclear how the City could have given Plaintiff notice before he
purchased the property. Plaintiff signed the purchase documents on August 10, 2005, and did not
submit a subdivision application until December, 2005. The City did not have any duty to notify
Plaintiff of problems before he purchased the property, and did not owe him any duty to take any
specific actions with regard to the property until Plaintiff submitted a subdivision plat.
Therefore, there was no gross negligence, because the Defendants could not have been
inescapably drawn to recognize a duty to Plaintiff prior to him purchasing the property. The only
duty which arose after purchasing the property was outlined in the Lewiston Subdivision Code,
and Plaintiff has not alleged that the subdivision code has been breached. Further, there can be
no reckless, willful and wanton conduct, because no one knew whether developing the property
would result in a high degree of probability that harm would result. See I.C. § 6-904C(2). Even
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Plaintiff's expert does not know what caused the slope movement, so it cannot be said with
certainty that any harm was expected at all. Therefore, the immunity cannot be overcome on
these grounds.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the immunity does not bar negligent supervisiOn claims,
relying on Sherer v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. # 25, 143 Idaho 486 (2006). There are a number of
cases that plaintiffs often rely on to stand for the proposition that they can avoid immunity by
pleading negligent supervision. See Sherer, 143 Idaho at 491; Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,
472 (1986); Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. # 25, 149 Idaho 679 (2010). The first problem with
this argument is that it applies only to /.C. § 6-904A(2). In every case where the plaintiff
attempts to avoid immunity using negligent supervision as a claim instead of negligence, the
immunity at issues is § 6-904A(2). See Mareci v. Coeur D'Alene Sch. Dist. No. 271, 250 P.3d
791, 794 (Idaho 2011); Coonse by & ex ref. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803, 806
(1999). The § 6-904A(2) immunity is not applicable to or at issue in this case.
Second, the Supreme Court has held numerous times that liability cannot be avoided by
clever pleading. See Coonse by & ex rel. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803, 806 (1999)
("a plaintiff could, in many cases, avoid the effect of [the immunity] by simply drafting the
complaint to allege negligent supervision of the claimant," which is contrary to the purpose of
the immunity). The statute clearly states that the immunity applies to any claim which "arises out
of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an inadequate inspection of any real
property." J.C. § 6-904B(4). Whether Plaintiff calls it negligent supervision or negligent
inspection, it is the same. Defendants contend that the immunities apply.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he will prove that "the City knew there had been a landslide
in 1999 and had record of such in its files." Response, p. 43. First, there is no dispute that the
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Tim Richards memo was in the SP 4 file. The only issue is whether Defendants had an obligation
to go searching through a publicly available file to tell Plaintiff everything that was wrong with
the property. There is no such requirement under the Lewistion Subdivision Code. In any case,
Defendants contend that it could not do so with the time constraints imposed and limited
manpower available. Therefore, there is no issue of fact preventing the entry of summary
judgment on immunity grounds pursuant to I. C. § 6-904B.

K.

THE CITY HAD NO DUTY TO PROTECT THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF
PLAINTIFF JOHN BLOCK.
Plaintiff contends that the damage at issue in this case is property damage, and therefore

recoverable. Response, p. 43. Defendants disagree. Under Idaho law, all of Plaintiff's damages
are economic damage, and therefore Defendants had no duty to protect against its loss. Plaintiff
attempts to persuade the court that the property damaged was not the "subject of the transaction"
at issue. Response, pp. 44- 45. This characterization is incorrect. Defendants and Plaintiff agree
that the "subject of the transaction" in this case was the purchase of the lots. Response, p. 44;
Complaint,~[

11; Skinner Aff, Ex. 3. These lots include all of SP8, which was later subdivided

into CG and CG2. The land had a defect in it when purchased. This is comparable with the
defective duplexes in Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37 (1987), the defective seed potatoes
in Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995), the defective
concrete slab in Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299 (2005), and the defective
airplane engine in Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196 (1999). There was no negligently
performed personal services at issue as in Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 244
P.3d 166, 170 (2010), so that analysis does not apply.
The issue then becomes whether the damages to the houses later built on the property
constitute property damage. Plaintiff contends that the houses, retaining walls, fences,
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foundations, etc., are "clearly non-transactional property", and thus any damage to them
constitutes property damage. Response, p. 44. Plaintiff relies on Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys.,
147 Idaho 785 (2009) to show that there is an issue of fact precluding the entry of summary
judgment. However, Aardema does not apply. In Aardema, there was a dispute as to whether the
"subject of the transaction" was cows or milking machines. Id. at 791. Even though the Supreme
Court found that it was clear that the subject of the transaction was the milking machines, it also
found that there was an issue of fact regarding whether the milking machines damaged the cows,
an already existing property on which the milking machines were to be used. Id. There is no such
issue of fact in this case. All agree that the subject of the transaction was the property, to which
Plaintiff planned improvements.
Plaintiff also relies on a number of non-Idaho cases to show that the houses and other
improvements to the property do not fall within the definition of economic loss. Response, p. 45.
This is disingenuous. Plaintiff admits that he bought the lots with the intent of improving them.

Block Dep., p. 87. The Idaho definition of economic loss "includes costs of repair and
replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial
loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman

Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351 (1975). The houses, pools, retaining walls, etc.
were not pre-existing property which was damaged by the slope movement (which would be
identical to the issues in Aardema). The houses, pools, retaining walls, etc. were added to the
property so that Block could sell the property at a profit. Thus, when the land suffered the slope
movement, the damage to the houses, pools, etc. was not property damage, but was "loss of
profit or use." Plaintiff cannot rely on an Arizona case or a United States Supreme Court case 2

2

See Response, p. 45.
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which provide for a different rule than the clearly stated Idaho rule.
The analysis in the Aardema and Brian & Christie, Inc. cases only apply if 1) there is
damage to property outside the "subject of the transaction" whether caused by the defect in the
subject matter of the transaction or some external factor, or 2) the "subject of the transaction" is a
service, as opposed to a defective property. Neither of these factual scenarios applies to this case.
There is no aspect of Plaintiff's damages that is not economic. The damage to CG was caused by
the defect in the property (which was the "subject of the transaction"), and is therefore economic.
Plaintiff's only explanation as to why he should get damages on the CG2 houses and the business
loss is because they are "parasitic to an injury to person or property." Response, p. 46. But the
only alleged property damage was on the 153, 155, and 159 properties, which, as discussed
above, were improvements made for profit, and therefore are economic loss. When you consider
that Plaintiff admits he purchased the defective property with the intent of improving the
property, then it is clear that the improvements become an integral part of the "subject of the
transaction". 3
If Plaintiff's interpretation of the economic loss rule were to be adopted, it would deprive
the economic loss rule of any force. Under Plaintiff's theory, any improvement to a property that
is the "subject of the transaction" constitutes new and separate property. In other words, all a
party would have to do to avoid the economic loss rule, in its entirety, would be to "improve" the
"subject of the transaction." Under Plaintiff's interpretation, when the improvement is damaged
by the defect in the property, the economic loss rule would be invalidated because there was
"property damage" to the improvement. A party could purchase a defective piece of property,
It should be noted that according to the purchase order, Plaintiff purchased all four lots of SP8 at the same
time. Even though this was broken up into two separate subdivisions later on, the block of land Plaintiff
purchased was defective. Therefore, CG2 was defective when purchased, and was part of the "subject -of
the transaction". It cannot be considered separately from CG, even though it is a separate subdivision and
suffered no slope movement or damage itself.
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build a concrete slab on it, and wait for the slab to be damaged, and then claim damage of
"separate property", voiding the effectiveness of the economic loss rule. All economic loss
would become parasitic to the damage to the improvement, and the economic loss rule would be
void. However, this interpretation does not fit with existing Idaho case law.
Defendants agree that "Property damage encompasses damage to property other than that
which is the subject of the transaction." Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196 (1999). This must,
by definition, include improvements to the "subject of the transaction", or else the economic loss
rule will be easily circumvented. If Plaintiff's interpretation is correct, then Duffin was decided
incorrectly. The plaintiffs in that case purchased defective potato seeds, which they planted.

Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1005 (1995). The seed potatoes
grew new potatoes (the improvement), which were damaged by the defect in the seed potatoes.
Under Plaintiff's theory, the economic loss rule should not have applied, because the "subject of
the transaction" was the seed potatoes, not the new potatoes, which were damaged. Under
Plaintiff's theory, the new potatoes were new and separate property, and therefore damage to
them would have been "property damage".
The same is true in Blahd, where after purchasing the house, the plaintiffs remodeled and
"improved" the property, including placing slate tile in the house, which slate tile later cracked
and damaged. Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299 (2005). Under Plaintiff's
theory, the addition of slate tiles was new property, and the damage to the slate tile would have
been "property damage" other than to the subject of the transaction. The same is true in Tusch

Enters., where after purchasing duplexes, the plaintiff spent money and time improving the
duplexes. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40 (1987). The same is true in Mitchell Constr.

Co., where the damaged property was a roof for a building, which could not be put on the
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building because it was defective. State v..Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336 (1984).
In each of these cases, if Plaintiff's analysis were to be applied, the economic loss rule

should not have been available because there was damage to "improvements" to the subject of
the transaction, which constituted damage to separate property. However, in each of these cases,
the economic loss rule was appropriately invoked, and summary judgment was granted. The only
conclusion can be that the "subject of the transaction" includes any improvements, and that
damage to the improvements is the same as damage to the "subject of the transaction". The scope
of the improvements (from an entire potato crop in Duffin to some slate tile in a basement in

Blahd) does not change an improvement to separate property. Therefore, the economic loss rule
applies to not only the physical damage to 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Dr., but also to all
improvements on the properties, including houses, pools, retaining walls, etc. It also applies to
the business losses and lost profits on the undamaged houses in CG2 (which were also the
subject of the transaction). As all of Plaintiff's damages arise out of damage to subject of the
transaction, the economic loss rule applies to all of Plaintiff's damages.
Based on the foregoing, the economic loss rule is properly invoked. The only actual
physical damage which occurred, by Plaintiff's own admission, occurred to improvements to the
land. Response, p. 45. Damages to these improvements are nothing more than "loss of profits",
encompassed within the economic loss rule. As Plaintiff fails to argue that there is any applicable
exception to the economic loss rule, Defendants request that summary judgment be granted on
all of Plaintiff's claims.
L.

THE SUIT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The facts with regard to the statute of limitations are undisputed. A highly publicized

landslide occurred within SP4 in 1999. Documentary evidence of this landslide was placed in the
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City files in 1999. Plaintiff purchased the defective property at issue in 2005, without looking at
any City files. The houses at 153, 155, and 159 allegedly suffered damage in October, 2007, and
again in 2009 as a result of the defect in the property. Plaintiff was therefore damaged when he
purchased the property, and was on constructive notice of the defect to the property when he
purchased it (the documentary evidence of the defect was in a public document available to him
which he chose not to look at). Therefore, the statute of limitations, pursuant to I.C. § 6-911,
began running as of August 10, 2005. He is time barred from bringing any claims against the
City.

III.
CONCLUSION

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. There is no evidence
that Lowell Cutshaw or any Lewiston employee had any duty toward Block other than what was
owed under the Lewiston Subdivision Code. This code was complied with. Further, there is no
evidence that the City, Cutshaw, or anyone else acted with gross negligence or reckless, willful
and wanton conduct. Plaintiff has should not recover against these Defendants, and summary
judgment should be entered on the issues outlined above.

DATED this

day of August, 2011.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

Brian K. Julian,
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer
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STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF DEFENDA...~T JACK J. STREIBICK, A
SINGLE MAN AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MAUREEN
F. STREIBICK- I

Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King LLP, appearing for the Defendants Jack J. Streibick,
individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Maureen Streibick, that the aboveentitled action be dismissed against said Defendants with prejudice, on the ground and for the
reason that the same has been fully settled and compromised, all parties to bear their OVvTI costs
and attorney fees.
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Counsel for Defendant Jack Streibick
And The Estate of Maureen Streibick

0. Casey
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan

STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF DEFENDA,.~T JACK J. STREIBICK, A
SINGLE MAN .t\ND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MAUREEN
F. STREIBICK- 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Aif

I hereby certify that on the
J /- day of
d
, 20 11 , I served a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by me od indicated below, upon:
Ronald Landeck
Attorney at Law
693 Styner A venue
PO Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
Attorney for Plaintiffs

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile 208-883-4593
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

Brian K. Julian
Stephen L. Adams
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
Attorney for Defendants City of Lewiston
and Lowell J Cutshaw, City Engineer

[]
[]
[X]

Facsimile 208-344-5510
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

Clinto

STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREWDICE OF DEFENDANT JACK J. STREIBICK, A
SINGLE MAN AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MAUREEN
F. STREIBICK- 3

L

Clinton 0. Casey, ISB #4333
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP
1423 Tyrell Lane
P. 0. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 344-8035
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212
Attorneys for Defendant, Jack J. Streibick,
individually and as personal representative of
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho,
and its employees, LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer,
and DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and this does ORDER that the above-entitled action be
dismissed with prejudice as to Defendant Jack J. Streibick, a single man and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, on the ground and for the reason that the
same has been fully compromised and settled, the parties to bear their own costs and attorney
fees.
DATED this
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK )
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative
)
of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
)
)
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, )
and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, )
City of Lewiston, Engineer, and DOES 1-20,)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. CV-09-02219
AMENDED
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR
TRIAL Al\TD PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named case be set for JURY TRIAL
before the Honorable CARL B. KERRICK, District Judge, at the Nez Perce County
Courthouse, at Lewiston, Idaho, at the hour of9:00 a.m. on the 6th day of February, 2012,
for EIGHT to TEN (8-1 0) days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following:
supplemental disclosure of Defendant's expert witnesses, including
compliance with IRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i), shall be on or before September 9, 2011;

AMENDED ORDER SETTING
CASE FOR TRIAL AND
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
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all discovery shall be completed by December 9, 2011;
that a pre-trial conference shall be held on January 27, 2012, at the hour of
10:00 a.m. Lead counsel trying the case must be present at the pre-trial conference.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party shall:
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pre-trial
hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses asserted by
that party:
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial
conference to be marked;
3)

Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared to
submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing;

4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibits or to make
specific objections to its admissibility;
5) Furnish opposing counsel with the names and addresses of all
witnesses, the nature their testimony, experts' reports, and like
instruments, and complete all other matter which may expedite both
the pre-trial and trial of this case:
6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement;
7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions of law relied
upon:

AMENDED ORDER SETTING
CASE FOR TRIAL AND
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
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8) Submit to the court and counsel a copy of all jury instructions counsel
intends to request. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies,
one copy containing citations of authority and one copy suitable for
submission to the jury. The Court uses the following instructions from
IDJI and it is not necessary for counsel to submit them: 1.00, 1.01,
1.03, 1.03.1, 1.09, 1.11, 1.13, 1.15.1, 1.15.2, 1.17, 1.20.1, 1.20.2,
1.24.1, 1.24.2, and 9.00.
DATED this

/6rz...day of August, 2011.

(Li(3L
CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge
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Moscow, ID 83843

Brian K. Julian
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Anderson, Julian & Hull
C.W. Moore Plaza
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,

)
) Case No. CV 09-02219
)
Plaintiff,
) NOTICE OF CITATION OF
) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY
vs.
)
)
)
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK J.
)
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY OF )
LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the State of )
Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, )
City of Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1-20,
)
Defendants.
)

-------------------------------- )
Plaintiff John G. Block, through counsel, hereby provides citation of its additional authority
in support of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Memorandum"), as follows:
1.

Dale D. Goble, All Along the Watchtower: Economic Loss in Tort (The Idaho Case

NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY- 1

Law), 34 Idaho L. Rev. 225 (1998) (Exhibit A) (pertains to economic loss issue; Plaintiffs
Memorandum, pp. 43-46).
2.

Jackson v. City ofSeattle, 158 Wash. App. 647, 655-60,244 P.3d 425,430-32

(2010) (Exhibit B) (pertains to duty and economic loss issues; Plaintiffs Memorandum, pp. 25-32,
43-46).
3.

Udyv. CusterCounty, 136Idaho386,388-89,34P.3d 1069, 1071-72(2001)

(Exhibit C) (pertains to duty issue; Plaintiffs Memorandum, pp. 17-22, 23-32).
4.

Adams v. United States, 2010 WL 1248286, *2-*3 (D. Idaho) (Exhibit D) (pertains

to economic loss issue; Plaintiffs Memorandum, pp. 43-46).
DATED this 24th day of August, 2011.
LANDECK & FORSETH

By:~~
Danelle C. Forseth
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
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250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700
POST OFFICE BOX 7426
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426
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*226 I. INTRODUCTION
Recovery of solely economic losses in tort is problematic. There is an often-expressed concern that, if economic loss
were recoverable in tort, "contract law would drown in a sea of tort." [FNI] There is also a belief that "[p]ermitting recovery of all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make a [tortfeasor] liable for vast sums." [FN2] Set off
against such concerns is the tenet that "[t)he risk reasonably to be perceived defmes the duty to be obeyed." [FN3] The
tension among these viewpoints and the policies and perspectives underlying the respective domains of tort and contract
have combined to produce a rich and sometimes-contradictory body of case law.
The dissension between tort and contract reflects in part alternative approaches to structuring human relations. Tort is
a domain of socially imposed duties; contract, on the other hand, is based on nominally consensual duties created by
agreement. Tort establishes and enforces those safety requirements society deems minimally necessary; contract enforces
representations of the quality of the things to be exchanged between the parties. Tort generally - though not always - requires fault (negligence or intent) as a predicate of liability; contract does not require fault, only a failure to perform the
obligation as warranted. Tort protects interests in person, property, and relations by providing remedies designed to restore the status quo ante; contract protects the expectations of the parties at the time of the promise by providing benefitof-the-bargain remedies. In short, tort protects existing interests and entitlements against intrusions, while *227 contract
permits the reallocation of those entitlements. In a society where ideas of individual autonomy often masquerade as
founding principles, the socially imposed duties of tort may seem less congenial than the personally assumed duties of
contract. This is particularly likely in an age when the myth of the individual is again abroad in the land and the glorification of self-interest and laissez-faire ideology is the order of the day. [FN4] The choice has a broader dimension as welL
As Grant Gilmore noted, a legal system that emphasizes freedom of contract "must ultimately work to the benefit of the
rich and powerful, who are in a position to look after themselves." [FN5]
One of the leading Idaho cases on the recovery of economic loss in tort - Clark v. International Harvester Co. [FN6] strikes a balance between tort concerns for safety and contract's focus on quality:
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor that does not harm person
or property. If the defendant fails to exercise such due care it is of course liable for the resulting injury to person or
property as well as other losses which naturally follow from that injury. However, the law of negligence does not
impose on International Harvester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and breaks down infrequently
enough for Clark to make a profit in his custom farming business. This is not to say that such a duty could not
arise by a warranty - express or implied - by agreement of the parties or by representations of the defendant, but
the law of negligence imposes no such duty. [FN7]
As the court states, one marker along the boundary between the realms of tort and contract is the nature of the loss
plaintiff suffers: [FN8J as a general rule, a person who suffers "pure" economic loss [FN9J cannot *228 recover in tort;
recovery for such losses is restricted to contract. More formally, there generally is no tort duty to avoid conduct that
causes only economic harm; duty to prevent economic harm must generally be assumed in contract. When a person suffers neither personal injury nor property damage - when she seeks to recover pure economic losses - the rationale for tort
recovery is at its weakest because the plaintiff and her property were not endangered. In such cases, leaving the parties to
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their bargained-for agreement reinforces the core principles of both domains of law: disappointed but not endangered
plaintiffs are relegated to contract and their agreed-upon responsibilities.
Not all cases involving pure economic loss implicate the tort/contract boundary. The absence of a contract between
the parties renders the boundary issues largely irrelevant. That is, contract is not implicated when the parties are not in
privity. Although this now seems obvious, it was not always understood. In fact, until the first decades of this century,
the existence of a contract for the sale of product served to preclude the manufacturer's liability to a person not in privity
with the manufacturer even for physical injuries to that person. [FNlO] In the leading case - Winterbottom v. Wright
[FNll J - the court held that plaintiff, a coachman, could not sue the repairer of the stagecoach he was driving when its
wheel fell off, laming him. The court thought the possible liability too expansive:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any
person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach might bring a similar action. Unless
we confme the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue. [FN12]
It was more than seventy years before Benjamin Cardozo authored MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. [FNI3] holding
that the driver of an automobile could sue the remote manufacturer in tort for injuries when the wheel fell off his car:
*229 We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it
ought to be. We have put its source in the law. [FN14]
Although the court in Winterbottom relied on the contract between the owner of the stagecoach and its repairer, it did
so for liability-limitation reasons. The court did not fear the demise of contract but rather the unlimited damages that tort
seemingly allowed: "[I]f the (driver of the coachJ can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road,
who was injured by the upsetting of the coach might bring a similar action." [FN15] Privity of contract was important because it served to limit liability, not because the prohibition against a tort action reinforced contract principles. Similar
concerns with unlimited liability still motivate courts. In a companion case to Clark - Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co. [FNI6]- the Idaho Supreme Court noted:
Though the rule [against recovery of pure economic loss] has been expressed in different ways, the common
underlying pragmatic consideration is that a contrary rule, which would allow compensation for losses of economic advantage caused by the defendant's negligence, would impose too heayy and unpredictable a burden on the defendant's conduct.
. . . In contrast to the recognized liability for personal injuries and property damage, with its inherent limitations of size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open
- ended. [FN17]
Economic loss cases thus may implicate two different concerns. On the one hand, when there is a contract between
the parties, the socially imposed duties of tort are a potential threat to the bargained-for duties of contract: contract may
"drown in a sea of tort." [FN18] On the other hand, when there is no contract between the parties, the expansive, rippling-circle of potential economic loss with its specter of unlimited *230 and disproportionate liability gives courts justifiable pause. [FN19] Although pure economic loss is present in both situations, the rationales for denying recovery are
markedly different in the two situations.

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY

http://web2. westlaw.com/printlprintstream.aspx?mt=BusinessPrac&utid=2&prft=HTMLE...

Page 5 of 46

34 IDLR225
34 Idaho L. Rev. 225

PageS

At the same time, the per se rule against the recovery of economic loss in tort has long been riddled with exceptions,
qualifications, and clarifications. This not only demonstrates the degree to which Idaho courts are uncomfortable with a
per se no-duty rule, it also reveals the degree to which the nonliability rule is artificial when "[t]he risk reasonably to be
perceived defmes the duty to be obeyed." [FN20]
A recent decision by the Idaho Supreme Court- Duffm v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n [FN21] - offers an opportunity to review the Idaho caseload on recovery for economic losses in tort. The court in Duffm presented its own review
of the case law, concluding that the cases present "a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in all
negligence actions" subject to two exceptions. [FN22] A more comprehensive review will demonstrate, however, that the
law is actually a good deal less tidy than the court suggests.
II. DUFFIN v. IDAHO CROP IMPROVEMENT ASS'N
Eric and Melanie Duffm grew potatoes on their farm near Aberdeen, Idaho. Following discussions with the president
of Crater Farms, Inc. (CFI), the Duffms agreed to plant seed potatoes produced by CFI if the seed was "certified." Certification is conferred by the Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA), the delegatee of certain statutory authorities
conferred on the University of Idaho. The certification program is intended to maintain genetic purity and to ensure that
L~e seed is free of diseases and pests; it is conferred after a series of inspections and tests. ICIA certified the CFI seed
potatoes; CFI delivered the potatoes to the Duffms in March and early April, 1988. At the end of April, however, an additional ICIA inspection determined that the CFI potatoes were infected with bacterial ring rot. ICIA therefore informed
CFI that no further shipments could be sold as certified. Neither CFI nor ICIA informed the Duffms of the problem. The
Duffms subsequently discovered that their crop was also infected. They brought suit against CFI on various contractual
theories and *231 against !CIA for negligence, alleging that they had suffered three types of economic losses:
(1) the excess of the price paid for the seed because it was "certified"; (2) lost revenues which resulted from
reduced yields; and (3) lost revenues which resulted from having to sell the crop immediately upon harvest, rather
than by way of the more lucrative contracts the Duffms had already negotiated, or by waiting until the open market
prices were higher. [FN23]
The trial court granted ICIA summary judgment, holding that the Duffins' claim was for pure economic loss and thus
could not be recovered in a tort action [FN24] and that the Duffms could not recover for negligent misrepresentation.
[FN25] The Duffms appealed the dismissal of ICIA; the supreme court reversed the trial court's decision on the economic
loss issue but affrrmed its decision on negligent misrepresentation.
The supreme court began its analysis of the economic-loss issue with the two cases that defme the issue in Idaho,
Clark v. International Harvester Co. [FN26] and Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co. [FN27] The court concluded
that the decisions precluded recovery for pure economic loss in tort because in such cases "the defendant's conduct did
not invade an interest of the plaintiff to which the law of negligence extended its protection." [FN28] That is, there was
no duty in tort to avoid conduct that invades an exclusively economic interest: "Following Just's," the court wrote, "this
Court has adhered to a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in all negligence actions." [FN29J
This general rule applied only to "pure" economic loss. Economic losses are recoverable when they are accompanied
by either personal injury or property damage. [FN30J Thus, if the Duffins had suffered either *232 personal injuries or
property damage, they could also recover for any economic losses arising from the same event. The distinction between
"pure economic loss" and other economic loss required the court to distinguish between personal injury, property damage, and economic loss. It did so by reaffmning a distinction initially armounced in Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.: [FN31] damage to property that was the basis of the transaction between the parties is eco-
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nomic loss while damage to non-transactional property is property damage. Since the damage in Duffin was to the seed
potatoes that were the basis of the transaction among the parties, the court held that the damages were economic loss
rather than property damage. And since that loss was not accompanied by either personal injuries or property damage it
presumptively fell within the ~eneral rule against the recovery of pure economic loss in tort.
The rule against recovery of pure economic loss is not, however, absolute. The court therefore turned to two exceptions to the general rule against recovery of economic loss in tort that it recognized.
The court's first exception - that economic loss "might be recovered in tort where the occurrence of a unique circumstance requires a different allocation of the risk" [FN32] - is enigmatic. At a trivial level, of course, all cases present "a
unique circumstance" - what Paul Simon has aptly called "the myth of fmgerprints." [FN33] Presumably some "unique
circumstances" are important and others are not. The court, however, fails to offer anything beyond a citation to Just's
[FN34] and the assertion that "the certification of seed potatoes is not a 'unique circumstance' requiring a reallocation of
the risk." [FN35] Neither the enigmatic phrase nor the mere assertion of its inapplicability are of much assistance in determining the content or the scope of the exception.
The second exception, the court stated, "is applicable in cases involving a 'special relationship' between the parties."
[FN36] It was this exception that the court found applicable in Duffin:
*233 ICIA has held itself out as having expertise in the performance of a specialized function (and] ... it has
engaged in a marketing campaign ... the very purpose of which is to i..rtduce reliance by purchasers on the fact that
seed has been certified. Under such circumstances, ICIA occupies a special relationship with t.hose whose reliance
it has knowingly induced. [FN37]
This relationship between ICIA and the Duffms imposed a tort duty on ICIA to take care to protect the Duffrns from
economic loss. The court, therefore, reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
The Duffrns also brought a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The district court granted defendants a summary
judgment on this claim; the supreme court affrrmed summarily: "we expressly hold that, except in the narrow confmes of
a professional relationship involving an accountant, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho."
[FN38]
The Idaho Supreme Court used Duffm to summarize the case law on recovery for economic loss in tort. In the court's
analysis, although economic loss may be recovered when a plaintiff has also suffered either personal injury or property
damage, it generally may not be recovered when it is the only loss suffered. Such losses - "pure" economic losses - may
be recovered in tort in only two situations: when there is an undefrned "unique circumstance" that requires a different allocation of the risk and when there is a "special relationship" between the parties. Finally, the court independently discussed and sharply limited the possible reach of the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
The court's decision in Duffrn offers an accessible overview of the legal issues presented by economic loss. The
court's preliminary map of the borderlands between contract-based and tort-based claims is, however, markedly incomplete. Rather than the relatively well-defrned domains it presents, the borderlands are a contested region of indistinct and
shifting frontiers. To understand this terrain, it is helpful *234 to begin with an examination of the question of what
counts as "economic loss."
ill. UNCERTAINlY AT THE BORDER OF ECONOMIC LOSS AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
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Tort damages come in three varieties: personal injury, property damage, and economic loss. In most cases, the classification of losses presents no conceptual difficulties: the driver of a delivery truck runs a stop sign and hits a car
(property damage), injuring its driver (personal injuries), and causing the driver to miss work while recuperating
(economic loss); a passenger in the car - although not injured - misses an important meeting and loses a sale (economic
loss). In such cases, "economic loss" presents no defmitional issues: lost wages, lost profits, and the like are all "economic."
Although the distinction between personal injury and other losses is clear- both factually and ethically [FN39] - the
line between property damage and economic loss is more problematic because the two types of loss may overlap - sometimes substantially. The most significant area of overlap involves injury to a product. For example, if the delivery truck
had been damaged in a single-vehicle accident caused by the failure of its own brakes, is the damage "property damage"
or "economic loss" in a suit against the product seller? In other words: does the existence of a contract between the
parties affect the characterization of the type of loss? If the delivery truck had been a car would the claim be for property
damage? That is: does the fact that the property is held to produce income rather than for personal use, affect the characterization of the type of loss? What is the justification if such external factors affect the characterization of the type of loss?
As the court noted in Duffin, [FN40] the distinction between economic loss and property damage was given its
present contours in Idaho in Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co. [FN41] The case was brought
by the purchaser of an airplane to recover for extensive damages to the plane caused by engine failure during takeoff.
Differing statutes of limitations required the court to distinguish between tort and contract actions - which in turn led the
court to distinguish *235 between personal injuries, property damage, and economic loss:
Although personal injuries stand distinctly apart from the other two categories, a delineation between the latter two is
necessary. Property damage encompasses damage to property other than that which is the subject of the transaction. Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well
as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use. [FN42]
The court in Salmon Rivers thus drew the line between property damage and economic loss based on the identity of
the property: if the property that is damaged is the subject of the transaction - the delivery truck that crashes due to brake
failure - the loss is "economic." The airplane engine that failed causing the craft to crash in Salmon Rivers thus was economic loss. [FN43) Similarly, a tractor that was underpowered, [FN44J a roof coating that failed to perform, [FN45] and
a rental unit with substantial structural problems [FN46] were economic losses in suits against sellers and manufacturers
of the products. It is only when other, non-transactional property is injured that the loss is "property damage."
Although the court enunciated a bright-line rule, its subsequent decisions have dimmed the distinction. The court has
on occasion treated the loss of transactional property as property damage and on others has interpreted injury to nontransactional property as economic loss. For example, in Oppenheimer Industries v. Johnson Cattle Co., [FN47) plaintiff
sought to recover in negligence for the failure of a state brand inspector to demand proof of ownership of cattle being
offered for sale. Under the State Brand Board's regulations, the inspector was required to demand proof of ownership
when the brands on the cattle were "fresh." Despite the presence of fresh brands, the inspector failed to demand proof of
ownership - and the seller was in fact a cattle rustler. The court allowed the negligence claim despite the fact that the loss
involved property that was the subject of the transaction. It did so, not on the ground that the claim fell within an exception to the general no-duty rule, but rather on the ground that the injury was not economic loss: "Oppenheimer is not still
in possession of defective *236 goods. Rather, Oppenheimer has suffered the loss of its property (i.e. the cattle) due to
the negligence of the deputy brand inspector." [FN48] Since the loss was property da..'llage, a negligence action was per-
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missible.
As the court in Duffin tacitly acknowledged, Oppenheimer's distinction between lost and damaged property is logically insupportable. [FN49] If a defective product entirely self-destructs - if the engine failure had demolished the airplane
in Salmon Rivers rather than merely damaged it - would the loss thereby be transmuted into property damage? Or would
the fact that the owner still had possession of the wreckage be sufficient to prevent a claim for property damage? If the
crash had caused a loss of only ninety-five percent of the value, would the claim therefore be one for economic loss? A
distinction that turns on such fortuitous results is nonsensical.

The court has also wobbled in the opposite direction, refusing to allow tort claims in situations where nontransactional property was damaged. For example, in G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., [FN50] plaintiff purchased an
irrigation system that failed to deliver the necessary volume of water; plaintiff suffered reduced crop yields. The damage
thus was to non-transactional property the growing crops - rather than to the transactional property - the irrigation system. Nonetheless, the court asserted that this was an economic loss and refused to allow a negligence claim.
Although the G & M Farms decision is inconsistent with the defmition announced in Salmon Rivers and reaffirmed
in Duffm, it is eminently reasonable: the irrigation system was purchased in the course of the commercial endeavor of
producing crops. The plaintiff hoped to make a profit from sale of the crop; the damages sought were not intended to replace the damaged property, but rather to compensate the company for its lost profits. The court would have exalted form
over substance if it had focused on the fact that crops were non-transactional property and held the injury to be property
drunage. [FN51]
*237 A subsequent decision by the court of appeals offers a rationale for decisions such as G & M Farms. In Myers
v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, [FN52] milk production at a dairy farm was reduced by problems with a feed storage
and delivery system. The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on the tort claims, concluding
that only economic loss was involved and that such losses could not be recovered in a tort action. Although the court of
appeals cited the supreme court's defmition of "economic loss" from Salmon Rivers, it acknowledged that the Myers'
losses did not fall within that defmition. Instead, the court recast the term: "Arguably, the Myers did allege property
damage resulting from a defective product. However, these injuries did not result from a calamitous event or dangerous
failure of the product. Rather, they arose from the failure of the product to match the buyers' commercial expectations."
[FN53] Disappointed but not endangered purchasers are to be left to their contract remedies. The court therefore upheld
the summary judgment on the tort claims.
The defmition of pure economic loss as applied to damage to tangible property thus is more complicated than the
court acknowledged in Duffm. Salmon Rivers as modified by Myers distinguishes "economic loss" from "property damage" on the basis of two factors: first, damage to property that is the subject of the transaction forming the basis of the
suit is economic loss - regardless of the manner in which the loss occurred; [FN54] second, damage to other, nontransactional property is economic loss when the damage occurs through a non-calamitous event or a non-dangerous failure. [FN55] Stated from the opposite perspective: to be classified as property damage rather than economic loss, the
property must be both non-transactional property and damaged as a result of a calamitous event or a dangerous failure.
The Idaho courts have been less than clear on the principles underlying these defmitional lines. Since tort is concerned with safety, the prohibition of tort claims for non-calamitous losses to non-*238 transactional property such as
those in G & M Farms and Myers is consistent with policy underlying this body of law. Similarly, as the court of appeals
noted in Myers, contract principles are applicable to non-calamitous losses to non-transactional property since such
claims are "for lost profits and consequential business losses" resulting from an ineffective product. [FN56] These are the
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types of losses that are appropriately addressed within a contract framework - a framework that has been developed precisely to allocate business losses. [FN57J The refusal to allow claims for such losses to be brought in tort thus accords
with both fundamental tort principles - since safety was not at issue - as well as fundamental contract principles - since
the allocation of such business losses is the raison d'etre for contract damage rules.
The absolute prohibition against recovering for damage to transactional property, on the other hand, is more problematic. For example, if plaintiff purchases an airplane that crashes, the fact that plaintiff is miraculously uninjured seems
fortuitous - and the line prohibiting a tort claim seems on it face unprincipled. Nonetheless, on such facts the court in
Salmon Rivers simply announced the distinction between transactional and non-transactional property without any discussion of its basis. [FN58] To the extent that the tort goal of risk reduction is relevant, then endangerment should be the
touchstone for potential tort liability. As the Oregon Supreme Court decided when presented with a similar issue, "the
distinction [is] between the disappointed users [who are relegated to contract] and the endangered ones [who may sue in
tort]." [FN59]
Although the line between "endangered" and "disappointed" corresponds to the difference between safety and quality
that underlie the respective domains of tort and contract, most courts have concluded that the bright-line prohibition is a
satisfactory balance of the *239 competing policies [FN60] - particularly when the efficiency advantages of a clear rule
are added to the scales. [FN61] For example, the United States Supreme Court concluded that drawing the line between
economic loss and property damage between endangered and disappointed was "too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their business behavior." [FN62] Furthermore, the Court thought that the distinction ignored the
simple fact that, regardless of the nature of the event producing the loss, the loss "is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain- traditionally the core concern of contract law." [FN63J Contract law - particularly its warranty provisions - offers a preferable method for allocating risks to economic expectations, the Court concluded, because it provides tools for limiting the scope of otherwise unpredictable economic losses. [FN64] In short, the
rule defining damage to transactional property as "economic loss" is justified by the concern with the potentially unlimited liability that might arise in tort.
This seems to be the position that has evolved in Idaho: Salmon Rivers defmes losses to transactional property as
economic loss; Myers adds damage to non-transactional property that occurs from a noncalamitous event. Although there
are inconsistent decisions, they are *240 aberrational [FN65] or poorly reasoned. [FN66]
However the inconsistency in the case law is to be resolved, it is important to note that it involves a fairly narrow
range of situations. The more common examples of economic loss - such as lost profits - are not in dispute: the problem
stems solely from a sometimes uncertain boundary between tort and contract when tangible property is damaged. Furthermore, this uncertainty is most likely to be present in only a single type of case involving economic loss: cases involving the sale of goods. And economic loss may occur in a much more diverse group of cases.

N. THE CASES: A TYPOLOGY
Although the court in Duffin spoke of "a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses" in tort
[FN67J except in two situations -when "unique circumstances" or a "special relationship" are present [FN68] - the actual
typology of the cases is more complicated. Rather than an orderly rule-with-two-exceptions, the Idaho economic-loss
cases resemble a shifting map of the Balkans with their various factual patterns and the conflicting policies. Although it
may not be true that the no-duty role is more honored in the breach than in the application, it is nonetheless true that the
rule is subject to a significant number of exceptions and qualifications.
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Pure economic loss cases can be divided into six categories:
1. Cases involving shoddy goods in which there is a contract between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant contracts with plaintiff for the sale of a product that fails to perform as expected. For example, defendant sells
plaintiff a tractor which causes plaintiff economic losses when he is unable to plow the desired number of acres
per hour. [FN69]
2. Cases involving shoddy goods in which there is no contract between plaintiff and defendant. Most commonly, plaintiff contracts with a third party to purchase goods; the third party in *241 turn contracts with defendant, who breaches the contract; plaintiff seeks to recover against the remote manufacturer in negligence. For example, plaintiff seeks a metal building to house his business. He contracts with a local contractor to erect the structure. The contractor in turn orders the building from a fabricator. When the building turns out to be lessthan-desired, plaintiff seeks to sue the fabricator. [FN70J
3. Cases involving the misperformance of a service contract between defendant and plaintiff Defendant, for
example, contracts with plaintiff to insure plaintiffs business against the risk of flre. When the property is subsequently destroyed by ftre, plaintiff discovers that defendant had failed adequately to insure the inventory. [FN71]
4. Cases involving the misperformance of a service contract between defendant and a third party that causes
economic loss to plaintiff. Defendant, for example, contracts with a city to redevelop its blighted urban core and
agrees both to take steps to mitigate potential losses to businesses in the core and to complete the work by a specified date. A business in the redevelopment area suffers economic losses when customers avoid shopping at her
store because of the inconvenience the construction causes. [FN72] A recurrent variation on this category of cases
involves what are often characterized as "misrepresentations." For example, an accountant contracts with a company to prepare an opinion on the fmancial condition of a company. A third party loans money based on the opinion. When the company defaults on its loans, the third party brings a negligence action against the accountant. [FN73]
5. Cases in which economic loss is caused by damage to a relational interest: the breach of a tort - rather than
a contract - duty owed to a third party causes economic loss to the plaintiff. For example, defendant allows a visitor to bring a greyhound onto fairgrounds where a horse race is being held. The dog decides to join the race with
disastrous results for a jockey whose mount collides with the dog. The jockey's employer brings an *242 action for
the losses he suffers because the jockey is unable to ride for him. [FN74]
6. Cases involving economic loss in which a legislative standard creates the duty of care. Two examples suggest the diverse range of the cases in this category. In the first, plaintiff contracts with a third party to care for
plaintiffs cattle. The third party rebrands the cattle and sells them at auction. When plaintiff discovers its loss, it
brings suit against the State Brand Board, contending that one of the Board's inspectors had violated its regulations
which require inspectors to demand proof of ownership when brands were "fresh." [FN75] The second - and far
more common - example involves the Idaho \Vrongful death statute: defendant, for example, runs a stop sign and
kills a spouse and father, causing economic loss to his heirs. [FN7 6]
A. Shoddy Goods: Contracts Between Plaintiff and Defendant for the Sale of Goods
Shoddy goods often cause economic loss - if only because the purchaser fails to receive the value desired. This category of case is the clearest situation in which the boundary between tort and contract is at issue: the relationship
between the parties has its origin in contract and the losses suffered are exclusively economic. Not surprisingly, this is
also the situation in which the no-duty rule has its most general application.
In Taylor v. Herbold, [FN77] defendant purchased 7,000 cwt. of potatoes from plaintiff; he failed to take delivery as
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required by the contract. Plaintiff brought a contract action for the potatoes purchased but unclaimed. He also brought a
second action for "tortious damages" arising from the breach of the contract. Plaintiff sought these damages for the approximately 3,000 cwt. that remained in his cellar, contending that, because other buyers in the area knew of the dispute
between plaintiff and defendant, they were unwilling to purchase the remaining 3,000 cvvt. in the undivided 10,000 cwt.
pile. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment n.o.v. for the defendant on the tort claim, holding that a
breach of contract does not give rise to a tort unless the duty to act with due care arises independently of the contract.
*243 The court predicated its decision on a "general rule": the breach of a contract - without more - does not give rise
to a duty in tort. In explaining its decision, the court posited two types of situations in which "something more" would be
present and a tort duty would arise independently of the contractual relationship between the parties. First, one of the
parties might act negligently toward the other party without regard to the contract between them: the contract, in other
words, would merely bring the parties into physical proximity. [FN78] Second, in at least some situations, a contract
might itself give rise to a relationship that imposes a duty of due care on one of the parties. Such situations, the court
wrote, "primarily involv[e] cases in which one of the parties was engaged in a public calling or public transportation."
[FN79] In the case before it, the court concluded neither exception was applicable: Herbold had done nothing beyond
breaching his contractual duty to take delivery of the potatoes. He therefore was not liable in tort.
The court reached a similar conclusion in Clark v. International Harvester Co., [FN80] a negligence claim for a defectively designed tractor. Plaintiff, a custom farmer, experienced recurrent difficulties in attaining sufficient pulling
power from the tractor and he eventually *244 brought suit, seeking to recover for lost profits due to "down time" and for
the costs of repairing and replacing allegedly defective parts. The court reversed a judgment for plaintiff, holding that
such pure economic losses could not be recovered in a tort action. The issue, the court stated, was
the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety
defmed in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product
will not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees it will. [FN81]
The conjunction of Taylor and Clark creates a broad prohibition against tort [FN82] recovery of pure economic
losses arising from the breach of a contract between plaintiff and defendant for the sale of goods. It is a rule that the court
has almost consistently followed. The court has held that a negligence claim for shoddily constructed rental housing units
did not state a cause of action because plaintiff suffered only economic loss, [FN83] that a plaintiff could not rely upon
negligence in seeking to recover for the construction of a prefabricated building when the negligence caused neither personal injury nor property *245 damage, [FN84] that an irrigation system which failed to provide sufficient water volume
because of an allegedly negligent design was not actionable in tort, [FN85] and that the cost of repairing or replacing an
allegedly defe.ctive roof on a new building could not be recovered in either negligence or strict liability. [FN86]

B. Shoddy Goods: Contracts for the Sale of Goods in Which There is No Privity Between Plaintiff and Defendant
The court has reached the same no-duty conclusion when the purchaser of goods sues a remote manufacturer alleging
pure economic loss. Given the length of the distribution chain for most products, this category of cases is a common one.
Purchasers are unlikely to be in privity of contract with the actual manufacturer or assembler of a product. For example,
Ronald Corrado contracted with Adkison Corporation for the construction of a building to house his aircraft mechanic
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business. [FN87] Adkison in turn contracted with Rural Systems, Inc. (RSI) the dealer for American Building Company
(ABC) to provide a built-to-order metal building. In placing the order with ABC, RSI made a mistake. The building as
delivered also had additional problems. Corrado and Adkison sued ABC in both contract and tort for the economic losses
they suffered.
The court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant on the tort claims. Holding that "the law of contract should
control actions for purely economic loss and not the law of torts," the court concluded that "actions for purely economic
losses must be viewed in a contract setting with relevant contract principles." [FN88]
C. Poor Service: Contracts Between Plaintiff and Defendant
Just as shoddy products can cause economic loss, so can poor service. Furthermore, service contracts present factual
patterns that are superficially very similar to those in the sale of shoddy goods: plaintiff and defendant have a contract;
defendant breaches the contract; plaintiff seeks to recover not (or not only) in contract but (also) in tort. Again, this is a
situation in which the boundary between tort *246 and contract is at issue: the relationship between the parties has its origin in contract and the losses suffered are exclusively economic.
Despite the seeming similarities, the differences between sales and service contracts are more significant. Most fundamentally, the difference between the sale/purchase of a product and the sale/purchase of a service is the difference
between the mass-produced and the personal. [FN89] The purchaser of a product seldom obtains it directly from the
manufacturer; the purchaser of a service, on the other hat"1d, is quite likely to deal directly with the provider. While the
personal element in service contracts is declining with the rise of the service economy - and a concomitant increasing
scale of service providers that is approaching something akin to mass-production - nonetheless, service contracts remain
more personal and idiosyncratic: even taking a mass-produced VCR into the franchised warranty service provider requires a level of personal interaction that the purchaser of a product seldom has with its manufacturer.
These differences - as imprecise as they are - appear to lie at the core of the court's differing treatment of sales and
service contracts - a difference that the court has often stated as a conclusion that service contracts can form the basis for
a relationship between the parties that is sufficiently "special" to give rise to a tort duty to act with care in providing the
service. [FN90] Thus, for example, the court *247 has held that agreements to send a telegraph message, [FN91] to insure plaintiff's business, [FN92] or to repair his truck [FN93] are special relationships that do not to fall within the noduty-in-tort rule. Such situations are distinguishable from situations involving the sale of goods, the court has stated, because the sale of goods does "not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and experience." [FN94]
*248 In Duffln, the court stated its intention "to defme the parameters" of the "'special relationship' exception."
[FN95] The term, it wrote, "refers to those situations where the relationship between the parties is such that it would be
equitable to impose such a duty." [FN96] Unfortunately, this definition is singularly unhelpful because the key term "equitable" - provides so little guidance. Although the court does supplement its defmition with an examination of case
law, it looks at a single case - McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of A."llerica. [FN97] As a result, the court's analysis is
incomplete and potentially misleading. [FN98} In part, the analytical problems with the opinion may be traceable to the
fact that duty questions arise episodically and piecemeal in the process of deciding cases; to defme the category thoroughly requires an analysis of a large number of cases that are not easily collected. [FN99] In part, the problem is also
due to the court's narrow focus on the relationship question as a subset of the economic loss issue rather than as a recurrent source of a duty of care.
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Whatever the source of the problem, the court's definition is doubly under-inclusive. First, it failed to note that
"special relationship" is a source of duty applicable to more than just economic loss cases: a special relationship, for example, is an exception to the nonfeasance/misfeasance divide in negligence. That is, a special relationship may be the
source of a duty to protect someone from a risk not of the duty-bound person's making. [FNlOO] The court's analysis thus
does not include the full range of special-relationship cases. Second, the existence of a special relationship is not the sole
source of exceptions to the no-duty-to-prevent-economic-loss-in-tort rule. Other factors - such as the status of the defendant [FNIOIJ - may give rise to a duty to take care to prevent economic loss. Although the court stated that it *249 was
canvassing the topic, [FN102] it in fact omitted a number of cases and categories that should be included in any complete
summary.

1. The Status of the Service Provider as a Source of Duty
One of the earliest sources of duty in tort involved the so-called "public callings." At the common law, common carriers, innkeepers, and the like had tort duties of due care imposed on them beyond any duties they may have assumed in
contract. [FN103] It thus is not surprising that businesses which fit within the category or which are sufficiently analogous to it [FN104]- are also subject to liability for pure economic loss in tort. [FNI05]
For example, in Strong v. Western Union Telegraph Co. [FN106] plaintiff brought an action for damages caused by a
telegraph message that had inadvertently misquoted the price of cattle being bought and sold. Although the contract
between the telegraph company and the sender expressly stated that the company would not be liable for the results of a
mistransmission and offered the sender the opportunity to have the message verified for an additional charge, the court
set aside the contractual limitation on the ground that public policy precluded defendant from contracting away liability
for its own negligence. [FNI 07] In reaching this decision, the court emphasized the quasi-public nature of the company
as evidenced by its charter:
While [the telegraph company] may make rules and regulations in regard to the conduct of its business, the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of such rules must be determined with reference to public policy, precisely as
in the case of common carriers. Public policy is that principle of law under which freedom of contract or private
dealing is restricted by *250 law for the good of the community - the public good. A stipulation in a contract
which exempts the corporation from damages for its own negligence is void when applied to a telegraph company
as well as when applied to a common carrier. [FN108]
Having concluded that the company was precluded from disclaiming liability, the court invoked traditional tort principles: transmission of messages - particularly transmissions involving commercial transactions involved a foreseeable
risk ofharm and thus a duty to act with care. [FN109]
Similarly, in Lane v. Oregon Short Line Railroad [FNllO] plaintiff was able to sue in tort for the loss of lambs
shipped over the defendant's line - despite the fact that the contract with the carrier provided that the shipper would, "at
his own risk and expense, load, unload, care for, feed and water the stock until delivery." [FNill] En route to their destination, the lambs were unloaded for feeding into pens defendant provided. Plaintiff left the lambs unattended overnight
in the pens. When he returned the following morning, thirty-eight lambs were missing. Although the court reversed a jury
verdict for the plaintiff, it did so on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to prove that defendant was negligent rather than
on the grounds that plaintiff could not recover for pure economic loss in tort:
It is the duty of a carrier transporting livestock to furnish reasonable and proper facilities and opportunities for
feeding, watering and resting them ....
It is claimed that the failure to provide the gates with patented locks was negligence. No inference of negli-
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gence can be drawn from such failure, unless there was a showing of such circumstances that a prudent person
would have provided locks, as, for example, that others in the community locked their pens and corrals in which
livestock was kept at night, or that sheep or other livestock had escaped from the pens previously, or that it was
customary for railroad stockyards to be provided with locks. [FN112]
Such public calling cases emphasize the nature of one type of "special relationship." As the court in Strong noted,
these cases share a common core: one individual is required to surrender control over a *251 risk to another person who
therefore assumes responsibility for protecting the flrst individual the public are compelled to rely absolutely on the care and diligence of the company in the transmission of
messages, and by reason of those powers and the relation it sustains to the public, it is obligated to perform the duties it is chartered to perform with the care, skill and diligence [of] a prudent man .... [FN113]
When a traveler checks into an inn and deposits his weapons (think broad swords and six shooters [FN114]) with the
innkeeper, the traveler becomes dependent for his personal safety on the care of the innkeeper. [FN115] When a traveler
books passage on a common carrier, the traveler is forced to rely upon the skill of the carrier. [FN116] When an individual stores property in a warehouse, that person gives up her power to protect the property and the warehouseman becomes responsible for their safe storage. [FN117]
The relationship has extended beyond the traditional common law public callings. Thus, when an individual leases
personal property such as a barge, [FN118] a truck, [FN119] cattle, [FN120] or sheep [FN121] to another, the lessee has
a duty to act with due care to return the property in reasonable condition to the lessor. In each of the cases, one person
gives up the power to protect himself or his property against risk and necessarily relies upon another person to guard
against that risk. The courts have responded to such control/dependence relationships by imposing a duty of care.
2. Service Providers with Special Knowledge, Judgment, or Skill
A closely related category of special relationships involve professionals and others with special knowledge, judgment, or skill. Historically, *252 the public-calling category and the specialized-service-providers category were nearly
synonymous. One early English legal treatise, for example, stated that
if a Smith prick my horse with a nail, &c. I shall have my action of the Case against him, without any warranty by the smith to do it well.... For it is the duty of every Artificer to exercise his art right, &c. truly as he
ought. [FNl22]
As Strong demonstrates, however, the rationales invoked in the public calling cases - the public nature of the businesses and the control/dependence nature of the relationship - have diverged from those applicable to service providers
who possess special knowledge, judgment, or skill. While Strong emphasized the "public utility nature" of the telegraph,
the leading Idaho case on the liability of service providers emphasized the special expertise of the defendant and the resulting reliance of the plaintiff.

a. Professional Service Providers
In McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America, [FN123] plaintiff purchased a business through defendant, a real
estate agent who also sold insurance. The agent handled both the sale and the plaintiffs subsequent insurance requirements. Plaintiff requested sufficient insurance to cover the business and its inventory fully. The agent, however, insured
the business for less than the full amount - a fact that the owner discovered after the business burned. The court rejected
the defendant's argument that it had only contractual duties to the plaintiff:
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A person in the business of selling insurance holds himself out to the public as being experienced and knowledgeable in this complicated and specialized field. The interest of the state that competent persons become insurance agents is demonstrated by the requirement that they be licensed by the state, pass an examination administered by the state, and meet certain qualifications. An insurance agent performs a personal service for his client,
in advising him about the kinds and extent of desired coverage and in choosing the appropriate insurance contract
for the insured. Ordinarily, an insured will look to his insurance agent, relying, not unreasonably, on his expertise
in placing his insurance problems in the agent's *253 hands. When an insurance agent performs his services negligently, to the insured's injury, he should be held liable for that negligence just as would an attorney, architect, engineer, physician or any other professional who negligently performs personal services. [FN124]
These factors - the expertise of the agent, the reliance of the client, and the personal relationship between them - the
court asserted, distinguished the plaintiff's claim in McAlvain from that in Taylor which involved only the sale of potatoes and thus did not involve "the rendering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and experience"
present in McAlvain. [FN125] As the court in Duffm stated, in McAlvain the court "emphasized the fact that an insurance agent holds himself out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and that, by so doing, the
agent induces reliance on his superior knowledge and skill." [FN126]
This rationale is generally applicable to professionals and the court has consistently applied tort standards of liability
to a broad range of professionals - accountants, [FN127] architects, [FN128] attorneys, [FN129] surveyors, [FN130] notary publics, [FN131] and title companies [FN132] - despite the contractual source of the relationship between the parties
and the fact that the loss is purely economic.
In such cases, the contract forms the basis of the relationship. As a result, the scope of the obligation assumed under
the contract or the conduct of the parties pursuant to the agreement is potentially relevant *254 to a determination of
whether the defendant breached the imposed duty in tort. For example, when the litigation involves situations in which
defendant has not acted - situations that have traditionlly been labeled "nonfeasance" - questions of the existence of an
agreement are potentially relevant. In Bales v. General Insurance Co. of America, [FN133] the agent for the insurance
company agreed to renew an insurance policy on plaintiff's oats that were located in a warehouse. When the warehouse
burned, it was discovered that the agent had failed to renew the policy. Noting that liability was predicated on "the negligence of [defendant's] agent whereby he failed to execute an agreement to renew a policy of insurance," [FN134] the
court evaluated and rejected a series of contract defenses - lack of mutuality and indefmiteness of terms - before conclud- ing:
Again we call attention that this is not an action on a contract of insurance, but is an action for damages growing out of the breach of a duty which [defendant] owed [plaintiff] to renew the insurance on his oats .
. . . The failure to perform [this duty] in this case caused [plaintiff] to be without the protection of a policy of
insurance when his oats were destroyed, and rendered [defendant] liable for his resulting damage. [FN135]
In the absence of a contract, defendant had no duty to do something for the plaintiff and, in the absence of an obligation to act, would not have breached a tort duty owed to plaintiff. [FN136J
More commonly, the plaintiff and defendant will have engaged in conduct that will both provide evidence of the existence of a promissory relationship and surmount the misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy. For example, in a case involving an attorney who contacted a former client about a potential investment and who then provided the requisite legal
advice for the deal, plaintiff argued that the attorney had assumed a duty to exercise care to protect his interests - even
though there was no formal relationship between the parties. The *255 court agreed that the facts could be so understood,
noting that a letter from the client to the attorney "can be viewed as an offer for Runft [the attorney) to enter a unilateral
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contract. Although the breach of an assumed duty claim sounds in tort, evidence to support the existence of an assumed
duty can be contractual in nature." [FN137] Thus the letter and the attorney's subsequent actions were sufficient to create
a triable issue on whether the attorney had assumed a duty to protect plaintiff from his subsequent economic losses in the
business deal.
Not all white-collar or professional services give rise to special relationships. For example, in Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, [FN138] plaintiff sought loans from the bank to expand and remodel its
business. Following protracted negotiations, the bank refused to make the loans plaintiff sought. Plaintiff responded by
filing suit alleging that defendant had made an oral contract to loan the funds and that it had also breached several tort
duties. After concluding that there was no contract, the court turned to plaintiff's tort claims which were partially predicated upon the argument that the relationship between the bank and a customer was analogous to that between an insurer
and an insured. The court disagreed. The relationship between a bank and its customers was not a special relationship because it lacked the "personal" and "non-commercial" nature that characterized the relationship between insurer and insured; "[r]ather, the transaction here was a commercial one, which would have created a debtor-creditor relationship."
[FNI39) The lack of the "personal" element was fatal to the claim.
Just as not all professional relationships are special, so all special relationships are not professional: as the court in
Duffin recognized, [FN140] the McAlvain rationale has also been applied beyond the traditional bounds of what can be
categorized as "professional" occupations. The extension of the duty of care beyond public callings and professionals
has, however, proved more problematic.
*256 b. Non-Professional Service Providers
The court's handling of cases involving non-professional service providers has not been entirely consistent. Two lines
of decisions reveal the contours of the problem.
The first series of cases involve disputes that result from contracts to drill wells or install machinery or repair equipment. For example, Knoblock v. Arenguena [FN141] was a dispute that arose out of an oral agreement to drill a well.
After plaintiff completed the well, defendant refused to pay contending that the hole was not sufficiently straight to accommodate a pump. The court began with the proposition that defendant's agreement to drill the well "carried with it an
implied obligation to do the work in a good and workmanlike manner" because
[a]ccompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and
faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well
as a breach oftl1e contract. [FN142]
After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that the trial court's fmding that "the well was not such a well as
would be drilled in a good and workmanlike manner so as to fulfill the purpose for which it was intended" was supported
by substantial evidence and affirmed the judgment for plaintiff. [FN143]
Similarly, in Dick v. Reese, [FN144] the court imposed a negligence standard onto a contract for the repair of a truck.
The law, the court held, "implies a contract that the work shall be done with due care and competent skill." [FN145)
Thus, the "garageman must exercise ordinary care and skill in making the repairs." [FN146] The court has reached a similar conclusion in other cases. [FN147]

*257 On the other hand, the court has on occasion adopted an extremely formalistic approach. [FN148] For example,
in Steiner Corp. v. American District Telegraph, [FN149] defendant installed a fire alarm system in plaintiff's business

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY

http://web2. westlaw .com/print/printstream.aspx?mt=BusinessPrac&utid=2&prft=HTMLE...

8/12/2011

Page 17 of 46

34 IDLR225
34 Idaho L. Rev. 225

Page 17

and contracted to maintain the system, including monthly inspections. When the building caught fire, the alann system
failed. Defendant, it was subsequently determined, had not checked the system for eight months prior to the ftre.
Plaintiff's argument that defendant was liable for negligently rendering a service was rejected by the court on the ground
that defendant's conduct was "nonfeasance":
The actions alleged to have caused damage to Steiner were clearly acts of omission or nonfeasance, as opposed to active negligence or misfeasance. Steiner alleges that ADT failed to properly perform its duty to inspect
and maintain the frre alarm system. Thus, a clear duty must be shown to exist by operation of law, separate and
apart from the contractual duty to maintain the equipment. It is clear from the allegations in this complaint that
such a separate duty cannot be shown. Apart from this contract, ADT could not be said to have a duty to maintain
equipment in Steiner Corporation's building. Steiner has not pointed to any statutory duty of suppliers of fire alarm
systems, nor pointed to any common law duty of a supplier to his customer. The only duty to which ADT could be
held under the facts of this case is that which arose by virtue of the contract obligating it to maintain this frre alann
system. [FN150]
The difficulty with this approach is its artificiality. Consider, for example, this parallel restatement of Knoblock:
Arenguena's allegations that Knoblock failed to properly perform his duty to drill the well must fail in the absence of a
clear duty, shown to exist by operation of law, separate and apart from the contractual duty to drill the well. But apart
from his contract to drill the well, Knoblock had no duty to do so.
The duty that the court found in Knoblock v. Arenguena- a duty to drill with due care- is no less a conclusory statement than the opposite conclusion reached in Steiner Corp. v. American District Telegraph. For example, American District Telegraph had serviced the fue alanns for some period of time- it had, in other words, *258 "acted." Should the fact
that it stopped "acting" be determinative of plaintiff's legal rights? If Knoblock had simply given up on his efforts to
straighten the well at some point- stopped acting - would Arenguena have been limited to his contractual claim? The ultimate problem is that the misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy is highly manipulable; it often becomes a conclusory label
rather than a factual description.
The Steiner court alternatively held plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by the contract's exculpatory clause. The
court rejected the argument that the exculpatory clause should be voided as contrary to public policy because there was
neither "an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power" nor a "public duty" such as that imposed on public utilities and
common carriers. [FN151J
Another irrigation-well case reached a similar conclusion. In Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., [FN152]
plaintiff contracted with defendant for the sale and installation of an irrigation pump. The pump was installed carelessly
and plaintiff brought a negligence action for the resulting crop losses. Without commenting on the choice, the court
treated the issue exclusively as a question of contract law and upheld an exculpatory clause in the contract. [FN153]
It is possible to distinguish the cases based on the existence of an exculpatory clause in the service contract. Under
this reading Knoblock and Steiner simply establish contrary presumptions: when a clause is included, it will generally be
enforced; [FN154] when there is no clause, on the other hand, there is a presumption that a service contract includes "a
common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a
negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract." [FN155]

Similarly, the cases might be distinguished by the existence of a "special relationship" between the parties. Although
it is possible to characterize the relationship between the pump repairer and the pump owner as "special" - it is predicated upon a personal relationship involving the expertise of the repairer and the reliance of the *259 owner - the relation-
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ship does not seem intuitively to be any more special than that between the fire alarm installer and the building owner.
The difficulty is that the designation of some relationships as "special" tends to be conclusory because the court has
provided little explicitly on how to determine when a relationship is "special." Although the court has stated that "[t]he
'special relationship' exception generally pertains to claims against professionals who perform personal services, such as
physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers and insurance agents," [FN156] the court's application of the "special relationship" category has been broader than the traditional meaning of the term "professionals." The court has found a special relationship not only when physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers and insurance agents are involved, but also
when the service provider is a well driller, [FN157] a pump repairer, [FN158] an automobile repairer, [FN159] a boiler
repairer, [FN160] a water-heater installer, [FN161] an aircraft mechanic, [FN162] a plumber, [FN163] and a title company. [FN164]
The cases in which the court has found special relationships share a web of recurrent factors rather than a finite list of
elements. As a threshold matter, the cases generally involve personal relationships. As the court has noted, it is this personal element that distinguished the case from cases involving the sale of goods, cases that do "not involve the rendering
of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and experience." [FN165] In addition, the cases often involve
some expertise on the part of the defendant and a corresponding reliance by the plaintiff coupled with a foreseeable risk
that is within the expert's control. The court's statement in McAlvain about the relationship of the insured to the insurance agent is broadly applicable to *260 these relationships: "Ordinarily, an insured will look to his insurance agent, relying, not unreasonably, on his expertise in placing his insurance problems in the agent's hands." [FN166] It is possible
to substitute "attorney" or "architect" or "accountant" for "insurance agent" without distorting the sentence or its point.
"Well driller" and "automobile repairer" also do not significantly misstate the underlying relationship - nor, for that matter, does or should "frre alarm provider."
D. Poor Service: Service Contracts Between Defendant and a Third Party
The second category of service contract cases involve the misperformance of a service contract between defendant
and a third party; breach of this contract results in economic loss to plaintiff. Can the plaintiff recover her losses?
The cases fall into two, overlapping groups. In the first, defendant breaches a contract to perform a service owed to a
third party. For example, a construction company contracts with a city to redevelop its blighted urban core and agrees
both to take steps to mitigate potential losses to businesses in the core and to complete the work by a specified date. A
business in the redevelopment area suffers economic losses when customers avoid shopping at her store because the construction company fails to meet its contractual obligations. [FN167]
The second group of cases is a variation that has traditionally been characterized as "misrepresentation." [FN168] For
example, a bank contracts with an accounting f1rm to prepare a financial statement of its business. The accountant prepares an audit; plaintiff subsequently loans the bank money based on the audit. After the borrower-bank goes into receivership, the lender sues the accountant. [FN169]
Although there are paradigmatically pure cases - cases in which the misperformed service involves no misrepresentation and misrepresentation cases that involve no misperformed service - the two groups often overlap. That is, the misrepresentation in many *261 cases involves statements about a negligently performed service. Consider, for example, the
famous Cardozo opinion Glanzer v. Shepard. [FN170] Plaintiff contracted to purchase 905 bags of beans from a third
party, agreeing to pay a specified price per pound. The seller contracted with defendant to weigh the beans. Defendant
provided both the seller and plaintiff with a statement of the weight. Defendant unfortunately had misweighed and
plaintiff - who had overpaid - brought suit to recover his loss. Cardozo characterized the facts as involving a misrepres-
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entation. Defendant, in Cardozo's view, had misrepresented the weight of the beans; for Cardozo, the issue was whether
defendant could be held liable for that misrepresentation in the absence of a contract with the plaintiff. Note, however,
that the case can with equal accuracy be characterized as the negligent performance of service: defendant had negligently
misweighed the beans. [FN171] Similarly, in McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America, [FN172] defendant's conduct can be viewed either as the negligent performance of a service (insuring the business) or as a negligent misrepresentation (representing that the business had been fully insured).

1. "Pure" Services

The leading Idaho case is Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co. [FN173] The construction company and the City
of Idaho Falls entered into a contract for the renovation of the city's blighted urban core. The contract required defendant
to take specified steps to minimize the disruption to businesses in the area being renovated. Defendant failed to comply
with the mitigation measures and did not finish the renovation in a timely manner. Plaintiff brought a contract action
claiming to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the company and the city; it also joined a tort claim, contending that defendant's negligent conduct had caused it economic loss. Citing concerns for unlimited and disproportionate liability, the court refused to allow plaintiff to recover in tort. [FN174]
*262 The court's concern is the recurrent one: the fear that liability will exceed fault. As the court noted in Just's, the
traditional tort liability-limiting mechanism - foreseeability - provides no real limit in many pure economic loss situations: "In contrast to the recognized liability for personal injuries and property damage, with its inherent limitations of
size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virt'ually open-ended."
(FN175] If Just's were permitted to recover, there would be no reason to deny recovery to Just's suppliers and creditors
and its suppliers' suppliers and creditors ad infinitum.

2. "Pure" Misrepresentation
The current Idaho law on recovery of economic loss for negligent misrepresentation is traceable to two Cardozo decisions: Glanzer v. Shepard (FN176]- the bean weighing case- and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co. [FN177]
In Ultrarnares, a company contracted with the accounting firm Touche, Niven & Co. to prepare a certified balance sheet
of its assets and liabilities. The firm prepared thirty-two copies of the audit, one of which was used to obtain a loan from
illtramares. Unfortunately, the borrower was insolvent at the time of the audit and the loan became a loss. Ultramares
sued the accounting firm for its negligence in completing the audit.
In Glanzer, the court held the bean weigher liable; in Ultramares, the court refused to extend liability to the accountant because "a thoughtless slip or blunder ... may expose [defendants] to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." [FN178] Cardozo distinguished Glanzer as involving a relationship
between the bean weigher and the bean purchaser that was "so close as to approach privity." [FN179] For the court, the
privity substitute served to limit the weigher's potential liability; no similar limit was present in Ultramares.

The next significant case was decided in 1985 when the New York Court of Appeals handed down Credit Alliance
Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. [FN180] The case involved an extension of credit to a third party based on a consolidated tmancial statement prepared by an accounting finn. The court reexamined and reaffrrmed its prior decisions in Glanzer and illtramares, concluding that an accountant could *263 be held liable to a noncontractual party if three requirements were satisfied: "(1) the accountant must have been aware that the fmancial reports were to be used for a particular
purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3) there must
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have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or parties." [FN181] The court thought
that these requirements were a sufficient privity substitute that restricted potential liability within manageable bounds.
The New York case law is relevant because of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First
Bancorp. [FNI82] Idaho Bank & Trust was a negligence action brought by a lender against an accounting ftnn that had
been employed by the borrower to prepare a fmancial statement of the borrower's business. The accountant prepared an
audit; The lender loaned money based on it. After the borrower went into receivership, the lender sued the accountant.
On appeal from an order dismissing the claim, the court noted the unlimited liability issue and then simply and without
additional analysis adopted the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Credit Alliance. [FN183] The tripartite test
for liability for negligent misrepresentation thus became Idaho law. [FN184 J
E. Tort Duties Owed to Third Parties
Although many pure economic loss cases lie on the boundary between tort and contract, this is not universally true.
When one person breaches a tort duty owed to a third party, that breach may affect the economic interests of others. For
example, when a person is killed or injured in an automobile accident, the decedent's business partners may well suffer
economic loss as a result of the death or injury. Such economic interests generally are not recoverable in tort. In Everett
v. Trunnell, [FN185] for example, the court summarily rejected such a claim, noting that "a partnership has no right to
recover for the negligent injury to a partner." [FN186]
*264 The most extensive discussion of the rationale for this position was set out in Cain v. Vollmer. [FN187] Cain
was the master of an apprentice jockey who sued for proftts he lost as a result of physical injuries to the apprentice. Although the court had previously allowed the jockey to recover his lost wages, [FN188] it rejected the master's claim, emphasizing the distinction between the master's action for lost proftts and the jockey's action for personal injury and the
resultant loss of earning capacity:
In this case the one seeking damages is a race-horse man - one who follows the races and enters his horses and
... depends on making his money by winning prizes in the various races. That there is a wide difference between
the nature and character of damages asked in each of these cases cannot escape the attention of anyone. The one is
direct; the other is proximate and dependant on innumerable secondary and intervening causes. The jockey earned
a salary and certain sums for "outside mounts" whether he won the race or not. This was his earning capacity. On
the other hand, the jockey alone cannot win the race; he must have a fleet horse ... and upon the whole these imaginative proftts may dwindle into real losses.
. . . [T]he proftts it is claimed appellant would have realized depend on so many intervening circumstances
and contingencies, the unfavorable happening of any of which would dissipate these prospective gains. We are
fully satisfted that prospective proftts to a race-horse man for races that have never been run and race meets and
associations that have never been held and against all contestants, is entirely too remote, uncertain and indeterminable to be
allowed. [FN189]
The court's concern is apparent: the economic losses that the race-horse man sought were uncertain and therefore potentially unlimited.
In addition to this fear of speculative awards and unlimited liability, the decision in cases such as Everett rest upon
the common law belief that tort actions are personal to the injured party [FN190) - a belief that reflected the concern with
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limiting liability to reasonable *265 bounds. The combination of these concerns supports a broad prohibition against allowing recovery for losses attributable to the breach of a tort duty owed to a third party rather than to the plaintiff.
F. Legislative Standards as a Source of Duty
An often-neglected category of cases involves a legislative standard that creates the applicable tort duty of care. This
is a quite heterogeneous group of cases.

The loss may be caused by the misperformance of a service contract between defendant and a third party when defendant is under a statutory obligation to protect plaintiff's interests. For example, an abstracter prepared an abstract of
title to a parcel of land for the landowner. The abstracter failed to note that the land had been mortgaged. Plaintiff purchased the land relying on the abstract. When he was subsequently required to redeem the parcel, plaintiff brought an action against the abstracter who argued that his liability was determined by contract and thus did not extend to plaintiff
with whom it was not in privity. In Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co., [FN191] the court held that this general rule had
been abrogated by statute: "it was evidently the intention of the Legislature to include within its protection any person
that might suffer damage by reason of the neglect or omission of the abstracter ... due to carelessness." [FN192] The
statute, in other words, created a tort duty owed to people not in privity of contract with the title company.
In other situations, the statutory duty to protect against economic loss may exist independently of contract. For example, in Oppenheimer Industries v. Johnson Cattle Co. [FN193] plaintiff had contracted with Bohlen Cattle Company to
care for cattle that Oppenheimer owned. Bohlen subsequently rebranded some 1,681 head of cattle and sold them at auction. When Oppenheimer discovered its loss, it brought suit against the State Brand Board, contending that one of the
Board's inspectors had violated its regulations which required inspectors to demand proof of ownership when brands
were "fresh." The court agreed: the regulation imposed a duty on brand inspectors to demand proof of ovmership - and
the beneficiaries of that duty included cattle owners. [FN194]
*266 By far the most common example of a legislatively created duty, however, is the state's wrongful death act. The
common law viewed the claim arising from the breach of a tort duty as personal to the injured person; as a result, the law
did not recognize claims for injuries resulting from the death of a third party. Decedent's heirs had no better claim for
their losses than did decedent's partners. [FN195] This was reversed by statute. [FN196] As a result, a decedent's heirs
may now recover for their economic losses attributable to tortious conduct resulting in the death.
V. A TRANSITIONAL SUMMARY
This brief review of the Idaho case law on recovery of economic loss demonstrates that it is a good bit more complex
than the general-rule-with-two-exceptions explanation that the court presents in Duffm - and even this more complex typology suffers from over-precision. There are, for example, a not-readily-classifiable group of decisions such as Hudson
v. Cobbs. [FN197] The case grew out of a complex real estate transaction gone bad. Plaintiff purchased an office complex only to discover that some of his "tenants" had signed sham advance rental agreements into order to enable the
seller to convert a short-term loan into long-term fmancing and sell the property to him. After the bank foreclosed,
plaintiff brought an action seeking to recover for negligent misrepresentation as well as fraud. The court held that the
only duty that the "tenants" had to the plaintiff was under the contract to lease office space; plaintiff's claim was in contract and not in tort. [FN198] The examples could be multiplied.
Although incomplete, the typology does contain the majority of economic loss cases. It also reveals the underlying
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policy concerns.

*267 VI. POLICY AND RATIONALES
The case law reflects two dominant policy concerns. On the one hand, the court has sought to preserve contract
against the encroachment of tort. The prohibition against recovering pure economic loss in tort serves this goal:
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor that does not harm person
or property. If the defendant fails to exercise such due care it is of course liable for the resulting injury to person or
property as well as other losses which naturally follow from that injury. However, the law of negligence does not
impose on International Harvester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and breaks down infrequently
enough for Clark to make profit in his custom farming business. [FN199]
On the other hand, the court has also expressed repeated concern over the potential for unlimited liability inherent in
pure economic loss situations. Again, the prohibition against recovering pure economic loss in tort serves this policy goal:
[A] . . . rule, which would allow compensation for losses of economic advantage caused by the defendant's
negligence, would impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden on the defendant's conduct.
. . . In contrast to the recognized liability for personal injury and property damage, with its inherent limitations
of size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open
-ended. [FN200]
The sometimes-conflicting, sometimes-reinforcing interaction of these policies on the underlying rationales for tort
and contract liability accounts for at least part of the court's apparent scatter-shot approach to pure economic loss cases.

A. Tort vs. Contract

I. Shoddy Goods
On a doctrinal level, cases involving the sale of goods present the clearest situation in which the core principles of
both tort and contract *268 support the same result: neither the potato seller nor the tractor or shop buyer is endangered
by their contractual partners - and when person or property is not endangered, society's interest in imposing safety standards through tort law is not implicated. [FN20 1J Instead, the buyers were disappointed by the quality of their contractual
partner's performance - and quality (i.e., warranty) is a contract concern. As the court stated in Clark, tort is concerned
with protecting persons and property rather than with guaranteeing the purchaser a profit. [FN202] If plaintiff wants a
profitable tractor, he must be sure that the seller promises to provide him such a tractor.
Shoddy goods causing only economic loss thus creates the least tension between tort and contract - and presents the
simplest case for the judiciary. [FN203]

2. Poor Service
Cases involving the misperformance of service contracts are impossibly diverse because the variety of services is so
great: one person hires another to drill a well, to teach children reading and mathematics, to insure a business, to run a
drill press, to install and maintain a fire alarm system, or to audit a company's books. Despite the diversity, however, ser-
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vice contracts do share underlying similarities.
Most significantly, service contracts are employment contracts. As such, they have a different feel than contracts for
the purchase of goods in which the purchaser and the manufacturer seldom meet face-to-face. While the personal element
in service contracts is declining *269 with the rise of the service economy, service contracts remain more personal because they involve some direct contact between the contracting parties - a level of personal interaction that the purchaser
of a product seldom has with its manufacturer.
It is this rather imprecise difference - the personal nature of the relationship - that forms the basis for the differing
treatment of service contracts. As the court has commented in a related context, "the special relationship that exists
between insurer and insured" is based on "the unique 'personal' (non-commercial) nature of insurance contracts."
[FN204] Of course not all service relationships give rise to a tort duty of care; something more than a personal relationship is necessary. That something more is covered by the unhelpful label of "special relationships," a mixed group that
includes relationships that embody at least two different sets of recurrent factors. On the one hand, there are relationships
in which one person surrenders the power to protect himself against a risk and thereby becomes dependent upon another
for his protection. Common carriers, innkeepers, and other falling within the common-law category of "public callings"
are examples of this type of special relationship. The category, however, is broader than the common-law public-callings
classification since it includes a range of "custodial" relationships. [FN205] On the other hand, there are relationships in
which the service provider has some expertise, specialized judgment or skill. Although the court has not been either entirely clear or entirely consistent in its decision& including or excluding service providers, the factors that appear to unite
the cases include the service providers special knowledge, judgment, or skill in a field that lies outside the knowledge of
the "reasonable person" and that involves a risk of harm. Although such service providers are often professionals - doctors, lawyers, and architects - the category also includes providers of specialized services such as automobile mechanics,
well drillers, boiler repairers, water-heater installers, and the like. Beneath the variability are a web of similarities: a personal relationship involving control/expertise of a risk on one side and dependence/reliance on the other.

The conclusion that a service provider owes a duty of care to the service purchaser - that the relationship between
them is "special" *270 -is often consistent with both tort and contract rationales. On the one hand, when a person (the
service purchaser) either surrenders the power to protect himself against a risk (the passenger on a common carrier) or
purchases the service because of the expertise of the provider in guarding against a risk (the la\\'Yer for her knowledge of
the intricacies of drafting a will), imposition of a tort duty reinforces societal risk-reduction objectives. If the service provider were under no duty of care to protect the service purchaser, the purchaser would be largely unprotected. The imposition of a duty in such cases thus is consistent with tort principles.
On the other hand, contract objectives are also likely to be advanced in such cases because an obligation to act with
due care is likely to correspond to the parties' implicit understanding of the relationship: one purchases the common carrier's best efforts or the lawyer's reasonable drafting ability. Indeed, courts are generally unwilling to find liability under
contract's no-fault theories of recovery. As the court noted in a case involving an aircraft mechanic,

[i]n circumstances involving the rendition of personal services the duty upon the actor is to perform the services in a workmanlike manner. . . . "In both instances the standard of care is imposed by law and under either
[tort or contract] theor[ies] there is no difference in the standard of care required of the party rendering the personal service." [FN206]
Services, in short, generally are measured against a negligence, reasonable-care standard - regardless of whether the
court writes in terms of contract or tort. [FN207]
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B. Unlimited Liability

The second recurrent policy concern is the possibility of unlimited or (at least) disproportionate liability. The commercially interconnected nature of modem society has increased the possibility that a single event can spread decreasing
economic ramifications like widening circles through a pond of water. A moment's inattention could *271 result in devastating liability. The concern is not the size of the potential loss to any one person but rather the unknown potential extent of liability, the unknown number of persons and companies that might be injured. As the Idaho Supreme Court
noted, allowing recovery of pure economic loss might "impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden" because, unlike liability for personal injury or property damage, with their "inherent limitations of size, parties and time, liability for all
the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended." (FN208]
This concern is insignificant in cases in which there is a contract between the parties. When defendant contracts to
sell goods or to provide a service to plaintiff, privity provides a limit to potential liability. While the defendant doubtless
takes the plaintiff as she finds him, [FN209] it is an identified plaintiff rather than an unknowable and indefinite group of
plaintiffs. This limitation is not present when defendant contracts with a third party - particularly when the contract is for
the provisions of services that involve representations that can pass along an unforeseeably convoluted chain.
1. Shoddy Goods
When A.'llerican Building Company (ABC) fabricated a metal building to specifications provided by its local dealer,
[FN210] it doubtless knew (at least in general terms) that there was a contractor and an ultimate purchaser. Although
ABC might not have known their actual identities, it at least knew that such entities existed and its potential liability to
them was bounded by the passage of the goods down the distribution stream; the fact that ABC was unlikely to have
known the purposes for which Corrado purchased the building - and thus the magnitude of his potential losses - is not
problematic since his generic identity was known. If economic losses were restricted to these foreseeable parties - the
contractor and ultimate purchaser - the concern with unlimited liability would not affect decisions in cases. Economic
loss, however, is not so circumscribed: when the building was unsuitable for Corrado's aircraft maintenance business,
Corrado was not alone in suffering economic losses. Commercial entities who would have used Corrado's service were
forced to find alternative and potentially more costly alternatives; Corrado's parts suppliers *272 lost sales to Corrado for
work that was not done; Corrado's suppliers' suppliers also lost sales - the losses rippled outward in nearly untraceable paths.
The nearly untraceable, speculative nature of the losses raises a corollary concern: the potential for fraudulent claims.
Corrado doubtless had a variety of potential suppliers. Which of those he would have chosen had the building not been
defective so that he could have pursued his aircraft maintenance business is speculative - and the speculative nature multiplies at each stage of the distribution chain. Although this rippling effect is present in all economic loss cases involving
shoddy goods, when there is no contract between the parties the courts lack a ready and principled reason (such as privity) to limit liability. These concerns originally supported rules limiting recovery in contract to parties in privity. While
the significance of privity has been substantially reduced in contracts for the sale of goods, [FN2ll] there are doubly
sound policy reasons for maintaining the barrier when the damages sought are such indirect economic losses.
2. Poor Service
When there is a contract between the parties for the provision of a service, privity of contract provides a limit for potential liability by identifYing the affected party. When the court decides that a service-based relationship is sufficiently
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"special" to be reinforced with a tort duty, the existence of a contract between the parties offers a principled limit to the
potential liability of the service provider.
\Vllen there is no contract between the parties, the threat of unlimited liability becomes the overriding concern. In
"pure" service cases such as Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., the widening circle of distributors and suppliers
who lose sales raises this specter. Although the court might have fashioned a principled privity substitute in Just's it did
.fmd the retailer to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Arrington Construction and the City of Idaho Falls
[FN212] - the traditional negligence liability-limiting mechanism - foreseeability - does not do so because the everwidening circle of loss is eminently foreseeable.
This problem is compounded when the service includes a representation. When an accountant contracts with a company to prepare a *273 .fmancial statement, she has no control over and is unlikely even to know of the uses to which the
company may put the statement. If the accountant is careless in preparing the statement, she is exposed to potentially unlimited liability. Such concerns initially led courts peremptorily to deny liability. The per se denial of any liability seems
unfair, however, in some situations. For example, if the accountant knew the purposes for which the statement was prepared, concerns for unlimited liability are less persuasive. In Glanzer v. Shepard, [FN213] the bean weigher not only
knew of the purpose of his weighing but also knew the identity of the buyer; the relationship between weigher and purchaser, the New York court subsequently wrote, was "so close as to approach privity." [FN214] When courts have found
such principled limits on liability, they have been willing to impose liability on those whose negligent misrepresentations
have caused economic loss to persons with whom they are not in privity. [FN215] This is, for example, the explicit rationale for the tripartite test in Credit Alliance: [FN216] the prongs of the test are designed to provide a nonarbitrary
basis for rest.icting liability within manageable limits.
3. Breach of Tort Duties Owed to Third Parties
Concern for unlimited liability also lies at the center of the cases denying liability to third parties who suffer economic losses when a defendant breaches a tort duty to a third party. When the Lewiston Interstate Fair and Racing Association allowed Norman and his sister Norma Vollmer to bring their greyhound onto the fair grounds, they breached their
duty to Benjamin Franklin McClain, Jr., a jockey in the afternoon's races. McClain was permitted to recover for his economic losses as well as his physical injuries when the Vollmer's dog decided to join the race. [FN217] McClain's employer, however, was denied recovery of his economic losses. The court's evident concern was the speculative and illimitable nature of the losses:
We are fully satisfied that prospective profits to a race-horse man for races that have never been run and race
meets and associations that have never been held and against all *274 contestants, is entirely too remote, uncertain
and indeterminable to be allowed. [FN218)
C. Some Conclusions
When there is a contract between the parties, judicial concern focuses on preserving some space for contract in a tort
universe; when there is no contract between the parties, judicial concern focuses on the potential for unlimited liability.
Contrariwise, when there is a contract between the parties, there is no significant concern for unlimited liability; when
there is no contract between the parties, the concern to preserve some breathing space for contract is minimal.
Similarly, the tort concern for safety of person and property and the contract attention to representations about the
quality of the bundles being exchanged interact in recurrent patterns. When safety is threatened - particularly human
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safety - tort concerns are dominant; endangered persons are a primary concern. When safety is not an issue - when the
person is disappointed rather than endangered - contract considerations are more important.
Law, of course, is not mathematics. Individual cases require judgment. But in applying that judgment, judges should
be attentive to underlying policies and the patterns they produce.

VII. DUFFIN: A REPRISE
Back to Duffm.
Recall that the Duffms purchased seed potatoes from Crater Farms, Inc. (CFij on the condition that the seed was
"certified" by the Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA) as free of diseases and pests. CFI delivered the potatoes
to the Duffrns in March and early April, 1988. At the end of April, however, an ICIA inspection determined that the CFI
potatoes were infected with bacterial ring rot; ICIA therefore informed CFI that no further shipments could be sold as
certified. Neither CFI nor ICIA informed the Duffms of the problem. The Duffins subsequently discovered that their crop
was infected with bacterial ring rot. They brought suit against CFI in contract and against ICIA for negligence, alleging
that they had suffered a variety of economic losses. [FN219]
The supreme court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for ICIA, holding that ICIA had a duty to protect the
Duff..rns against economic loss because of the special relationship between the parties. *275 [FN220] The court also held
that the Duffrns had failed to state a claim for misrepresentation. [FN221] These two conclusions merit additional atten-tion.

A. Special Relationships

Although the court stated its intention to use Duffrn "to defrne the parameters of [the special relationship] exception,"
its analysis is at best tantalizingly elliptical. "The term 'special relationship,"' the court wrote, "refers to those situations
where the relationship between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there
is an extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a party's economic interest."
[FN222] Unfortunately, however, the proffered standard - "equitable" - advances the analysis only marginally since it is
itself subject to substantial uncertainty. Why, for example, is it equitable to hold ICIA liable to the Duffrns, a commercial
enterprise with whom it had no dealings? Are there factors or patterns to the types of relationships that the court is willing to characterize as "special"? In short, why is this relationship "special"?

It is, of course, possible to construct several explanations for the court's use of the term: it may have felt, for example, that the Duffins were less sophisticated than ICIA and thus deserving of additional judicial solicitude. The court
has in the past suggested that "an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power" might justifY disregarding an exculpatory
clause. [FN223J But such speculation is problematic for at least two reasons. Most fundamentally, it is speculation. The
court has not stated that some factor such as unequal bargaining power or lesser commercial sophistication is the basis
for its use of the term "equitable." Second, if such concerns underlie the court's conclusion, it could have as easily
reached the conclusion within the context of contract law which has quasi-tort concepts such a "unconscionability" and
"reasonableness" to handle such problems.
The basic difficulty is precisely this point: the court does not offer guidance on the factors or factual patterns that
give rise to the designation "special." This need not be a complete or a final list; it need not be set in stone. Judging requires judgment and necessarily involves *276 an occasional false start or wrong tum. But the court does need to elucid-
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ate the factors that inform its judgment. [FN224]
In place of an explicit discussion of parameters to the special-relationship exception, the court offers a discussion of a
single case: McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America. [FN225] McAlvain was a suit by the purchaser of a hardware store against the real estate agent who sold him the property. The defendant was also an insurance agent and
plaintiff requested defendant obtain sufficient fire insurance to cover the property and its inventory. When a fire subsequently destroyed the building, the purchaser discovered that it had not been completely insured; he brought an action
in tort to recover his losses. The supreme court affmned a jury verdict for the purchaser emphasizing the relationship
between insurer and insured:
A person in the business of selling insurance holds himself out to the public as being experienced and knowledgeable in this complicated and specialized field. The interest of the state that competent persons become insurance agents is demonstrated by the requirement that they be licensed by the state, pass an examination administered by the state, and meet certain qualifications. An insurance agent performs a personal service for his client,
in advising him about the kinds and extent of desired coverage and in choosing the appropriate insurance contract
for the insured. Ordinarily, an insured will look to his insurance agent, relying, not unreasonably, on his expertise
in placing his insurance problems in the agent's hands. When an insurance agent performs his services negligently,
to the insured's injury, he should be held liable for that negligence just as would an attorney, architect, engineer,
physician or any other professional who negligently performs personal services. [FN226]
The court also noted that the personal nature of the relationship was the factor that distinguished the case from cases
involving the sale of goods, cases that do "not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and experience." [FN227]
The Duffm court characterized McAlvain as holding that a person such as an insurance agent who "holds himself out
to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and that, by doing so, ... induces reliance on his superior knowledge and skill" has a *277 duty to protect the person whose reliance is sought. [FN228) That is, the Duffm
court read McAlvain to establish the principle that an expert whose conduct induces reliance has a duty to protect the
person who relies from economic loss. The relationship between the Duffms and ICIA was analogous:
ICIA has held itself out as having expertise in the performance of a specialized function [and] it has engaged
in a marketing campaign . . . the very purpose of which is to induce reliance by purchasers on the fact that seed has
been certified. Under such circumstances, ICIA occupies a special relationship with those whose reliance it has
knowingly induced. [FN229]
Thus, the court concluded, there was a special relationship between the Duffms and ICIA that justified the imposition
of a tort duty on ICIA to protect the Duffms from economic loss.
In recapitulating McAlvain, the court subtly but significantly shifted emphasis. While the McAlvain court gave at
least equal weight to the personal nature of the relationship between insured and insurer, the Duffm court emphasized the
purchaser's reliance on the certifier's expertise. This shift in emphasis masks a dramatic shift in doctrine.
Unlike all of the court's previous special-relationship cases, there was no personal relationship between ICIA and the
Duffins. Indeed, there was no evidence that ICIA had ever had any contact with the Duffins or that it even knew of their
existence. ICIA dealt with seed producers such as CFI; it did not deal with the purchasers of the seed. In fact, the district
court had dismissed the Duffms' misrepresentation claim because they had no evidence that "ICIA knew the Duffms
would rely on its representations." [FN230]
Of course, the fact that the court has not previously found a special relationship in the absence of a personal relation-
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ship does not mean that it is powerless to do so or that the decision to do so is flawed. The court might well choose to
treat the "personal relationship" element simply as one factor among several that are relevant to the conclusion that the
relationship is sufficiently special to impose a duty. Nonetheless, the court abandons t.-,_e requirement without any discussion of the role that this element has played in previous decisions - and thus appears not to have considered the potential
problems that its new holding may encounter.
*278 The personal nature of the relationship in special relationship cases plays at least two roles. On the one hand, it
provides the moral justification for the imposition of a tort duty in addition to the assumed contractual duties. As the
court in McAlvain stated, the personal element in "special relationships" is the distinguishing factor that sets specialrelationship cases apart from the sale of goods cases such as Taylor v. Herbold. [FN231] The court has emphasized "the
unique 'personal"' nature of the concept in a variety of contexts. [FN232] There are, of course, other rationales that can
justify the imposition of a duty - the court in Duffm, for example, emphasizes !CIA's conduct that was intended to induce
reliance.
A second - and perhaps even more important - role is that the personal nature of the relationship serves to limit potential liability. The imposition of a duty without some limit raises the specter of "too heavy and unpredictable a burden"
because liability for "the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended." [FN233] When a
service provider knows the service purchaser, the provider's potential liability is necessarily circumscribed. Abandoning
the requirement that the relationship be personal also abandons the implicit liability limitation: ICIA, for example, is potentially liable to all purchasers of certified seed - an indeterminate group.
There are other mechanisms that the court might employ to limit liability in a principled manner. The court in Du:ffm
offers that reliance as a limiting mechanism, stating that ICIA "occupies a special relationship with those whose reliance
it has knowingly induced." [FN234] It seems unlikely, however, that induced reliance can successfully fill the role of liability-limiting mechanism. The conduct cited by the court to justify its holding - ICIA held itself out, it knew that certified seed had a higher value, it engaged in a marketing campaign for certified seed [FN235] - does not provide a limitation on potential liability comparable to the abandoned personal relationship. Under the court's approach, ICIA became
potentially liable to every potato farmer in the *279 state - "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class." [FN236]
Furthermore, the court's citation of Glanzer as an example of such knowing inducement is problematic because Glanzer is inapplicable: both the crucial factual predicates and the justification for the decision tum on the personal relationship between the bean weigher and the purchaser. The weigher not only knew the identity of the purchaser but also personally provided him with a copy of the weight receipt. [FN237] It was this fact that prompted Cardozo to characterize
his decision in Glanzer as involving a relationship "so close as to approach privity." [FN238] It was this personal relationship between the weigher and purchaser that provided a substitute for privity and allowed the court to impose a tort
duty on the weigher. In Duffm, the evidence indicates that ICIA had never had any contact with the Duffms or any knowledge of them as individuals. The reliance that ICIA induced in the Duffms was no different than the reliance it
"induced" in thousands of potato farmers. This reliance provides no significant limitation to potential liability. The
court's abandonment of the personal element of special relationships thus is problematic because it offers no apparent
basis for limiting !CIA's liability.
The potential thus created for unlimited liability is part of a more basic difficulty. The court has mischaracterized the
essential nature of the case. Not only was there no personal relationship between ICIA and the Duffms, there was no
privity between the parties: ICIA had not contracted with the Duffins to certify the potatoes. Rather, it had contracted
with CFI to provide testing and certification services. The case thus involves a service contract between defendant and a
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third party - it is, in other words, analogous to cases such as Just's [FN239] and Idaho Bank &Trust [FN240J rather than
to McAlvain. [FN241]
This problem implicates the court's second decision - the conclusion that the Duffins did not state a claim in negligent misrepresentation.

*280 B. Negligent Misrepresentation
The Duffins also predicated their case on a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The district court had granted summary judgment on this claim and the supreme court affirmed summarily: "we expressly hold that, except in the narrow
con!mes of a professional relationship involving an accountant, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized
in Idaho." [FN242]
The difficulty with this summary decision is that Duffin in fact is a negligent misrepresentation case. The defming
characteristic of such cases is that defendant has a contract with a third party to provide that person with a service weighing beans in Glanzer, preparing a certified balance sheet in U1tramares, or preparing a financial statement in Idaho
Bank & Trust - the service is performed negligently - the beans are misweighed or insolvency is undetected - and the representation that embodies the completed service - the receipt or balance sheet or financial statement - reaches the plaintiff
who relies upon it to her detriment. This is what occurred in Duffin: ICIA contracted with CFI to test its seed potatoes so
that they could be certified if they met the requirements; ICIA failed to detect the presence of bacterial ring rot in the
potatoes and negligently certified them; the Duffms relied upon the certification - a representation that they were diseasefree - to their detriment.
The court, of course, has the power to extend liability and to craft new exceptions. In previous cases, the court has relied upon the special-relationship concept to justify the imposition of a tort duty in addition to the parties' assumed contract duties and there is nothing inherently troubling about relying upon the special-relationship concept as the basis for
allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentation. A special relationship can readily serve as a privity substitute to limit
liability - this was after all the rationale in Glanzer. [FN243] But Glanzer involved a personal relationship: the bean
weigher not only knew the identity of the purchaser but also provided a copy of the weight receipt to him personally.
This, then, is the ultimate problem with the court's decision in Duffm: the court both expanded the special-relationship concept by removing the requirement that there be a personal relationship between *281 the parties and extended it to a new group of cases in which there was no privity between the parties. This means that the court creates the potential for unlimited liability because both the personal nature of the relationship and privity that had previously served to
limit liability are no longer required.
Additionally, the policy concerns that traditionally have dominated this area of law do not justify the extension. The
Duffms were not endangered by the potatoes; the tort concern for safety of person or property was not implicated. Instead, the Duffins were disappointed by the quality of the seed potatoes because they were not as they were represented
to be - the traditional contract concern. Given this, it is difficult to see why the Duffms should not be left to the contract
they had with the seller, CFI.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS
There seems to be a natural desire to compose sweeping summaries: "the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract"; [FN244] or: "Contract ... is dead"; [FN245] or, again: "economic
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loss generally cannot be recovered in torts." [FN246] The difficulty with such statements - however much apparent order
they may bring at a global level - lies in the loss of detail.
The Idaho Supreme Court's desire to write a simple summation of the law on recovery of economic loss in tort led it
into oversimplification. Not only has the court previously allowed recovery of economic loss in more than two limited
exceptions, but it has also developed a far more complex body of law on the question. Duffm's oversimplification of that
body of case law raises significant questions: what does the court mean when it speaks of a "special relationship"? Its
nod to "equitable" and its emphasis on expertise and induced reliance, seem unbounded when stripped of the requirement
that the relationship be personal. Similarly, the court's extremely summary disposition of the negligent misrepresentation
claim is problematic, since Duffin itself seems to be such a claim. How is the court's rejection to be understood? And if
Duffin is not a negligent misrepresentation case, does it sub silencio overrule Just's since both cases arise out of the
breach of a contract with a third party?
Ultimately, this article is a plea that the court require more. Idaho has more than a century's worth of tort cases. They
form a rich narrative that examines recurring issues from a variety of perspectives. The question of whether economic
loss should be recoverable in *282 tort actions, for example, has been discussed in the context of contract between the
parties for the sale of goods or services, in the context of contract for the sale of goods or service where the parties to the
suit are not the parties to the contract, and when there is no contract. Each of these situations involves different factual issues; they raise different policy concerns. The court should not be too quick to lump this variety into a simple generalrule-with-two-exceptions pigeonhole - to do so is to lose the learning that is embodied in the narrative. Rather, the court
should add to the narrative, enriching the jurisprudence by adding its own stories, its ovm explanations.

[FNal). Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D., University of Oregon; A.B., Columbia College. I
appreciate the comments of Joarm Henderson, Debra Kronenberg, Monique Lillard, Jack McKinney, and Cathy Silak on
earlier versions of this article.
[FNl]. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986). See also Grant Gilmore, The
Death of Contract 87 (1974) ('"contract' is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of'tort."').
[FN2]. East River Steamship, 476 U.S. at 874.
[FN3]. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.). As the Idaho Supreme Court long ago
noted, "It is contrary to natural justice to say ... that the plaintiffs ... must suffer their loss in silence, and the defendant
... is under no obligation to compensate plaintiffs for their loss." Wilson v. Boise City, 6 Idaho 391, 399, 55 P. 887, 890
(1899).
[FN4]. For ideologically pure statements, see Charles Fried, Contract As Promise (1981); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory
of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
[FN5]. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 95.
[FN6]. 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
[FN7]. Id. at 336, 581 P.2d at 794 (footnote omitted).
[FN8]. There are, of course, other markers along the boundary. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that emo-
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tional distress cannot be sought when the relationship between the parties arises out of a contract. In such cases, plaintiff
must seek punitive damages. See Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 669 P.2d 1371 (1985). But see Walston v. Monumental
Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 218-20, 923 P.2d 456, 463-65 (1996) (emotional distress may be recovered in a relationship
based on contract when there is a special relationship between the parties).
[FN9]. "Pure" economic loss is an economic loss independent of physical injury to the plaintiffs person or property. The
qualification is essential because economic losses are fully recoverable when a plaintiff has also suffered personal injury
or property da..'!lage. E.g., L & L Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Boise Water Corp., 120 Idaho 107, 813 P.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1991)
(property damage); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974) (personal injury).
[FNl 0]. This distinction has a long and particularly well-known history since it is the central storyline in the series of
cases tracing the evolution of products liability. See Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 6-19 (1948).
[FNll]. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842).
[FN12]. Id. at 405 (Abinger, C.B.); see also Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
[FN13]. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
[FN14]. Id. at 1053. MacPherson and its progeny are examined in William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69
YaJe L.J. 1099 (1960).
[FN15]. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405 (Abinger, C.B.).
[FN16). 99 Idaho 462,583 P.2d 997 (1978).
[FN17]. Id. at470, 583 P.2dat 1005 (citations omitted); see also Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163,112 P. 686 (1910).
[FN18]. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S. at 866.
[FN19]. In the classic Cardozo phrase, to hold an accountant liable to non-contracting pa.'iies for negligently auditing
books exposed the accountant to liability "in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 175 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931).
[FN20]. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.).
[FN21]. 126 Idaho 1002, 895 P.2d 1195 (1995). A companion case- Feld v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho
1014, 895 P.2d 1207 (1995)- presented essentially identical facts and was decided on the basis ofDuffm.
[FN22]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200.
[FN23]. Id. at 1005, 895 P.2d at 1198.
[FN24]. Id. at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199.
[FN25]. Id. at 1009-10, 895 P.2d at 1202-03. The trial court also held that ICIA was an instrumentality of the state and
that the Idaho Tort Claims Act therefore applied. Id. at 1008-09, 895 P.2d at 1201-02. The case presented additional issues on the existence of warranties and the effectiveness of disclaimers in the dealings between the Duffms and CFI. The
trial court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on these issues; the supreme court affmned those decision. Id. at
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1010-13,895 P.2d at 1203-06.
[FN26J. 99 Idaho 326,581 P.2d 784 (1978).
[FN27]. 99 Idaho 462,583 P.2d 997 (1978).
[FN28]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200.
[FN29]. Id.
[FN30]. The court actually writes that "there are exceptions to the general rule of non-recovery" of "purely economic
losses in a negligence action." Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. The first of these, it states, is that "economic
loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or property." Id. This "exception" is not in fact an exception to the "general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in all negligence actions," since the losses
are not "purely economic" when they are accompanied by either personal injury or property damage.
[FN31]. 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975).
[FN32]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007-08, 895 P.2d at 1200-01.
[FN33]. "Over the mountain/Down in the valley/Lives a former talk-show host! Everybody knows his name/He says
there's no doubt about it/It was the myth of fmgerprints/I've seen them all and man/They're all the same." Paul Simon,
All Around the World or The Myth of Fingerprints, on Graceland (Warner Brothers Records 1986).
[FN34]. Just's simply states the same enigmatic "unique circumstances requiring a different allocation of risk" exception,
Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978), and in tum cites Union Oil Co. v.
Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
[FN35]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
[FN36]. Id.
[FN37]. Id. In addition, the court concluded that a second defendant - the Federal-State Inspection Service - had done
nothing "actively ... to induce reliance" and therefore did not have a special relationship with the purchasers of certified
seed. Id.
[FN38]. Id. at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203. The decision to which the court implicitly refers is Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v.
First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989). Idaho Bank & Trust held that an accountant can be held liable for
negligent misrepresentation under specific circumstances. Id. at 1083, 772 P.2d at 721. Although the court's statement in
Duffin is absolute, the extent to which the prohibition applies to claims for personal injury or property damage, the language is dicta.
[FN39]. Cf. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975)
("A plaintiff can seek recovery of damages ... for personal injury, property damage, and economic loss. Although personal injuries stand distinctly apart from the other two categories, a delineation between the latter two is necessary.").
[FN40]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1199.
[FN41]. 97 Idaho 348,544 P.2d 306 (1975).

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY

http://web2. westlaw .com/printlprintstream.aspx?mt=BusinessPrac&utid=2&prft=HTMLE...

8/12/2011

Page 33 of46

34 IDLR225
34 Idaho L. Rev. 225

Page 33

[FN42]. Id. at 351,544 P.2d at309.
[FN43]. Id.
[FN44]. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
[FN45]. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984).
[FN46}. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987).
[FN47J. 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1987).
[FN48]. Id. at 426, 732 P.2d at 664. Alternatively, the court might have held that the loss of the cattle was property damage because the category "transactional property" applies only to transactions between a buyer and a seller. Such a distinction would narrow the term "transactional," but would do violence either to the term or to the rationale for the definition.
[FN49]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007 n.5, 895 P.2d at 1200 n.5.
[FN50]. 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991).
[FN51]. Counter-examples to G & M Farms are also available. For example, in Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95
Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974), a bean farmer who sought to recover for lost profits when he was required to recall a
crop of seed beans rendered unusable by a defect in a pesticide-fungicide manufactured by defendant was permitted to
proceed under alternative theories of strict liability in tort, negligence, and breach of warranty. In a subsequent case, the
court categorized the losses in Shields as "property damage" - even though the loss occurred in the context of a commercial transaction indistinguishable from that in G & M Farms. See Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 332,
581 P.2d 784,790 (1978).
[FN52]. 114 Idaho 432, 757 P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988) (review denied).
[FN53]. Id. at 436, 757 P.2d at 699. The holding in Myers was prefigured in Clark where the court quoted extensively
from Prosser's Handbook on the Law of Torts that a seller might be liable in negligence for damage to the defective
product where the damage is caused by an accident but not when "there is no accident." Clark v. International Harvester
Co., 99 Idaho at 333, 581 P.2d at 791 (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 101, at 665 (4th ed.
1971)). The court in Clark did not, however, emphasize the point, and the issue was not presented by the facts.
[FN54J. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306,309 (1975).
[FN55]. Myers, 114 Idaho 432, 757 P.2d 695.
[FN56]. Id. at 436, 757 P.2d at 699.
[FN57]. Id.
[FN58]. See Salmon Rivers, 97 Idaho at 351, 544 P.2d at 309. Plaintiff in a subsequent case also involving a malfunctioning aircraft raised the issue, arguing that the economic loss was caused by the plaintiff's refusal to use the aircraft
given the "potential for calamitous personal injury or property damage" if it again fell out of the sky. Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc., 119 Idaho 626, 631, 809 P.2d 487, 492 (1991) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (quoting Appel-
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Iants Brief). The court did not reach the question. The court has reached a similar result at other points of contact
between tort and contract. For example, in 1985 the court held that emotional distress could not be recovered in an action
for breach of contract; if the conduct was sufficiently outrageous, recovery might be available in punitive damages.
Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371 (1985). In a subsequent decision the court refused to allow emotional distress for the negligent repair of an aircraft - even though the discovery of the problem occurred when the plane was airborne. Hathaway v. Krumery, 110 Idaho 515,716 P.2d 1287 (1986) (per curiam).
[FN59]. Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or. 1978) (Linde, J.).

[FN60]. This appears to be the majority rule. E.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S.
858, 870-71 (1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965). There is, however, substantial diversity on
the topic. See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663 (N.J. 1985) (commercial buyer may recover for pure economic loss only in contract); Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1970)
(consumer may recover pure economic loss in strict liability in tort); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d at 1387 (tort
recovery for pure economic loss permitted when the user is "endangered" rather than "disappointed"); Berg v. General
Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818,822 (Wash. 1976) (pure economic loss may be recovered in negligence).
[FN61]. The most frequently cited justification for rules is efficiency: by providing a clear line between competing universes, a rule reduces the costs of litigation over the boundary. Those whose claims fall on the contract side of the line
will forebear when they can only hope to recover in tort. The gain, of course, is purchased at some loss of equity since a
case-by-case determination produces fairer results. Contrariwise, the gains in equity are purchased at the cost of increased indeterminacy and inefficiency. See East River Steamship, 476 U.S. at 870.
[FN62]. Id. at 870. The rationale obviously assumes the conclusion: contract rules protect contract interests better than
do tort principles.
[FN63]. Id.
[FN64]. "A warranty action also has a built-in limitation on liability, whereas a tort action could subject the manufacturer
to damages of an indefinite amount" because "foreseeability is an inadequate brake. . . . Permitting recovery to all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make the manufacturer liable for vast sums." Id. at 874.
[FN65). For example, in a decision decided before Salmon Rivers but reaffirmed after that decision, the court held that
nontransactional property damaged in a non-calamitous event was "property damage" rather than "economic loss."
Shields v. Morton Chern. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,
332,581 P.2d 784, 790 (1978) (categorizing the losses in Shields as "property damage").
[FN66]. See Oppenheimer Indus. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423,426, 732 P.2d 661, 664 (1987).
[FN67]. 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200.
[FN68]. Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
[FN69]. See Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
[FN70]. See Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984).
[FN71]. See McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777,554 P.2d 955 (1976).
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[FN72]. See Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
[FN73J. See Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989).
[FN74]. See Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910).
[FN75]. Oppenheimer Indus. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1987).
[FN76]. E.g., Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944).
[FN77]. 94 Idaho 133,483 P.2d 664 (1971).
[FN78]. See id. at 138, 483 P.2d at 669 (fmding an exception for "those situations in which misfeasance rather than nonfeasance was the issue"). For example, the court of appeals has held that a defendant who had contracted to install a water heater could be liable in negligence if the water heater lacked a pressure relief valve:
Negligence in the sense of nonperformance of a contract will not sustain an action sounding in tort, in the
absence of a liability imposed by law independent of that arising out of the contract itself; rather, active negligence or
misfeasance is necessary to support an action in tort based upon a breach of contract. Taylor v. Herbold .... Here Galbraith's claim does not assert nonperformance by Vangas of a contract to install a water heater. The water heater was, in
fact, installed. Rather, the complaint, in substance, alleges misfeasance by Vangas in installing a water heater which
lacked a pressure relief valve
.... The contract for sale and installation of a water heater (complete with a pressure relief device) established
the relationship, and certain obligations, between the parties. But each of them also brought into this relationship a more
general duty. This is the duty that "one owes ... to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to
the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care
might result in such injury."
Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 914, 655 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho
617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980) (quoting Kirby v. Sonville, 594 P.2d 818, 821 (Or. 1979))). Because the Taylor court
does not emphasize the fact that the loss was solely economic, it does not note that its first exception will rarely, if ever,
produce exclusively economic loss.
[FN79]. Taylor, 94 Idaho at 138,483 P.2d at 669.
(FN80]. 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
(FN81]. Id. at 334,581 P.2d at 792 (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965)).
[FN82]. Although Clark was a negligence action, the court's discussion focused more broadly on "tort" actions including
strict liability in tort claims. See id. at 333-36, 581 P.2d 791-94. The case has subsequently been cited as deciding that
"economic loss ... will not support a tort action in either negligence or strict liability." State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108
Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1984). The issue appears never to have been argued. This ambiguity may account
for the Duffm court's seeming vacillation on the scope of the general rule. Although the court states that there is "a general rule prohibiting recovery of purely economic losses in all negligence actions," it also writes that there are exceptions
which allow recovery of such losses "in tort" under some circumstances. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200
(emphasis added). The prohibition includes only non-intentional torts. Pure economic losses can be recovered in fraud,
an intentional tort that is located on the fuzzy tort-contract boundary. See, e.g., Zuhlke v. Anderson Buick, Inc., 94 Idaho
634, 496 P.2d 95 (1972); Edmark Motors, Inc. v. Twin Cities Toyota, Inc., 111 Idaho 846, 727 P.2d 1274 (Ct. App. 1987).
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(FN83]. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,40-41,740 P.2d 1022, 1025-26 (1987).
[FN84). Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406,411,690 P.2d 341,346 (1984).
[FN85]. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 527, 808 P.2d 851,864 (1991).
(FN86]. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1984).
[FN87]. See Adkison, 107 Idaho 406,690 P.2d 341.
[FN88). Id. at 410, 410-11, 690 P.2d at 345, 345-46.
(FN89]. The change from hand-made to mass-produced with its resulting depersonalization of the
chase of products was one rationale for changing the law of products liability from contract to tort.
producer to avoid responsibility for the danger it built into a product by avoiding any contact with
user. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Co., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (Traynor, J.); Escola v.
436, 440, 443-44 (CaL 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1916) (Cardozo, J.).

contract for the purContract allowed the
the actual purchaser/
Coca Cola, 150 P.2d
1050, 1053-54 (N.Y.

(FN90]. "Special relationships" as a source of the duty of care are not limited to cases involving economic loss. To understand the role of such special relationships in tort, it is helpful to note briefly the bigger picture. Duty in negligence
can be conceived as falling into four broad categories: (1) a general duty to act with care when the actor creates a risk:
when an individual acts in a manner that imposes a foreseeable risk of harm on others, the actor generally has a duty to
act with due care to minimize the risk. E.g., Wilson v. Boise City, 6 Idaho 391, 55 P. 887 (1899). (2) a general no-duty
when the individual does not create the risk: when the individual did not create the risk, she generally does not have a
duty to act either to minimize the risk or to protect individuals subject to it. E.g., Fagundes v. State, 116 Idaho 173, 774
P.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1989). The distinction is often characterized as the difference between misfeasance - which subjects
the actor to a duty to act with care - and nonfeasance - which does not give rise to a duty to act to protect. The distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance can be paper thin. See, e.g., Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 (9th
Cir. 1975); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980). (3) exceptions to the no-duty-to-act rule: in some
situations, the court has been willing to impose a duty to act when the individual did not herself create the risk. For example, when the individual assumes a duty, e.g., Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990); Davis
v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931), or there is a special relationship between defendant and plaintiff, e.g., S.H.
Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973); Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954), or
between defendant and a third party whose conduct is the source of the risk, e.g., Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P .2d 318
(1931), the court has imposed duties to protect others from harm. (4) limited duty situations are situations in which the
court has been unwilling to apply the general duty-to-act-with-care standard to activities that cause certain types of injuries. The paradigm example is emotional distress: concern with unlimited liability and potentially fraudulent claims has
led the court to fashion duty rules that stop far short of the traditional "foreseeability" limitations on tort liability. See,
e.g., Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37 (1990); Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist. No.
231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640 (1989). Economic loss falls into this category. In addition to the broad similarities
among the different types of limited duty situations, there are also similarities between the types of factual patterns and
policies that will lead to the creation of a duty-to-act under the third category and the patterns and policies that will lead
to more expansive liability for the limited duty interests in the fourth category. The most striking of these is the "special
relationship" category: the court has been willing to impose a duty-to-act when there is a sufficient relationship between
either plaintiff and defendant, e.g., Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990) (landlord/tenant's
employee); Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989) (school/student); Merritt v. State,
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108 Idaho 20, 696 P.2d 871 (1985) Gailer/jailed); Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 500 P.2d 218 (1972)
(quasi-common carrier/passenger); Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954) (conunon carrier/passenger); McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909) (race promoter/jockey), or between
defendant and the third party who has created the risk, e.g., Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980)
(bartender/consumer); Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931) (doctor/nurse). These "special relationships" are
conceptually indistinguishable from the "special relationships" involved in the pure economic loss cases. One recurrent
source of "special relationships" in the duty-to-act context are service contracts. See, e.g., S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman,
95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973) (boiler repairer had a duty to inspect the external safety devices on boiler and thus
was potentially liable for boiler explosion not caused by the repairer's work); Clark v. T&-r, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016
(1954) (common carrier had a duty to protect passengers from risk of alternative transportation after bus broke down).
[FN91]. Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910).
[FN92]. McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777,554 P.2d 955 (1976).
[FN93]. Dick v. Reese, 90 Idaho 447,412 P.2d 815 (1966).
[FN94]. McAlvain, 97 Idaho at 780, 554 P.2d at 958; see also Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1120. Although the
court did not note it, the law applicable to the sale of products does offer an analogue to the factual patterns that characterize "special relationships" - and the Uniform Commercial Code has provided an implied warranty that reflects such relationships. The Code provides that, when a purchaser informs the seller of the purchaser's particular needs and the seller
makes a recommendation upon which the purchaser relies, the seller has impliedly warranted the product to be fit for the
purchaser's particular purposes. Idaho Code§ 28-2-315 (1995).
[FN95]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
[FN96]. Id.
[FN97). 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976).
[FN98]. The court did not canvas the many decisions that have recognized relationships as sufficiently "special" to create
a duty in negligence. Thus, it did not fully articulate the factors required to denominate a relationship as "special."
[FN99). Cases involving special relationships are difficult to collect because they fall through the cracks in both the older
digesting system and the newer computerized systems: the digests do not have a category for "special relationship" and
not all cases that involve the issue employ the terminology.
[FNIOOJ. See, e.g., S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973).
[FNlOl]. E.g., Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910).
[FN102]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007,895 P.2d at 1200.
[FN103]. See generally Norman F. Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 411 (1927).
[FN104]. See Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 500 P.2d 218 (1972) (a private bus line that acted like a
common carrier would be treated as a common carrier).
[FN105]. Public callings are exceptions to several doctrines. For example, the court has imposed liability on public call-
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ings in situations that would otherwise be characterized as nonfeasance. See, e.g., Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d
1016 (1954); Rosendahl v. Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 P. 293 (1926); see also DavidS. Bogen, The Innkeeper's Tale: The Legal Development of a Public Calling, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 51, 51-53 (discussing theories on basis of public callings and the extension of the category into other legal areas); Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for
Awards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 2033, 2043-44 (1987) (exception to
exclusion of punitive damages).
[FN106]. 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910).
[FN107J. Cf. Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984) (state-licensed outfitter could contractually limit liability for its own negligence).
[FN108]. Strong, 18 Idaho at 400-01, 109 P. at 913 (citation omitted).
[FNI09]. Id. at402, 109 P. at 914.
[FNllO]. 34 Idaho 37, 198 P. 671 (1921).
[FNI I 1]. Id. at 39, 198 P. at 671.
[FN112]. Id. at 40, 198 P. at 671.
[FN113]. Strong, 18 Idaho at 404, 109 P. at 915 (emphasis added).
[FNI 14]. As one commentary on public callings has noted: "Frequently in defming rules of law we must delve deeply into the past to fmd the reason for the rule of conduct or liability." Arterburn, supra note 103, at 411.
[FN115]. Although "[a]n inn is a refuge from the perilous world outside," the duties imposed on innkeepers flowed from
the fact that the "[d]angers outside the inn were less significant than the dangers within." Bogen, supra note 105, at 91.
[FN116]. See, e.g., Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251,270 P.2d 1016 (1954).
[FN117]. E.g., Shockley v. Tennyson Transfer & Storage, Inc., 76 Idaho 131, 278 P.2d 795 (1955). Cf. Rosendahl v.
Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 P. 293 (1926) (plaintiff stored bonds in a safe deposit box that was robbed).
[FN118]. Carscallen v. Lakeside HighwayDist., 44 Idaho 724,260 P. 162 (1927).
[FNI19]. Ford v. Transport Holding Corp., 96 Idaho 388, 529 P.2d 784 (1974).
[FN120]. Glover v. Spraker, 50 Idaho 16, 292 P. 613 (1930).
[FN121]. Cluerv. Leahy, 44 Idaho 320,256 P. 760 (1927).
[FN122]. Anthony Fitz-herbert, The New Natura Brevium § 94d, at 225 (London: corrected & rev'd ed. 1666).
[FN123]. 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976).
[FN124]. Id. at 780, 554 P.2d at 958 (citations omitted); see also Bales v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 53 Idaho 327, 24 P.2d
57 (1933) (insurance company was liable in negligence when its agent failed to renew an insurance policy on plaintiffs
oats); Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 P. 1009 (1918) (insurance company was liable in negligence
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when its agent failed to write an insurance policy on plaintiffs drugstore).
[FN125]. McAlvain, 97 Idaho at 780, 554 P.2d at 958.
[FN126]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at ll20.
[FN127]. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Smith, Ill Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986); Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63
(1985); Owyhee County v. Rite, 100 Idaho 91,593 P.2d 995 (1979).
[FN128]. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982).
[FN129). E.g., Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d 293 (1992); Fitzgerald v. Walker, 113 Idaho 730, 747 P.2d
752 (1987), following remand, 121 Idaho 589, 826 P.2d 1301 (1992); Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 813 P.2d 350
(1991); Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleism & Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 748 P.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1987).
[FN130]. Williams v. Blakely, 114 Idaho 323, 757 P.2d 186 (1988).
[FN131]. Osborn v. Ahrens, 116 Idaho 14,773 P.2d 282 (1989).
[FN132]. Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co., 39 Idaho 238, 227 P. 34 (1924); Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho
440, 126 P. 612 (1912). Cf. Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82 (1982) (where defendant undertook to
insure plaintiffs' title and did not undertake to abstract that title, it was liable in contract for the amount of the policy and
was not liable in tort).
[FN133]. 53 Idaho 327, 24 P.2d 57 (1933).
[FN134]. Id. at 330, 24 P.2d at 57.
[FN135]. Id. at 335, 337, 24 P.2d at 59, 60.
[FN136]. The misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy recurs in cases such as Taylor v. Herbold where defendant agreed to
purchase plaintiffs potatoes and then failed to remove them from the cellar. The court rejected tort liability in part because "active negligence or misfeasance is necessary to support an action in tort based on a breach of contract; mere nonfeasance ... is not sufficient." Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho at 138, 483 P.2d at 669 (quoting 1 C.J.S. Actions § 49(c)
(1955)). The existence of a "special relationship" thus overcomes the nonfeasance by obligating the duty-bound person to act.
[FN137]. Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffm & Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607,612, 873 P.2d 861, 866 (1994).
[FN138]. 119 Idaho 171,804 P .2d 900 (1991).
[FN139]. Id. at 176, 804 P.2d at 905. The court has reiterated this conclusion on several occasions. E.g., Eliopulos v.
Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 848 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1992), (review denied (1993)); Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991).
[FN140]. "Although McAlvain dealt with the existence of a professional or quasi-professional relationship, we do not
limit the 'special relations' exception exclusively to such cases." Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
[FN141]. 85 Idaho 503,380 P.2d 898 (1963).
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[FN142]. Id. at 507-08, 380 P.2d at 901 (emphasis added) (quoting 38 Am. Jur. Negligence§ 20 at 662 (1954)).
[FN143]. Id. at 505, 380 P.2d at 899.
[FN144}. 90 Idaho 447,412 P.2d 815 (1966).
[FN145). Id. at451, 412 P.2d at 817 (quoting 8 Am Jur. 2d Bailments § 220 (1963)).
[FN146]. Id. at 452, 412 P.2d at 817 (citations omitted); see also Beare v. Stowes' Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317,
658 P.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1983).
[FN'147]. See, e.g., Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 690-91, 682 P.2d 640, 643-44 (1984) (action seeking to
recover for dropping a pump back into a well when defendant was seeking to remove the pump for repairs sounded in
tort rather than contract).
[FN148]. Cf. Ralph J. Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1131 (1995).
[FN149]. 106 Idaho 787, 683 P.2d 435 (1984).
[FNI50]. Id. at 790-91, 683 P.2d at 438-39.
[FN151]. Id. at 791, 683 P.2d at 439.
[FN152]. 93 Idaho 496,465 P.2d 107 (1970).
[FN153]. Id. at 498-99, 499-500, 465 P.2d at 109-10, 111-12. Cf. Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100
Idaho 175, 178-79, 595 P.2d 709, 712-13 (1979) (discussing Rawlings). See also Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976,
695 P.2d 361 (1984).
[FN154]. The court has stated that such clauses will not be enforced when there is "an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power" or defendant is engaged in a "public calling." Steiner, 106 Idaho at 791, 683 P.2d at 439; Rawlings, 93 Idaho
at 499-500,465 P.2d at 111-12; Strong, 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. at 913.
[FNI55]. Knoblock, 85 Idaho at 507-08, 380 P.2d at 901 (quoting 38 Am. Jur. Negligence§ 20 at 662 (1954)).
[FN156]. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 408, 848 P.2d 984, 992 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted) (review denied
(1993)).
[FNI57]. Knoblock, 85 Idaho 503, 380 P.2d 898. Cf. Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007, 712 P.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1985)
(expressing doubt on the application of the no-duty rule to construction of a water system at a trailer court - an issue not
assigned as error).
[FN158]. Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 682 P.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1984) (review denied).
[FNI59]. Dick v. Reese, 90 Idaho 447, 412 P.2d 815 (1966); see also Beare v. Stowes' Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho
317,658 P.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1983).
[FNI60]. S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973).
[FN161]. Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 655 P.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1982).
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[FN162]. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975).
[FN163]. Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408,415, 546 P.2d 54,61 (1975).
[FN164]. Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 P. 612 (1912).
[FN165]. McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976) (emphasis added); see also
Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975) ("In circumstances involving the rendition
of personal services the duty upon the actor is to perform the services in a workmanlike manner.").
[FN166]. McAlvain, 97 Idaho at 780,554 P.2d at 958.
[FN167]. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P .2d 997 (1978).
[FN168]. Although these third-party cases are often categorized as negligent misrepresentation, it is important to note
that these are not the only type of cases that can be so characterized. For example, if the owner of an automobile takes it
into a repair shop complaining of strange noises and the repairer tells her, "Everything is just fme" when he has no basis
for his statement, the repairer's conduct might also be characterized as a negligent misrepresentation. E.g., Pabon v.
Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 164 A.2d 773 (N.J. 1960); see also Intermountain Constr. Co. v. City of Ammon, 122 Idaho
931, 841 P.2d 1082 (1992) (allegations that city had negligently misrepresented the cost of building permits).
[FN169]. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho 1082,772 P.2d 720 (1989).
[FN170]. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
(FN171]. The alternative characterization question extends beyond the third party service contract context to include
many service contracts in which there is a contract between the parties. For example, McAlvain v. General Insurance Co.
of America, 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976), can be viewed either as a negligent performance of a service case
(failing to insure the business fully) or a negligent misrepresentation case (misrepresenting the status of the insurance on
the business).
[FN172]. Id.
[FN173]. 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
[FN174]. Id. at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005. The court, however, did hold that plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the
contract between defendant and the city. Id. at 467, 583 P.2d at 1002.
[FN175]. Id.
[FN176]. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
[FN177]. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
[FN178]. Id. at 444.
[FN179]. Id. at 446.
[FN180). 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
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[FN181]. Id. at 118.
[FN182]. 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989).
[FN183]. Id. at 1083-84, 772 P.2d at 721-22.
[FN184]. The court subsequently reaff11111ed its conclusion that negligent misrepresentation, "as recognized in Idaho
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho at 1082, 772 P.2d at 720 (1989), is a viable cause of action in Idaho."
Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474,479, 797 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1990).
[FN185]. 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983).
[FN186]. Id. at 790, 673 P.2d 390. Cf. Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chartered, 98 Idaho Sup. Ct. Rep. 205
(1998) (plaintiff cannot recover for her collateral claims for injuries allegedly done to her husband).
[FN187]. 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910).
[FN188]. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909).
[FN189]. Cain, 19 Idaho at 167-69, 112 P. at 687-88.
[FN190]. Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944); Kloepferv. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919).
[FN191]. 39 Idaho 238,227 P. 34 (1924).
[FN192J. Id. at 244-45, 227 P. at 36.
[FN193]. 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1987).
[FN194]. Id. at 425, 732 P.2d at 663. The court's analysis in Oppenheimer is less than clear. Although the court holds
that the regulation creates a duty to protect cattle owners, its decision muddles the distinction between property damage
and economic loss by holding that the loss of the cattle was property damage. This is incorrect under Salmon Rivers
Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975), since the cattle were the transactional
property. As the court in Duffin tacitly acknowledged, Oppenheimer's distinction between lost and damaged property is
logically insupportable. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007 n.5, 895 P.2d at 1200 n.5. It thus is better to consider Oppenheimer to
involve a statutory duty to protect against economic loss. In a subsequent decision, the court has seemingly confused duties based on statutory standards and duties based on the relationship between the parties. In Tomich v. City of Pocatello,
127 Idaho 394, 901 P.2d 501 (1995), the owners of a small airplane that was stored at a municipal airport brought an action to recover for the destruction of the airplane when the tie-downs failed in a wind storm. The court aff11111ed a judgment for the owner on the ground that there was a special relationship between the owner of the airplane and the owner
of the airport. The court relied upon certain statutory obligation to support its conclusion that there was a special relationship. The court, however, fails to explain why statutes create a special relationship, seeming to confuse these two sources
of a duty in tort.
[FN195]. See Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983).
[FN196]. Idaho Code§ 5-311 (1990).
[FN197]. 118 Idaho 474, 797 P.2d 1322 (1990).
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[FN198]. Id. at 477-78, 797 P.2d at 1325-26.
[FN199]. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,336, 581 P.2d 784,794 (1978).
[FN200]. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978) (citations omitted).
[FN201]. In Taylor, the court stated this distinction as the difference between misfeasing and nonfeasing: where defendant has not created a risk (misfeased) but simply failed to act, it has not endangered plaintiff and thus has not invaded any
tort inter est. Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho at 138-39, 483 P.2d at 669-70. The same concern is present in Myers where the
court of appeals refused to allow a tort action for property damage because the "injuries did not result from a calamitous
event or dangerous failure of the product." Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, 114 Idaho 432, 436, 757 P.2d 695,
699 (Ct. App. 1988) (review denied).
[FN202]. Clark, 99 Idaho at 336, 581 P.2d at 794.
[FN203]. In addition to this doctrinal basis, the court has also provided a rationale for restricting recovery to contract
claims based on the constitutional allocation of powers between the judicial and the legislative/executive departments of
state government. As the court noted in Clark, the legislature had enacted the Uniform Commercial Code which
"contains a comprehensive and finely tuned statutory mechanism for dealing with the rights of parties to a sales transaction." Id. at 334, 581 P.2d at 792; see also Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200; Adkison Corp. v. American
Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 410, 690 P.2d 341, 345 (1984). To replace these statutory mechanisms with tort law would alter the balance struck by the legislature - the UCC, for example, with its tolerance, if not permissiveness, of disclaimers
is generally more favorable to sellers - and would arguably have a "corrosive effect" on the constitutional power granted
to that body. Clark, 99 Idaho at 335, 581 P.2d at 793.
[FN204]. White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1986). C£ Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975) ("In circumstances involving the rendition of personal services the
duty upon the actor is to perform the services in a workmanlike manner." (emphasis added)); McAlvain v. General Ins.
Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976) ("An insurance agent performs a personal service for his client"; contracts for sale of goods do "not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge
and experience.").
[FN205]. See, e.g., Merritt v. State, 108 Idaho 20, 696 P.2d 871 (1985) (jailer/inmate); Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No.
331, 116 Idaho 586,778 P.2d 336 (1989) (school/pupil).
[FN206]. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975) (quoting Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
v. Superior Burner Serv., 427 P.2d 833, 840 (Alaska 1967}); see also Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline
Corp., 97 Idaho 408,415,546 P.2d 54,61 (1975}.
[FN207]. The rationale is often stated most clearly in cases asserting that a doctor breached a contractual duty to cure the
patient. In Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164, 168, 409 P.2d 110, 112 (1965), the court rejected such a claim, noting
that "in the absence of a specific agreement, an agreement of a practitioner with his patient is one for services and treatment, not for a particular result." See also Ogle v. De Sano, 107 Idaho 872, 693 P.2d 1074 (Ct. App. 1984); Trimming v.
Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932).
[FN208]. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978); see also Cain v. Vollmer,
19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910).
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[FN209]. See, e.g., Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 429 P.2d 397 (1967); Garrett v. Taylor, 69 Idaho 487, 210 P.2d 386
(1949). There is no reason to assume that the traditional rule is inapplicable to economic losses. The driver who runs
down a millionaire can expect to pay more than the driver who kills a bum.
[FN210]. Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984).
[FN211]. The Uniform Commercial Code and the Idaho Products Liability Reform Act explicitly and implicitly remove
privity requirements in transactions for the sale/purchase of goods. See Idaho Code § 28-2-318 (1995) (express and implied warranties may not be limited by seller when personal injuries occur); Idaho Code § 6-1407(1) (1990) (product
sellers other than manufacturers generally not liable when manufacturers are answerable for "harm" to claimants).
[FN212]. Just's, 99 Idaho at 466-67, 583 P.2d at 1001-02.
[FN213). 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
[FN214]. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441,446 (N.Y. 1931) (explaining the decision in Glanzer).
(FN215]. E.g., Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989).
(FN216]. Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
[FN217]. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909).
[FN218]. Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 169, 112 P. 686,688 (1910).
[FN219]. Duffm v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1004-06, 895 P.2d 1195, 1197-99.
[FN220]. Id. at 1008,895 P.2dat 1201.
[FN221]. Id. at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203.
[FN222]. Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
[FN223J. E.g., Steiner Corp. v. American Dist. Tel., 106 Idaho 787, 791, 683 P.2d 435, 439 {1984); Rawlings v. Layne &
Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 499, 465 P .2d 107, 110 (1970).
[FN224]. Cf. Dale D. Goble, Of Defamation and Decisionmaking: Weimer v. Rankin and the Abdication of Appellate
Responsibility, 28 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1991).
[FN225]. 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976).
[FN226]. Id. at 780, 554 P.2d at 958 (citations omitted).
[FN227]. Id.
[FN228). Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008,895 P.2d at 1201.
~29}. Id. In addition, the court concluded that a second defendant - the Fedeml-State Inspection Service - had done
nothing "actively ... to induce reliance" and therefore did not have a special relationship with the purchasers of certified
seed. Id.
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[FN230]. Id. at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199.
[FN231]. Cases involving the sale of goods do "not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized
knowledge and experience." McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976). Taylor
involved the breach of contract to purchase potatoes. Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664 (1971).
(FN232]. White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1986) (bad faith claim involving insurance contract); Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975) (aircraft mechanic).
[FN233]. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978); see also Cain v. Vollmer,
19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910).
[FN234]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201 (emphasis added). But recall that the trial court had found that
there was no evidence that "ICIA knew the Duffms would rely on its representations," id. at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199, a
finding that raises questions about "knowingly induc[ing]."
[FN235]. Id.
[FN236]. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931).
[FN237]. Glanzerv. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
[FN238]. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,446 (1931).
[FN239J. Just's held that a business located in a city's blighted urban core could not recover in tort for business losses
traceable to the breach of a contract between the city and a construction company that was redeveloping the core. Just's,
99 Idaho 462,583 P.2d 997.
[FN240]. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989).
[FN241 ]. In McAlvain, defendant had a contract with plaintiff to insure his business; that contract provided the basis for
a relationship between the parties that the court thought sufficiently special to justify the imposition of a tort duty in addition to the contractually assumed duties. McAlvain, 97 Idaho 777,554 P.2d 955.
[FN242]. Duffm, 126 Idaho at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203. The decision to which the court implicitly refers is Idaho Bank &
Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989), where the court held that an accountant can be held liable for negligent misrepresentation under limited circumstances. While the court's statement is absolute, the facts of the
case do not rule out maintaining a claim for negligent misrepresentation where the person had suffered either personal injury or property damage.
[FN243]. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
[FN244]. HenryS. Maine, Ancient Law 182 (Frederick Pollock new ed. 1930) (1861).
[FN245]. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 3.
[FN246]. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200.
34 Idaho L. Rev. 225
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westiaw.
244 P.3d425
158 Wash.App. 647, 244 P.3d 425
(Cite as: 158 Wash.App. 647, 244 P.3d 425)
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 1.
James H. JACKSON and C.R. Hendrick, a marital
community, Appellants,

v.
The CITY OF SEATILE, a Washington municipal
corporation; Plaintiffs,
and
Trenchless Construction Services, L.L.C., a Washington Limited Liability Company, and QPS, Inc., a
Washington corporation, which does business in
Seattle, King County, Washington as "Quality
Plumbing," Respondents.
No. 64244-8-I.
Nov. 22,2010.
Background: Homeowners filed suit against construction contractors, alleging that they negligently
installed a waterline for the previous owner, which
caused a landslide that damaged home and landscaping. Contractors filed motions for summary
judgment dismissal. The Superior Court, King
County, 2009 WL 4571546,Michael Trickey, J.,
granted motions. Homeowners appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Becker, J., held
that:
(1) city ston:nwater code did not impose any duty
on contractors;
(2) contractors owed a common law duty of care to
homeowners when installing waterline; and
(3) economic loss rule did not apply to preclude
homeowners' negligence claim.
Reversed.
West Headnotes
[1] Negligence 272 €;::::::>202
272 Negligence
2721 In General
272k202 k. Elements in general. Most Cited

Page 1

Cases
To show actionable negligence, plaintiff must
establish: (1) the existence of a duty owed to the
complaining party, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a
resulting injury, and (4) that the claimed breach
was the proximate cause of the injury.
[2} Negligence 272

~210

272 Negligence
272U Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k210 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Duty in a negligence action is a threshold question.
[3] Negligence 272 ~210
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k2IO k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Negligence 272 ~222
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k222 k. Duty based upon statute or other
regulation. Most Cited Cases
A duty may be predicated on violation of statute or of common law principles of negligence.
[4] Negligence 272

~1205{7)

272 Negligence
272XVII Premises Liability
272XVII(G) Liabilities Relating to Construction, Demolition fu'"ld Repair
272kl205 Liabilities of Particular Persons
Other Than Owners
272kl205(6) Contractors
272kl205(7) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases
City ston:nwater code, setting forth require-
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ments for erosion control "for all land disturbing
activities" as well as construction controls, and
providing for enforcement actions for violations of
code, did not impose any duty on construction contractors who allegedly negligently installed waterline for prior homeowner that caused a landslide
that damaged current homeowners' home and landscaping, as code lacked language expressing a purpose to protect a particular class of persons, and instead stated that one of its remedial purposes was
for the protection of life, property and the environment from erosion, and code contained language
specifically disavowing an intention to protect a
particular class of persons.
[5] Negligence 272

~1550

272 Negligence
272XVIII Actions
272XVIII(C) Evidence
272XVIII(C)l Burden ofProof
272kl550 k. In generaL Most Cited
Cases
A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim has the
burden of establishing the existence of a duty.
[6] Negligence 272 €::::=>1025
272 Negligence
272XVII Premises Liability
272XVII(B) Necessity and Existence ofDuty
272k1025 k. Duty based on statute or other regulation. Most Cited Cases
Negligence 272

272k1202 Defects in Buildings and Structures in General
272k1202(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Negligence 272 €::::=>1204(1)
272 Negligence
272XVII Premises Liability
272XVII(G) Liabilities Relating to Construction, Demolition and Repair
272kl204 Accidents and Injuries in Genera I
272k1204(I) k. In generaL Most Cited
Cases

~210

272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k210 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Negligence 272

Page2

~1202(1)

272 Negligence
272XVII Premises Liability
272XVII(G) Liabilities Relating to Construction, Demolition and Repair

Building codes and other similar municipal
codes do not typically serve as a basis for tort liability because they are enacted merely for purposes
of public safety or for the general welfare.
[71 Negligence 272 €:;::::::>1205(7)

272 Negligence
272XVII Premises Liability
272XVII(G) Liabilities Relating to Construction, Demolition and Repair
272kl205 Liabilities of Particular Persons
Other Than Owners
272kl205(6) Contractors
272kl205(7) k. In generaL Most
Cited Cases
Construction contractors who allegedly negligently installed waterline for prior homeowner that
caused a landslide that damaged current homeowners' home and landscaping owed current owners a
common law duty of care when installing waterline,
as installation of waterline created a dangerous condition on the hillside land above the home, the land
had previously been designated as a potential landslide area by the city, and it was reasonably foreseeable that drilling and connecting a new waterline
would cause damage to third persons if done
without sufficient attention to compacting the disturbed soil or stabilizing the newly bored waterline.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 385.
[8] Negligence 272 €;;;:;;>1205(2)

272 Negligence
272X:Vll Premises Liability
272XVIT(G) Liabilities Relating to Construction, Demolition and Repair
272k1205 Liabilities of Particular Persons
Other Than Owners
272k1205(2) k Developers and builders. Most Cited Cases

Page3

homeowners' loss was damage to their home and
landscaping, caused by the violent occurrence of a
landslide, which was an event allegedly precipitated
by the defective condition in which the contractors
left the hillside.
[10} Torts 379 €;;;:;;>118

379 Torts
379! In General
379kll6 Injury or Damage from Act
379kll8 k. Economic loss doctrine. Most
Cited Cases

Negligence 272 <8:=>1205(8)

272 Negligence
272X:Vll Premises Liability
272XVIT(G) Liabilities Relating to Construction, Demolition and Repair
272k1205 Liabilities of Particular Persons
Other Than Owners
272kl205(6) Contractors
272kl205(8) k. Accepted work doctrine. Most Cited Cases

The economic loss rule marks the fundamental
boundary between the law of contracts, which is designed to enforce expectations created by agreement, and the law of torts, which is designed to protect citizens and their property by imposing a duty
of reasonable care on others; if the rule applies, the
party will be held to contract remedies, regardless
of how plaintiff characterizes the claims.
[llJ Negligence 272 <8:=>463

A builder or construction contractor is liable
for injury or damage to a third person as a result of
negligent work, even after completion and acceptance of that work, when it was reasonably foreseeable that a third person would be injured due to that
negligence. Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 385.

272 Negligence
272XIV Necessity and Existence ofinjury
272k463 k. Economic loss doctrine. Most
Cited Cases

[9} Negligence 272 €;;;:;;>1251

313A Products Liability
313AII Elements and Concepts
313Ak154 Nature oflnjury or Damage
313Akl56 k Economic losses; damage to
product itself. Most Cited Cases

272 Negligence
272XVIT Premises Liability
272XVIT(J) Necessity and Existence ofin- jury
272kl251 k Particular cases. Most Cited
Cases
Economic loss rule did not apply to preclude
homeowners' negligence claim against contractors
who allegedly negligently installed waterline for
prior homeowner that caused a landslide that damaged current homeowners' home and landscaping,
as the waterline itself worked as anticipated, and

Products Liability 313A <8:=>156

For purposes of the economic loss rule, an
"economic loss" is a defect of quality as evidenced
by internal deterioration; but when a loss stems
from defects that cause accidents involving violence or collision with external objects, that is a
physical injury susceptible of a tort remedy.
[12] Products Liability 313A €;:;:;;;;>156
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313A Products Liability
313AII Elements and Concepts
313Akl54 Nature of Injury or Damage
313Akl56 k. Economic losses; damage to
product itself. Most Cited Cases
When a defective product mJures something
other than itself, such as a person or other separate
property, the loss is not merely an economic loss
and tort remedies are appropriate.
**427 Larry L. Setchell, Benjamin Ta-Shin Shih,
Helsell Fetterman LLP, Seattle, WA, for Appellants.
Kathleen Boyle, Themis Litigation Group, Gregory
Fuller, Seattle City Attorney's Office, Seattle, WA,
Shellie McGaughey, McGaughey BridgesDunlap
PLLC, Bellevue, WA, for Respondents.

BECKER,J.
*649 ~ 1 The trial court granted summary judgment dismissal of a homeowner's negligence claims
against two construction contractors whose allegedly negligent installation of a waterline for the
previous owner caused a landslide, damaging the
landscaping and house. We reverse. This is not a
negligent construction case where the economic
loss rule would apply and recovery would be *650
limited to contract remedies. The contractors are liable in tort if their negligence caused the landslide.
~ 2 "We affirm orders granting summary judgment only when satisfied, after considering the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Burg v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc.,
110 Wash.App. 798, 803-04,43 P.3d 526 (2002).

~ 3 The appellant homeowners are James Jackson and his wife, C.R. Hendrick. They bought their
house from Corrine Otakie and moved in in
November 2006. Earlier that year, Otakie had a
problem with a leaking waterline. She contacted respondent QPS, Inc., a plumbing company. After in-
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vestigating, QPS determined that fncing the old line
would be too dangerous because it came down a
steep hillside. QPS recommended installing a new
waterline using the trenchless method. Otakie took
the advice. She contracted with respondent Trenchless Construction Services, LLC, to drill and install
the new waterline. She contracted with QPS to connect one end of the line to her house and the other
end to the city water main at the top of the hill
above her house, and to backfill any excavations.
~ 4 Starting near the city water main above
Otakie, Trenchless drilled a tunnel 5 inches in diameter and 160 feet long, at an acute angle down the
hill to her house. The drilled line began on city
property and crossed at least one private lot that did
not belong to Otakie. Trenchless installed a one and
one quarter inch pipe for the length of the line. QPS
dug a trench, 30 feet long and 5 feet deep, along the
top of the hill above Otakie's house from the water
main to the start of the waterline Trenchless installed. QPS backfilled the connection trench. QPS
then connected the pipe to the house, completing
the installation in March 2006.
~ 5 In November 2006, a large sinkhole formed
at the top of the hill above the **428 house-now
owned and occupied by Jackson-near the water
main where QPS had dug and backfilled the connection trench. The sinkhole was reported *651 by
a local homeowner and backfilled by the city. The
sinkhole reformed in early December, but it was not
reported or filled again.
~ 6 In December 2006, heavy rains fell on
Seattle. On December 14, a city catch basin
clogged and water began to pool in the sinkhole.
The pooling water burst from the sinkhole, scouring
a path down the hill to Jackson's property. The
scour path, 15 feet wide by 4 to 5 feet deep,
roughly followed the waterline drilled by Trenchless, causing the hillside above Jackson to slide
down. The landslide caused considerable damage to
the landscaping and house.
~

7 Jackson sued the city of Seattle, Trenchless,
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and QPS. He sued Seattle for negligently inspecting
and backfilling the first November sinkhole and for
allowing the catch basin to fail. Jackson voluntarily
dismissed all claims against Seattle after they
reached a mediated settlement.
~

8 Trenchless and QPS each moved for summary judgment dismissal. In opposition to the motions, Jackson filed declarations by engineers who
opined that the construction by Trenchless and QPS
caused the landslide and that it would not have
happened if QPS had properly compacted the soil
when it backfilled the 30 foot water main connection trench at the top of the hill, or if Trenchless
had used a better medium to stabilize the downhill
tunnel it bored for the 160 foot long pipe, or if
Trenchless and QPS had properly planned and coordinated their project with each other and with the
city.
~ 9 The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment, orally ruling the contractors owed
no duty to Jackson. Jackson appeals.

[1][2][3][4] ~ 10 To show actionable negligence, "a plaintiff must establish: (I) the existence
of a duty owed to the complaining party; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) a resulting injury; and (4)
that the claimed breach was the proximate cause of
the injury." Burg, 110 Wash.App. at 804, 43 P.3d
526. Duty in a negligence action is a threshold
question. A duty may be predicated "on violation of
statute or of common law principles of negligence."
*652 Burg, llO Wash.App. at 804, 43 P.3d 526.
Jackson offers both a city ordinance and the common law as predicates for a duty owed by contractors. He relies on Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77
Wash.2d 800, 467 P.2d 292 (1970). In Wells, a
hangar at the municipal airport blew apart in a
fierce storm. The plaintiff's leg was broken when he
was hit by a flying piece of plywood. According to
the experts who testified for the plaintiff, the construction of the hangar fell short of the wind resistance standards in the city building code. The trial
court allowed the plaintiff's case to go to the jury
on the theory that a violation of the wind resistance

standards breached a duty arising from the building
code and also on the common law theory of a
breach of a property owner's duty to an invitee. The
Supreme Court affirmed.
[5] ~ 11 The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of a duty. Burg, llO
Wash.App. at 804, 43 P.3d 526. Jackson first contends the contractors breached a duty created by the
Seattle stormwater code, analogous to the building
code violations that were held to breach a statutory
duty in Wells.
~ 12 "In deciding when violation of a statute or
administrative regulation shall be considered in determining liability, this court has relied upon the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965)."
Melville v. State, 115 Wash.2d 34, 36-37, 793 P.2d
952 (1990). Section 286 gives a four factor test:

The court may adopt as the standard of conduct
of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation
whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes
the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and

(c) to protect that interest against the kind of
harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular
hazard from which the harm results.
**429 *653 ~ 13 The version of the stormwater
code in effect at the time the contractors began their
work set forth requirements for erosion control "for
aU land disturbing activities." Former SMC
22.802.015 (2006}. Compliance required the use of
construction controls to achieve the following objectives:
b. Before the completion of the project, per-
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manently stabilize all exposed soils that have
been disturbed during construction. Methods such
as permanent seeding, planting, and sodding may
be specified by rules promulgated by the Direct- or.
c. Prevent the transport of sediment from the
site. Appropriate use of methods such as, but not
limited to, vegetated buffer strips, stormdrain inlet protection, silt fences, sediment traps, settling
ponds, and protective berms may be specified in
rules promulgated by the Director.
Former SMC 22.802.015(C)(3)(b)-(c). The
code authorized certain city agencies to investigate
and initiate enforcement action against parties responsible for code violations. Former SMC
22.808.030. An enforcement action could be initiated either through the office of the hearing examiner or in court, potentially leading to an order for
corrective action or monetary penalties. Former
SMC 22.808.040. The code also included a section
on "Violations" making noncompliance with the
code a "civil violation" and designating more egregious activities, such as noncompliance with orders,
as "criminal violations." Former SMC 22.808.090.
Creating a dangerous condition was specifically
designated as a civil violation:
Dangerous Condition. It is a violation of this subtitle to allow to exist, or cause or contribute to, a
condition of a drainage control facility, or condition related to grading, stormwater, drainage or
erosion that is likely to endanger the public
health, safety or welfare, the environment, or
public or private property.
Former SMC 22.808.090(A)(5). Jackson contends these provisions of the code demonstrate that
its purposes satisfy the Restatement four-part test.
[6] *654 ~ 14 The difficulty for Jackson is the
lack of language expressing a purpose to protect a
particular class of persons. Building codes and other similar municipal codes do not typically serve as
a basis for tort liability because they are enacted
merely for purposes of public safety or for the gen-
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eral welfare. Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673,
677, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978). Halvorson was an exception to the traditional rule because it involved a
housing code with a declaration of purpose that
specifically mentioned a concern for the welfare of
the "occupants" of buildings, not just the welfare of
the public as a whole. Halvorson, 89 Wash.2d at
677, 574 P.2d 1190. Seattle's stormwater code, on
the other hand, comes v.'ithin the traditional rule. It
declares that one of its remedial purposes is protection of "life, property and the environment" from
erosion, flooding, landslides, and other hazards.
Former SMC 22.800.020(A)(l). Almost identical
language was discussed in Halvorson to show how
the purpose of a typical building code is to protect
the general public rather than a particular class of
individuals. Halvorson, 89 Wash.2d at 677 n. 2,
574 P.2d 1190. While the court in Wells did approve a duty instruction based on the city building
code, the parties in that case apparently assumed
the wind resistance standards were designed with a
purpose to protect a particular class. The issue
presented was whether the particular class was limited to persons directly injured by a collapsing
building. In deciding that the protected class was
broad enough to include anyone injured by flying
debris, the court did not address the precise issue
presented in this case-whether the code was intended to protect a particular class of persons rather
than the general public.
~ 15 Not only does the Seattle stormwater code
employ the general purpose language of a typical
building code, it also contains language specifically
disavowing an intention to protect a particular class
of persons. In the subsection on penalties and damages that can be awarded by the hearing examiner
or by a judge, the code specifically states: "It is expressly the purpose of this subtitle to provide for
and promote the health, safety and welfare of the
general public. This subtitle is not intended to create or *655 otherwise establish or designate any
particular class or group of persons who will or
should be especially**430 protected or benefitted
by its terms." Former SMC 22.800.020(B). The
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subtitle "does not establish a cause of action that
may be asserted by any party other than the City.
Penalties, damages, costs and expenses may be recovered only by the City." Former SMC
22.808.060(C).
, 16 When a court decides that a violation of a
statute shall be considered in determining liability
for negligence, the motivation for doing so is to
give effect to the will of the legislature:
It is not every provision of a criminal statute or
ordinance which will be adopted by the court, in
a civil action for negligence, as the standard of
conduct of a reasonable person. Otherwise stated,
there are statutes which are considered to create
no duty of conduct toward the plaintiff, and to afford no basis for the creation of such a duty by
the court. The courts in such cases have been
careful not to exceed the purpose which they attribute to the legislature. This judicial selfrestraint is rooted in part in the theory of the separation of powers.

W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on
Torts § 36 at 222 (5th ed.l984) (footnote omitted).
Jackson does not persuasively explain how we
could view the stormwater code as a foundation for
a negligence action in spite of the express disclaimer of a purpose to designate a protected class and
the express terms making the code enforceable only
by the city. We conclude he has not established the
existence of a duty arising from the code.
[7] ~ 17 This does not mean Jackson is without
a remedy. Even if a violation of the city stormwater
code is not negligence, this case does resemble
Wells in that the facts support a common law theory
of liability. We agree with Jackson that the contractors owed him the common law duty of care recognized in Davis v. Baugh Industrial Contractors,
Inc., 159 Wash.2d 413, 417, 150 P.3d 545 (2007).
[8] *656 ~ 18 In Davis, the crew foreman of a
concrete company was accidentally crushed to
death by falling cement blocks while he was in-
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specting leaking water pipes. A contractor had installed the pipes, allegedly without using reasonable care. The trial court granted summary judgment to the contractor on the ground that the common law completion and acceptance doctrine relieved the contractor of liability for negligence after
the work was completed by the contractor and accepted by the landlord. Abandoning the "ancient''
doctrine of completion and acceptance, the court instead employed RESTATEMENT (SECO:NTI) OF
TORTS§ 385 (1965):
§ 385. Persons Creating Artificial Conditions on
Land on Behalf of Possessor: Physical Harm
Caused After Work has been Accepted

One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects
a structure or creates any other condition thereon
is subject to liability to others upon or outside of
the land for physical harm caused to them by the
dangerous character of the structure or condition
after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining
the liability of one who as manufacturer or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of
others.
Under this section of the Restatement, "a builder or construction contractor is liable for injury or
damage to a third person as a result of negligent
work, even after completion and acceptance of that
work, when it was reasonably foreseeable that a
third person would be injured due to that negligence." Davis, 159 Wash.2d at 417, 150 P.3d 545.
~ 19 This statement in Davis defmes the duty
that Trenchless and QPS owed to Jackson when
they installed the waterline. Viewed in the light
most favomble to Jackson, the evidence establishes
that the installation of the waterline created a dangerous condition on the hillside land above the residence. The land had previously been designated as
a potential landslide area by the city of Seattle, and
it was reasonably foreseeable that drilling and connecting the new waterline would cause damage to
third persons if done without sufficient attention to
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compacting the disturbed*657 soil or stabilizing the
newly bored waterline. See Schneider v. Strifert, 77
Wash.App. 58, 63, 888 P.2d 1244 (1995)
("Foreseeability is a question of fact **431 for the
jury unless reasonable persons could reach but one
conclusion.").
[9] ~ 20 Trenchless and QPS argue that Davis
is factually distinguishable. In Davis, the negligently installed water pipes leaked, whereas in this
case the new waterline remained intact and functioned as promised. And in Davis, the negligence
caused bodily injury, whereas in this case there was
only property damage. But these are not material
distinctions. They do not override the policy concerns that motivated our Supreme Court to cast
aside the completion and acceptance doctrine:
The doctrine is also harmful because it weakens
the deterrent effect of tort law on negligent builders. By insulating contractors from liability, the
completion and acceptance doctrine increases the
public's exposure to injuries caused by negligent
design and construction of improvements to real
property and undermines the deterrent effect of
tort law. Illinois long ago abandoned the doctrine
specifically for this reason, stating that "[aJn underlying purpose of tort law is to provide for public safety through deterrence of negligent designers and builders. This purpose cannot be accomplished if these persons are insulated from liability simply by the act of delivery." Johnson v.
Equip. Specialists, Inc., 58 Ill.App.3d 133, 373
N.E.2d 837, 843, 15 Ill.Dec. 491 (1978).
Davis, 159 Wash.2d at 419-20, 150 P.3d 545.
Similarly here, the deterrent effect of tort law on
negligent construction would be diminished by absolving contractors of tort liability so long as they
deliver a functional system and do not cause bodily
injury. Contractors who install a waterline on a
steep slope have to be concerned about the condition in which they leave the slope, not just the condition of the waterline. And liability imposed under
Restatement § 385 is "for physical harm"; this includes damage to property, not just personal injury.
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[10] 'il 21 Trenchless and QPS insist that the
economic loss rule bars Jackson's negligence action. "The *658 economic loss rule marks the fundamental boundary between the law of contracts,
which is designed to enforce expectations created
by agreement, and the law of torts, which is designed to protect citizens and their property by imposing a duty of reasonable care on others." Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
I, 124 Wash.2d 816, 821, 881 P.2d 986 (1994). "If
the economic loss rule applies, the party will be
held to contract remedies, regardless of how the
plaintiff characterizes the claims." Alejandre v.
Bull, 159 Wash.2d 674, 683, 153 P.3d 864 (2007).

'il 22 In a case involving a claim of negligent
misrepresentation by homebuyers against an appraiser hired by their lender, this court stated that it
is error to apply the economic loss rule where no
contractual relationship exists between the parties.
Borish v. Russell, 155 Wash.App. 892, 901, 904,
230 P.3d 646 (2010). Citing Borish, Jackson contends the economic loss rule has no application in
this case because he did not have a contract with
Trenchless or with QPS.
~ 23 The idea that there must be pnVlty
between the parties before the economic loss rule
comes into play would seem to be at odds with the
leading case of Berschauer/Phillips. In that case,
the court made the economic loss rule the foundation of its decision to deny a tort remedy to a general contractor even though the damages, costly
delays in the construction of a school project, were
allegedly caused by negligent preparation of architectural plans and negligent inspection of the work
by individuals with whom the contractor did not
have a direct contractual relationship. The court
denied the contractor's tort claims because the damages caused by the construction delays were only
economic losses. Notwithstanding Borish, we conclude it is appropriate to consider the economic loss
rule here, even though Trenchless and QPS did not
directly contract with Jackson.
~

24 Based on the economic loss rule, Trench-
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less and QPS argue that any duty they had to install
the waterline safely arose solely by means of their
contracts with Otakie *659 and accordingly Jackson
must be limited to a contract remedy. We disagree.
As discussed above, a duty in tort to use due care in
installing the waterline arose from the common law.
**432 ~ 25 The contractors contend Jackson's
claim is precluded by Stuart v. Coldwell Banker
Commercial Group, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 406, 745
P.2d 1284 (1987). In Stuart, a condominium
homeowners' association, suing on behalf of original and subsequent unit purchasers, attempted to impose tort liability upon the builder and vendor of
the units for construction defects that resulted in
rotting and impairment of the units. Stuart, 109
Wash.2d at 422, 745 P.2d 1284. Applying the economic loss rule, the court refused to recognize a tort
cause of action for negligent construction. Beyond
the terms expressed in the contract of sale, "the
only recognized duty owing from a builder-vendor
of a newly completed residence to its first purchaser is that embodied in the implied warranty of
habitability." Stuart, 109 Wash.2d at 417, 745 P.2d
1284. Stuart does not stand for the proposition that
a building contractor can only be sued for contract
remedies. The court was concerned with preventing
the consumer from using a tort theory to obtain
compensation for a defective "product" (the condominium) that did not meet the consumer's market-based economic expectations. The court was
careful to preserve tort liability for physical damage
caused when the "product" does not meet a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. Stuart, 109
Wash.2d at 419, 745 P.2d 1284, quoting Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403
P.2d 145 (1965).
[II] 'II 26 Under Stuart, Jackson's loss was not
an "economic" loss. An economic loss is a defect of
quality as evidenced by internal deterioration. But
when a loss stems "from defects that cause accidents involving violence or collision with external

objects," that is a physical injury susceptible of a
tort remedy. Stuart, 109 Wash.2dat 420, 745 P.2d
1284.FN1 If the new waterline *660 had not functioned properly and had to be reinstalled or fixed,
that would be an economic loss. But the waterline
itself worked as anticipated. Jackson's loss was
damage to his house and landscaping, caused by the
violent occurrence of the landslide-an event allegedly precipitated by the defective condition in
which the contractors left the hillside.
FNI. See also Eastwood v. Horse Harbor
Foundation, Inc., 170 Wash.2d 380, 241
P.3d 1256 (2010); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v.
LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 170 Wash.2d
442, 243 P.3d 521 (2010). These two decisions, issued after oral argument in this
case and cited by Jackson as supplemental
authority, confirm our decision and our rationale.
[12] 'l)27 In short, we agree with the distinction
stated in Stieneke v. Russi, 145 Wash.App. 544,
556, 190 P.3d 60 (2008), review denied, 165
Wash.2d 1026, 203 P.3d 381 (2009): "When a defective product injures something other than itself,
such as a person or other separate property, the loss
is not merely an economic loss and tort remedies
are appropriate." The same is true of a defective installation of a product. The nature of Jackson's loss
is injury to property resulting from the allegedly
negligent installation of an otherwise functional
waterline. Because Jackson establishes that Trenchless and QPS owed him a duty of care under Davis,
the trial court erred in treating his case as if it were
a claim for negligent construction precluded by Stuart.

'II 28 In addition to arguing lack of duty, QPS
contends the dismissal can be affirmed on the alternative ground of lack of proximate cause. This
argument was not properly raised below and we
will not consider it. White v. Kent Med. Center,
Inc., 61 Wash.App. 163, 168-69,810 P.2d 4 (1991).
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~ 29 The record shows genuine issues of material fact remain concerning breach of duty. Summary
judgment was inappropriate.
~

30 Reversed.

WE CONClJR: SCHINDLER and GROSSE, JJ.
Wash.App. Div. 1,2010.
Jackson v. City of Seattle
158 Wash.App. 647, 244 P.3d 425
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Idaho,
Pocatello, May 2001 Term.
David Leslie UDY, Plaintiff,

Kidwell, J., filed a specially concurring opinion.

v.
CUSTER COUNTY, Defendant.
Roy Chivers and Susan Chivers, husband and wife,
and Fred McDonald and Roxanna McDonald, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Custer County, Idaho, and Mickey Roskelley, in his
official capacity as Sheriff of Custer County, Idaho,
Defendants Respondents.
David Leslie Udy, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Custer County, Defendant-Respondent.
Roy Chivers and Susan Chivers, husband and wife,
and Fred McDonald and Roxanna McDonald, husband and wife, Plaintiffs,
v.
Custer County, Idaho, and Mickey Roskelley, in his
official capacity as Sheriff of Custer County, Idaho,
Defendants.
Nos. 26345, 26346.
Oct 24,2001.
Injured driver and his passengers brought action against county and its sheriff, alleging sheriff
observed and negligently failed to remove from the
highway the rock driver later struck with his
vehicle. The District Court, Seventh Judicial District, Custer County, Richard T. St. Clair, J., granted summary judgment to defendants, and plaintiffs
appealed. The Supreme Court, Walters, J., held
that: (1) State, rather than county sheriff, had a statutory duty to remove rocks and other obstructions
from highway; (2) sheriff did not voluntarily assume a duty to remove the rocks from highway the
night before the accident; and (3) common law duty
to remove or warn of the rocks on highway would
not be imposed on sheriff.
Affirmed.

West Headnotes
[IJ Automobiles 48A ~255
48A Automobiles
48AVI Injuries from Defects or Obstructions in
Highways and Other Public Places
48AVI(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability
48Ak255 k. Cause of or Responsibility for
Defects, Obstructions, or Dangerous Conditions.
Most Cited Cases
Statute suggesting county sheriff was to work
with State Police to protect the highways surfaces
from damage did not imply that sheriff owed a duty
to remove rocks or other obstructions from the
State's highways, or to communicate to some other
person or entity the need for removal of rocks or
obstructions. I.C. § 31-2022(13).

[2] Appeal and Error 30

~842(1)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, m
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases

An issue of statutory construction is subject to
the Supreme Court's free review.
[31 Statutes 361

~189

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
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361k189 k. Literal and Grammatical
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Interpretation. Most Cited Cases
Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words.
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State, through its Department of Transportation, rather than county sheriff, had a statutory duty
to remove rocks and other obstructions as part of its
maintenance of the State's highways. I.C. §§
40-201, 40-502.

[4] Statutes 361 0=190

[61 Negligence 272
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36lkl87 Meaning of Language
36lk190 k. Existence of Ambiguity.
Most Cited Cases
If the language of the statute is unambiguous,
the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be
given effect and there is no occasion for construction.
[5] Automobiles 48A C=>255
48A Automobiles
48AVI Injuries from Defects or Obstructions in
Highways and Other Public Places
48AVI(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability
48Ak255 k. Cause of or Responsibility for
Defects, Obstructions, or Dangerous Conditions.
Most Cited Cases
Highways 200 0=187(3)
200 Highways
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions
200k187 Nature and Grounds of Liability
200kl87(3) k. Liability of State. Most
Cited Cases
Highways 200 0=198
200 Highways
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions
200kl98 k. Liabilities of Local Authorities and Officers. Most Cited Cases

~210

272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k210 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
No liability arises from the law of torts unless
the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.

[7] Appeal and Error 30

~842(4)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(4) k. Questions as to Negligence. Most Cited Cases
Generally, the question whether a duty exists is
a question of law, over which the Supreme Court
exercises free review.
[8] Negligence 272 C':=>210
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k210 k. In GeneraL Most Cited Cases
One owes no affirmative duty to act to assist or
protect another absent unusual circumstances,
which justifY imposing such an affirmative responsibility.
[9} Automobiles 48A €=::::>255
48A Automobiles
48AVI Injuries from Defects or Obstructions in
Highways and Other Public Places
48AVI(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability
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48Ak255 k. Cause of or Responsibility for
Defects, Obstructions, or Dangerous Conditions.
Most Cited Cases

forthcoming.

Automobiles 48A €:;:=264

48A Automobiles
48AVI Injuries from Defects or Obstructions in
Highways and Other Public Places
48AVI(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability
48Ak255 k. Cause of or Responsibility for
Defects, Obstructions, or Dangerous Conditions.
Most Cited Cases

48A Automobiles
48AVI Injuries from Defects or Obstructions in
Highways and Other Public Places
48AVI(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability
48Ak263 Obstructions
48Ak264 k. In GeneraL Most Cited
Cases
Even if county sheriff had voluntarily removed
rocks and other debris from the state highways on
prior occasions, sheriff, by way of these prior actions, did not voluntarily assume a duty to remove
the rocks from highway the night before the accident involving driver and passengers.

[12] Automobiles 48A €:;:=255

State retained exclusive custody and control
over the maintenance of the highway by virtue of
statutory authority and thus the Supreme Court
would decline to impose a common law duty on
county sheriff to remove or warn of the rocks on
highway, where sheriff had no special relationship
with driver or passengers who were injured after
vehicle struck rock in highway. I.C. §§ 40-201,
40-502,73-116.

[10] Negligence 272 €=::::>218
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k217 Voluntarily Assumed Duty
272k218 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act,
having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner; however,
liability for an assumed duty can only come into being to the extent that there is in fact an undertaking.

**1070 *387 Douglas W. Crandall, Boise, argued
for appellants Chivers and McDonald.
Cooper & Larsen, Pocatello, for appellant Udy.
Reed W. Larsen argued.
Naylor & Hales, P.C., Boise, for respondents.
Kirtlan G. Naylor argued.

272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k217 Voluntarily Assumed Duty
272k218 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

WALTERS, Justice.
This is an appeal from the district court's decision granting summary judgment in a negligence
action in favor of Respondents Custer County and
Sheriff Mickey Roskelley. The district court held
that Sheriff Roskelley did not have a legal duty to
remove or warn of rocks on a State highway. We
afftrm.

Although a person can assume a duty to act on
a particular occasion, the duty is limited to the discrete episode in which the aid is rendered; past voluntary acts do not entitle the benefited party to expect assistance on future occasions, at least absent
an express promise that future assistance will be

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 1, 1998, David Udy was driving his
truck on Highway 75 approximately two miles
north of Clayton in Custer County. Roy Chivers
and Roxanna McDonald were passengers in Udy's

[11] Negligence 272 €=::::>218
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truck. While driving, Udy encountered a large rock
in the road. Udy was unable to avoid hitting the
rock as another vehicle was approaching in the opposite lane. Udy's vehicle struck the rock, blowing
out the right front tire and causing Udy to lose control. The truck subsequently rolled, causing injuries
to Udy and his passengers.
On the night before the accident, Custer
County Sheriff Mickey Roskelley and his wife had
traveled on Highway 75 to Clayton to serve some
papers. Roskelley admitted that on his return from
Clayton, he observed several small rocks on the fog
line approximately one-third of a mile from the
scene of Udy's subsequent accident. Sheriff Roskelley did not remove the rocks or notify other deputies or the Idaho Transportation Department (lTD)
of the presence of the rocks.
On January 8, 1999, Udy filed a complaint
against Sheriff Roskelley and Custer County alleging that Roskelley observed and negligently
failed to remove from the highway the rock Udy
later struck with his vehicle. The Chivers and MeDonalds also filed a complaint against Roskelley
and the county alleging injuries as a result of Roskelley's negligence in leaving the rock on the highway. The defendants subsequently filed a motion
for summary judgment. On February 8, 2000, the
district court granted the defendants' motion, ruling
tl1at as a matter of law, Sheriff Roskelley owed no
duty to remove or warn of the rock struck by Udy's
vehicle. Udy, the Chivers, and the McDonalds appeal the district court's decision. The question
presented on appeal is whether Sheriff Roskelley
owed a duty of care to the Appellants to warn of or
remove the rocks on Highway 75.
DISCUSSION
A. Sheriff Roskelley's Duty

1. Statutory Duty Under Idaho Code Section
31-2202
[1] We initially examine the Appellants' argument that the district court erred by ruling that

Page4

Sheriff Roskelley does not have a statutory duty to
remove obstructions from **1071 *388 the highway. It is clear that there is no statute explicitly placing a duty on county sheriffs to remove rocks or
obstructions from highways, and the Appellants do
not assert otherwise. In addition to the absence of
such an express mandate, the district court held that
there was no duty implicitly existing by virtue of
any other statutory authority. The Appellants disagree and challenge the district court's conclusion
that the IDT has an exclusive duty to maintain
Custer County's highways. They assert that the legislature, through Idaho Code section 31-2202, intended to impose a duty on county sheriffs to protect against hazards on the physical surface of the
highway. The Appellants, however, acknowledge
that there is no authority for their argument. Instead, focusing on I.C. § 31-2202(13), they assert
that a common sense reading of the statute implies
that a county sheriff owes a duty to remove or alert
someone of the presence of the rocks on the surface
of the road if the rocks pose a hazard to the traveling public. We disagree.
[2][3][4] The Appellants' arguments raise an issue of statutory construction, which is subject to
our free review. See City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 128 Idaho 219, 221, 912 P.2d 106, 108
(1996); Harris v. Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123
Idaho 295, 297, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1992). Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of
the statute's literal words. See In re Permit No.
36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852
(1992); Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 856,
893 P.2d 801, 803 (Ct.App.l995). If the language
of the statute is unambiguous, "the clear expressed
intent of the legislature must be given effect and
there is no occasion for construction." Ada County
Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho
425, 428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993). See also Wolfe
v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 404, 913
P.2d 1168, 1174 (1996); State v. Watts, 131 Idaho
782,784,963 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct.App.l998).
Idaho Code section 31-2202 provides, among a

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY

http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?mt=BusinessPrac&utid=2&prft=HTMLE...

8/12/2011

Page 5 of 10

34 P.3d 1069
136 Idaho 386, 34 P.3d 1069
(Cite as: 136 Idaho 386, 34 P 3d 1069)
lengthy list of duties, that each county sheriff shall:
13. Work in his county with the Idaho state police in the following respects:
(a) Require all persons using the highways in the
state to do so carefully, safely and with exercise
of care for the persons, property and safety of
others;
(b) Safeguard and protect the surface and other
physical portions of the state highways ....

Page 5

862 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Ct.App.1993) (noting that the
duty to maintain U.S. Highway 95 falls within
lTD's jurisdiction as inside the boundaries of the
State of Idaho). The presence of this statute indicates that the State of Idaho, through its Department
of Transportation, has a statutory duty to remove
rocks and other obstructions as part of its maintenance of the State's highways. We therefore hold that
Sheriff Roskelley did not have a statutory duty to
remove the rocks from Highway 7 5 or to notifY
anyone else of the need for removal of the rocks.

The plain and ordinary meaning of this statute
suggests that a sheriff is to work with the Idaho
State Police to protect the highways surfaces from
damage. This would not appear to include a duty to
remove rocks or other obstructions from the State's
highways, nor a duty to communicate to some other
person or entity the need for removal of rocks or
obstructions. The language instead indicates that
law enforcement personnel are to make sure that
vehicles do not damage the physical surface of the
highway. Had the legislature intended to impose a
duty on county sheriffs to remove or notifY
someone of the presence of highway obstructions, it
could easily have done so. As the district court observed in this case, adding a phrase like
"maintaining the state highways for traffic safety"
to I.C. § 31-2202 could reasonably be interpreted to
include the removal of obstructions. The Court
must assume, however, that the legislature did not
include such a phrase because it did not want to impose this duty on county sheriffs as a matter of statutory liability.
[5] Instead, the legislature has placed the responsibility of maintaining State highways,FN 1
such as Highway 75, on the ITD.FN2 Idaho Code
section 40-201 imposes upon the **1072 *389
State the duty to "improve and maintain the highways" within its jurisdiction. LC. § 40-201. See
also I.C. § 40-502 (stating that all state highways
shall be maintained by the ITD); Roberts v. Transp.
Dep't, 121 Idaho 727, 731, 827 P.2d 1178, 1182
(Ct.App.1991); State v. Smith, 124 Idaho 671, 674,

FNI. Idaho Code section 40-120(4) defmes
"State highway system" to mean "the principal highway arteries in the state, including connecting arteries and extensions
through cities, and includes roads to every
county seat in the state." Clearly, Highway
75, which is the primary route running
north from Shoshone to Challis and is
defmed in the "Official Highway Map" issued by the ITD as a "Major State Highway" is one of the "principal highway arteries in the state."
FN2. We note that Idaho's counties are
charged by statute with the duty of maintaining the highways within the county
highway system. See I.C. § 40-604; Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 557, 808
P.2d 1300, 1302 (1991). Additionally,
Idaho Code §§ 40-202, 40-203, 40-203A
a.11d 40-203B describe how counties and
highway districts may establish highway
systems of their own within their
"respective jurisdiction[s]." These statutes
also provide that, by agreement, maintenance duties may be shifted among the state,
counties, cities and highway districts on
certain highways. See State v. Smith, 124
Idaho 671, 674, 862 P.2d 1093, 1096
(Ct.App.l993). In this case, however, no
evidence was offered by the Appellants or
is evident from the record to show that
some other entity or agency besides the
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State was involved in the maintenance of
any part of Highway 75.
2. Duty Under the Common Law
(6][7][8] No liability arises from the law of
torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff. See Hoffinan v. Simplot Aviation, 97 Idaho
32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975). Genemlly, the question
whether a duty exists is a question of law, over
which we exercise free review. See, e.g., Freeman
v. Juker, I 19 Idaho 555, 808 P.2d 1300 (1991).
This Court follows the rule that "one owes the duty
to every person in our society to use reasonable
care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or
foreseen that a failure to use such care might result
in such injury." Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,
619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). Further, there is a
"general rule that each person has a duty of care to
prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to
others." Sharp v. W.H Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297,
300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). However, one also
owes no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect
another absent unusual circumstances, which justifY
imposing such an affrrmative responsibility. See
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho
388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). With these
principles in mind, we next examine whether Sheriff Roskelley owed a common law duty to warn of
or remove the rocks from Highway 75.
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to perform the act in a non-negligent manner."
Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840,
843, 875 P.2d 937, 940 (1994) (citing Bowling v.
Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 793
P.2d 703, 705 (1990)). Liability for an assumed
duty, however, can only come into being to the extent that there is in fact an undertaking. See Bowling, 117 Idaho at 1032, 793 P.2d at 705. Although a
person can assume a duty to act on a particular occasion, the duty is limited to the discrete episode in
which the aid is rendered. See City of Santee v.
County of San Diego, 211 Cal.App.3d 1006, 259
Cal.Rptr. 757 (1989).FN3 **1073 *390 In other
words, past voluntary acts do not entitle the benefited party to expect assistance on future occasions, at least in the absence of an express promise
that future assistance will be forthcoming. See id. at
762. See also, Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v.
Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Tex.l991) ("A person's duty to exercise reasonable care in performing
a voluntarily assumed undertaking is limited to that
undertaking, and will not normally give rise to an
obligation to perform additional acts of assistance
in the future.").

a. Voluntary Assumption of Duty
[9] The Appellants first assert that the district
court erred in fmding that Sheriff Roskelley did not
voluntarily assume a duty. They contend that because Sheriff Roskelley testified that it was his
pmctice to remove or contact someone to remove
obstructions from the highway, Sheriff Roskelley
assumed a duty to remove the rocks, even if he did
not have a statutory duty to do so. We disagree with
the Appellants' argument.
[10][11] This Court has recognized that it is
possible to create a duty where one previously did
not exist. "If one voluntarily undertakes to perform
an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises

FN3. In Santee, a bicyclist suffered injuries when struck by an automobile in an improperly lighted intersection. The bicyclist
sued the City of Santee, which sought indemnity from the County. The City argued
that inasmuch as County sheriff deputies
had previously reported street light outages, the County was obligated to continue
performing these acts of assistance because
the City detrimentally relied on the County
for this assistance. The court pointed out
that if a future obligation to assist can be
imposed based upon past acts, "an act of
humanitarian assistance can become an albatross of mandatory obligation in the future," and the natural consequence will be
to discourage people from assisting others
in the first instance. Santee, 259 Cal.Rptr.
at 763. In Santee, there was no evidence
that any express promise was made to City
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officials to report light outages in the future, and the court therefore refused to find
a duty to report the light outage on the occasion in question. See id. at 759-62 & n. 3.
Thus, while Sheriff Roskelley may have voluntarily removed rocks and other debris from the
State's highways on prior occasions, the Court concludes that Sheriff Roskelley, by way of these prior
actions, did not voluntarily assume a duty to remove the rocks from Highway 75 the night before
the accident. There is nothing in the record indicating that Sheriff Roskelley increased the risk created
by the rocks on Highway 75; instead, the risk created by the rocks remained unchanged. As the court
noted in Santee, "nonfeasance which results in failure to eliminate a preexisting risk is not equivalent
to nonfeasance which increases a risk of harm." 259
Cal.Rptr. at 762.

Accordingly, we hold that Sheriff Roskelley,
despite evidence of prior acts of removal or notification, did not voluntarily assume a duty to remove
the rocks he observed on Highway 75 the night before Udy's accident. To hold otherwise would be
tantamount to holding that Sheriff Roskelley had a
permanent duty to remove obstructions from the
highway.
b. General Duty to Exercise Ordinary Care
[12] Udy argues that Sheriff Roskelley has a
general common law duty to remove or warn of obstructions on the highway. Udy first contends that a
series of Idaho cases holding that a municipality
has a duty to exercise "reasonable and ordinary care
to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for
ordinary travel," demonstrates that a similar, common law duty exists with respect to county sheriffs.
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Preston, 97 Idaho 295,
298, 543 P.2d 848, 851 (1975). Udy, however, cites
no authority, Idaho or otherwise, either establishing
or recognizing a common law duty for county sheriffs to remove or warn of obstructions on the State's
highways.
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also asserts that cases from New York and
Indiana establish that a state or county made be liable for a dangerous condition in a highway, if it
has actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe
condition. See Boger v. Lake County Commissioners, 547 N.E.2d 257 (Ind.l989); Siegel v. State of
New York, 56 Misc.2d 918, 290 N.Y.S.2d 351
(N.Y.Ct.Cl.1968). What Udy ignores, however, is
that the source of the duty for the public entity, be
it city, state, or county, stems from its custody and
control over the road. This is true in New York, see
Ham v. Giffords Oil Co., 235 A.D.2d 457, 652
N.Y.S.2d 747, 748 (1997) ("A County owes a general duty of care to the wayfarers on the roads it
owns, controls, or maintains."), Indiana, see Templeton v. City of Hammond, 679 N.E.2d 1368
(Ind.Ct.App.l997) ("The State and its counties have
a duty to maintain and repair the roads within their
control."), and elsewhere. See Wells v. Stephenson,
561 So.2d 1215, 1217 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.l990)
("Cases holding an entity liable for failure to report,
repair, or maintain a traffic control device are based
on the premise that the entity had some duty, custody, or control over the sign at the intersection.");
Schomp v. Averette, 591 So.2d 56 (Ala.l991)
(holding that county corrilllission had no duty to
maintain intersection where accident occurred because intersection was under exclusive control of
State of Alabama Highway Department).
As noted above, the ITD is charged with the responsibility of
Highway 75. See I.C. §
40-201; I.C. § 40-502. Because the ITD retains exclusive custody and control over the maintenance of
the highway by virtue of statutory authority, Sheriff
Roskelley car,not be assessed with responsibility
for the same activities through application by the
courts of a common law principle. I.C. § 73-116;
State v. Iverson, 79 Idaho 25, 310 P.2d 803 (1957);
Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Columbia Basin Steel &
Iron, Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 471 P.2d 574 (1970)
(common law principles abrogated by statutory enactments).
**1074 *391 We also take care to note that this
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is not a situation where Sheriff Roskelley created a
foreseeable risk of harm through his own affmnative conduct. Udy's argument is instead predicated
on the notion that Sheriff Roskelley, because he is a
law enforcement officer, owes a greater duty to the
public than the average person. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals addressed a similar argument in Warren v. District of Columbia, concluding that:
[T]he allegations of negligence in the present
case derive solely from defendants' status as police employees and from plaintiffs' contention
that defendants failed to do what reasonably
prudent police employees would have done in
similar circumstances. The difference is between
ordinary negligence on one hand and a novel sort
of professional malpractice on the other. A person does not, by becoming a police officer, insulate himself from any of the basic duties which
everyone owes to other people, but neither does
he assume any greater obligation to others individually. The only additional duty undertaken by
accepting employment as a police officer is the
duty owed to the public at large.
444 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C.1981). See also Williams v.
State, 34 Cal.3d 18, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d
137, 139-40 (1983) (noting general principles that
"one has no duty to come to the aid of another'' and
that "[a] person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affmnative action to assist or protect another unless there is some
relationship between them which gives rise to a
duty to act" are often "muddied by widely held misconceptions concerning the duty owed by police to
individual members of the general public.").
Viewed in this sense, Udy's claims are in reality claims for negligent police protection for which
there can be no recovery absent a special relationship with the victim. See Lundgren v. City of McCall, 120 Idaho 556, 557-58, 817 P.2d 1080,
1081-82 (1991). Cf Isabella County v. Michigan,
181 Mich.App. 99, 449 N.W.2d 111 (1989) (state
police officer who failed to report downed traffic
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sign was not liable to motorist who was injured in
collision with that sign absent evidence of special
relationship between officer and injured motorist
giving rise to duty on officer's part); Alderman v.
Lamar, 493 So.2d 495 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.l 986) (no
duty to decedent absent special relationship to report or place upright a leaning stop sign causing
fatal automobile collision). Here, the record does
not establish, nor does Udy argue that he or his passengers were in a special relationship with Sheriff
Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may
have been prevented through reasonable law enforcement actions is insufficient to establish a duty
to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for
SheriffRoskelley's liability in tort.
The Chivers and McDonalds, on the other
hand, citing the Court's decision in Ransom v.
Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 (1987),
argue that where an officer of the law should foreseeably know that his failure to act may create an
unusual risk of harm to others, he is under a duty to
take reasonable precautions to avoid the harm from
occurring. Their reliance on Ransom, however, is
misplaced.
Ransom was a negligent entrustment case in
which the plaintiffs were injured when their vehicle
was struck by another vehicle that was bei..'lg driven
the wrong way down a one-way street. See id. at
203, 743 P.2d at 71. The driver of the vehicle had
been the passenger when the vehicle had been previously stopped by a police officer. The officer, although concluding that both the driver and the passenger were intoxicated, gave the keys to the passenger with instructions not to drive. See id.
A close examination of the Court's decision in
Ransom reveals that the source of the duty in that
case was the officer's control over the vehicle at the
time of the stop. See id. at 208, 743 P.2d at 76
("Where a person has a right to control a vehicle,
he must exercise ordinary care and not permit another to use it in circumstances where he knows or
should foreseeably know that such use may create
an unreasonable risk of harm."). Because the officer
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exercised legal control over the vehicle at the time
of the stop, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the tort of negligent entrustment requires
ownership of the vehicle. See id. Here, as we mentioned above, the duty to maintain, and therefore
the custody and control,**l075 *392 of Highway
75 lay with the ITD. We therefore decline to impose a common law duty on Sheriff Roskelley to
remove or warn of the rocks on Highway 75.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the district
court's summary judgment in favor of Sheriff
Mickey Roskelley and Custer County. Costs, but
not attorney fees are granted to the Respondents
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40.
Chief Justice TROUT and Justice SCHROEDER
and EISMANN concur.
Justice KIDWELL, specially concurring.
The analysis of the
opinion appears to
reflect the law of Idaho and probably most other
jurisdictions. To be more specific, no common law
or statutory duty is owed or due to the plaintiffs in
this case under the facts presented. Therefore, I
have no alternative, but to concur.
However, I am concerned that the factual situation in the present case could be cited as precedent
for the proposition that a public official has no civil
duty, no matter how hazardous the situation, to take
any action to prevent possible i.1jury to members of
the public. An example is appropriate to illustrate
my concerns: a sheriff in his patrol car sees a hazardous rockslide around a blind curve. Although his
radio works, he does not use it to notify those
charged with maintaining the roadway. A person is
killed or seriously injured because the rockslide
was not removed from the road. In this situation, a
question arises as to whether the legal system
should impose some minimal duty on a public official charged with a caretaking responsibility. The
question of whether there should be a duty looms
larger when the hazard is great and the action necessary to rectify the problem is minimal.

The concept of when the legal system does or
should impose a legal duty is elusive.
There is a duty if the court says there is a duty;
the law, like the Constitution, is what we make it.
Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability.... In
the decision whether or not there is a duty, many
factors interplay: the hand of history, our ideas of
morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to
where loss should fall.
William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52
Mich. L.Rev. 1, 15 (1953) (footnote omitted).
By analogy, Judge Learned Hand, speaking for
the majority in a classic tort case, provides some
guidance. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d
Cir.l932). The facts of this case are well known:
two tugboats lost their barges and cargoes during a
predicted storm in the Atlantic Ocean. Had the tugs
been equipped with working radios, the tug masters
would have known about the storm and could have
likely avoided it. At issue in the case was whether
the tugboat owners had a duty to equip the tugs
with working radios. Although at the time, only one
tugboat line equipped its tugs with radios, the court
held that not using available technology to avoid
the storm was a cause of the injury sustained by the
Therefore, a duty to use the means
available to avert an accident existed.
In the present case, if Sheriff Roskelley had
used a communication device to inform the Department of Transportation that a hazard existed on the
road, the accident and subsequent litigation could
have been prevented. It seems that placing a duty
upon Sheriff Roskelley to make a very brief telephone call for the protection of motorists is appropriate.

Idaho,200 1.
Udy v. Custer County
136 Idaho 386, 34 P.3d 1069
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. Idaho.
Tirmn ADAMS, et al, Plaintiffs,

v.
UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
Civ. No. 03-0049-E-BLW.
March 24, 2010.
WestKeySummaryProducts Liability 313A
C;:;:;::> 114
313A Products Liability
313AII Elements and Concepts
313Akll4 k. Negligence or Fault. Most Cited
Cases

Products Liability 313A C;:;:;::>222
313A Products Liability
313AIII Particular Products
313Ak222 k. Pesticides, Herbicides, Insecticides, Fungicides, and Rodenticides. Most Cited
Cases
Growers failed to demonstrate that corporation's
failure to follow through on its offers of assistance
regarding the planting of crops created an increased
risk of harm to support its assumed duty claim. The
damage caused by corporation, a manufacturer of
agricultural products, was caused by its advice to use
its product and plant crops as normal, rather than by its
failure to follow through on offers of assistance after
the product was applied to the crops. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 50(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge.
INTRODUCTION
*1 The Court has before it DuPont's motion for
judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. The
Court heard oral argument, and the motion is at issue.
The Court will grant the motion to the extent it seeks
(1) a dismissal of the assumed duty claim, and (2) a
new trial on damages as to DuPont. The motion is
denied in all other respects.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law-Rule
50(b)
In resolving DuPont's Rule 50(b) motion, the
Court may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence. EEOC v. Go Daddy Software,
Inc., 581 F.3d 951 (9th Cir.2009). Rather, the court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs and draw all reasonable inferences in their
favor. Id. "The test applied is whether the evidence
permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that
conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict." Id.

Motion for New Trial-Rule 59(a)
Rule 59(a) states: "A new trial may be granted ...
in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for
any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore
been granted in actions at law in the courts of the
United States." Historically recognized grounds include, but are not limited to, claims that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence, that the damages
are excessive or inadequate, or that, for other reasons,
the trial was not fair to the party moving. Molski v.
MJ. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724 (9th Cir.2007); 11
Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 2807 at p. 78 (1995).
The Court has the "duty to weigh the evidence as
the court saw it," and to grant a new trial and set aside
the verdict of the jury, "even though supported by
substantial evidence, where, in [the court's] conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear
weight of the evidence." Molski; 481 F.3d at 729.
ANALYSIS
The Court has filed, contemporaneously with this
decision, its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
with regard to the Plaintiff's claims against the BLM.
A detailed explanation of the litigation background is
contained in those Findings and Conclusions will
therefore not be repeated here. In addition, many of
the legal issues raised by DuPont in its Rule 50 Motion
were also raised by the BLM in its post-trial motions
and have been addressed in detail in the Court's
Findings and Conclusions, which are incorporated by
reference into this decision.
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Product Defect & Superseding Cause
DuPont argues that plaintiffs must point to a
specific, identifiable defect in Oust and failed to do so.
The Court disagrees. A design defect may be proved
by direct or circumstantial evidence of a malfunction
of the product, the absence of evidence of abnormal
use, and the absence of evidence of reasonable secondary causes which would eliminate liability of the
defendant. Mortensen v. Chevron Chemical Co., 107
Idaho 836, 693 P.2d 1038 (Jd.Sup.Ct.l984). Plaintiffs
satisfied this burden. As set forth in more detail in the
Findings of Fact, the plaintiffs showed that (I) Oust
was toxic in minute quantities to crops, (2) DuPont
knew of the dry and windy conditions at the application sites, (3) Oust was erodible by the wind and susceptible to being carried long distances, (4) Oust did
so erode, and persisted for several growing seasons in
the growers' fields, damaging crops (5) DuPont recommended Oust's use yet did not test the product for
use in southern Idaho soils, and (6) reasonably likely
alternative causes were ruled out.

*2 DuPont argues, however, that the BLM's
conduct was a superseding cause constituting an abnormal use. However, under the Idaho Product Liability Reform Act, product misuse is merely a defense
that results in apportionment under comparative fault
principles. See I.C. § 6-1405(3). DuPont argued that
the BLM was responsible, and the jury allocated 40%
of the fault to the BLM. The BLM's choice and application of Oust cannot be deemed a superseding
cause, vitiating DuPont's fault, when DuPont actively
promoted the use of Oust to the BLM. See Findings of
Fact.
Failure to Warn
DuPont argues that the jury verdict on the failure
to warn claims must be set aside. The Court disagrees.
The testimony of Drs. Benbrook and Gardisser established that Oust was mislabeled and supports the jury
verdict on these claims.
Various Jury Instructions
During the trial, the Court resolved all issues
concerning jury instructions. Nothing in the briefing
or argument warrants revisiting these issues.
Damages for 2000, 2002-2004, and Hansen Wheat
Crop
The Court can fmd no reason to change its prior

ruling on the plaintiffs' damages for 2000 and 2002 to
2004, and so will reaffirm that decision. See Memorandum Decision (docket no. 1436). That same decision discussed the Hansen wheat crop damages. The
Court fmds that those damages were properly
awarded.
Debt-Based Costs
In the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court sets forth in detail its ruling that
plaintiffs properly proved their claim to debt-based
costs. DuPont's challenge to this shall therefore be
denied.
Economic Loss
DuPont argues that Idaho's economic loss rule
bars all damages in this case. DuPont has, however,
waived this argument by waiting until after the trial
was completed to raise this argument. EEOC v. Go
Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951 (9th Cir.2009).
Nevertheless, both plaintiffs and DuPont urge the
Court to decide the issue to give guidance for the
upcoming damages trial. The Court will do so.
Idaho originally adopted the economic loss rule to
bar the purchaser of a defective product who has only
suffered economic loss from recovering those losses
in a negligence action against the manufacturer. Clark
v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P .2d
784 (1978). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that
the recovery of economic losses in negligence actions
is limitoo "to those situations involving personal injury or property damage." Just's Inc. v. Arrington
Canst. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997
(Id. Sup.Ct.l978).
Economic loss is defined as including "costs of
repair and replacement of defective property which is
the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial
loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of
profits or use." Id. at 1200, 583 P.2d 997. Property
loss, which is recoverable, is defmed as "damage to
property other than that which is the subject of the
transaction." Id.
*3 The crops grown on plaintiffs' farms are the
property of those growers. Damage to those crops is
property damage. Hence, the economic loss rule does
not apply.
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Yet DuPont argues that the loss of these crops
does not constitute a property loss, and they cite Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 895 P.
2d 1195 (Jd.Sup.Ct.l995). There, the court applied the
economic loss rule to bar a purchaser of defective
potato seed from recovering lost revenues resulting
from lost crop yields.
In Duffin, the plaintiff had purchased the seeds
from the defendant and hence had a contractual relationship with the defendant. Economic loss cannot be
recovered in that instance because the relationship is
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code and "the
economic expectations of parties have traditionally
not been protected by tort law." !d. at 1200. A product
seller "cannot be held liable for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business
unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet
the consumer's demands." Clark, 581 P.2d at 792
(quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 45
Cal.Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965)). While the law of
negligence would impose on the seed seller a duty to
avoid harm to person or property, it does not impose a
duty to produce seed that allows the purchaser to make
a profit. !d. at 794. A contrary rule "would subject the
defendant to claims based upon remote or speculative
injuries which he could not foresee in any practical
sense of the term." Just's, 583 P .2d at 1005.
In contrast, the plaintiffs here are innocent victims of DuPont's negligence. They purchased nothing.
They had no opportunity to bargain in the market over
matters of price and risk Thus, plaintiffs are not
seeking to realize their economic expectations from a
commercial transaction as was the case in Duffin.
Because it was foreseeable that downwind crops could
be damaged by an application of Oust in dry and
windy conditions, DuPont is not being subjected to
remote and speculative damages as was the case in
Just's.

As stated by each of the Idaho cases cited above,
the law of negligence imposes a duty to use ordinary
care to avoid damage to the person or property of
another. DuPont's negligence damaged the growers'
crops, their property. Hence, the economic loss rule
does not apply.

Assumed Duty Claim
The assumed duty claim rests on a simple prin-

ciple: "If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act,
having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner." Bowling v.
Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 793 P.2d 703,
705 (/d.Sup.Ct.1990). To prove the elements of this
claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) DuPont owed a
"duty recognized by law" with regard to stewardship,
(2) DuPont breached that duty, (3) a "causal connection" existed between DuPont's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) there was "actual loss or damage." Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation Dist.,
97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80, 83 (Idaho 1976). No special relationship is necessary between plaintiffs and
DuPont. See Memorandum Decisions (docket nos. 825
& 1393).
*4 There is evidence from which a reasonable
juror could fmd that DuPont assumed a duty to the
growers generally and breached that duty. Rile Miller,
DuPont's Vice-President of Global Marketing, testified that (1) DuPont owes a "stewardship duty" to the
growers, see Transcript at p. 976; (2) the duty extends
even after application of the product to the "performance" of the product, id. at p. 975, including the
"environmental fate" of the product, id. at pp. 982-83;
(3) the stewardship duty would include gathering "as
much information as possible" and "provid[ing] information to help independent agencies ... help in their
... investigation," when faced with growers' allegations of off-target movement of Oust that harmed
crops, id. at p. 986-87; (4) the stewardship duty would
include the taking and analysis of soil samples after
being notified of off-target movement, id. at pp.
1053-54; and (5) as part of the stewardship commitment, DuPont "make[s] every attempt available to
open our books up on information that's available on
how our products act in the environment .... " !d. at p.
992.
This stewardship duty thus consists of an obligation to gather and share information that would assist
the growers in determining what was killing their
crops. DuPont, having undertaken to perform this
duty, must perform it in a non-negligent manner.
Brizendine, 548 P.2d at 83. DuPont breached that duty
by not providing information or aid to the growers,
and by telling the growers to "plant as normal," when
DuPont knew that it had no basis for such advice. See
Transcript at pp. 7517-22, 548 P.2d 80 (testimony of
Dr. Miller).

NOTICE OF CITATION OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov.

W~rks.

Page4
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1248286 (D.Idaho)
(Cite as: 2010 WL 1248286 (D.Idaho))
DuPont argues that a corporate practice or policy
"is legally insufficient to create an assumed duty under
Idaho law." See DuPont Opening Brief (docket no.
1644) at p. 26. In support, DuPont cites Udy v. Custer
136 Idaho 386, 34 P.3d 1069
County,
(/d.Sup.Ct.2001). But Udy simply stated that "past
voluntary acts do not entitle the benefitted party to
expect assistance on future occasions, at least in the
absence of an express promise that future assistance
will be forthcoming." ld. at p. 1073. Plaintiffs'assumed duty claim does not seek to set up a duty based
on DuPont's conduct in other Oust incidents; rather, it
claims DuPont assumed a duty when it affirmatively
undertook to provide assistance and advice to the
growers in this incident.
However, Udy is relevant for another reason. It
held that "nonfeasance which results in failure to
eliminate a preexisting risk is not equivalent to nonfeasance which increases a risk of harm." !d. (quoting
City ofSantee v. County ofSan Diego, 211 Cal.App.3d
1006, 259 Cal.Rptr. 757, 762 (1989)). This statement
in Udy reveals the true weakness in plaintiffs' assumed
duty claim.
That weakness lies in the third element of the
claim: Plaintiffs must show a "causal connection"
between DuPont's conduct and the resulting damage to
plaintiffs' crops. Brizendine, 548 P.2d at 83. Theoretically, the causal connection could be sho\\n if the
plaintiffs relied on DuPont's promises of assistance
and advice to plant as normal, and that crop damage
resulted. Yet, as the Court has previously held in
connection with the fraud claim, none of the bellwether plaintiffs relied on DuPont's advice. See
Memorandum Decision (docket no. 1336).FN1
FNI. Although that decision examined reliance in the context of a fraud claim that had
to be proved by clear and convincing evidence, the evidence of reliance is equally
absent for this claim that need only be proved
by a preponderance.
*5 Plaintiffs argue that they are not required to
show reliance. They are correct. Idaho has adopted §
323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that offers
an alternative if reliance is missing:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should

recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the
other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking,
if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the
risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.

See Fagundes v. State, 116 Idaho 173, 774 P.2d
343, 346 (!d. App.Ct.1989) (citing § 323 with approval). Thus, even without reliance, plaintiffs could
prevail on their assumed duty claim if they can show
that DuPont's failure to follow through on its offers of
assistance created an increased risk of harm. The Restatement explains plaintiffs' burden of proof as follows:
Where, however, the actor's assistance has put the
other in a worse position than he was in before, either because the actual danger of harm to the other
has been increased by the partial performance, or
because the other, in reliance upon the undertaking,
has been induced to forego other opportunities of
obtaining assistance, the actor is not free to discontinue his services where a reasonable man would not
do so. He will then be required to exercise reasonable care to terminate his services in such a manner
that there is no unreasonable risk of harm to the
other, or to continue them until they can be so terminated.
See Comment c.
The plaintiffs have not sho\\TI how DuPont's offers of assistance put them "in a worse position than
[they were] in before." Id. Plaintiffs concede that "[n]o
damage flowed solely from post-2001 stewardship
failures," but argue that "it was th~ combination of the
pre- and post-application conduct that combined to
cause Oust damage in the 2002-2004 crop years." See
Plaintiffs' Brief(docket no. 1658) at p. 33.
This argument, however, begs the question: How
did DuPont's post-application offers of assistance
combine with pre-application conduct to cause damage? The record provides no answer. Rather, it reveals
that 100% of the damage testified to by Hofman was
caused by DuPont's pre-application conduct.
The analysis, at this point, circles back to Udy.
Because DuPont's pre-application conduct was responsible for 100% of plaintiffs' damage, DuPont's
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failure to follow through on post-application offers of
assistance is, at most, "nonfeasance which results in
failure to eliminate a preexisting risk." Udy, 34 P.3d at
1073. Under Udy, such nonfeasance cannot support an
assumed duty claim. Consequently, the Court will
grant DuPont's Rule 50(b) motion as to the assumed
duty claim.

Damages for Assumed Duty
The Court's Special Verdict Form instructed the
jury that if they awarded damages on the assumed duty
claim for DuPont's post-application conduct, they
were to award those damages separately from the
damages awarded on the claims for DuPont's
pre-application conduct. The jury calculated the total
damages and then allocated them 75% to the
pre-application claims and 25% to the post-application
claim for breach of an assumed duty.

*6 Because the Court has dismissed the assumed
duty claim, the damages awarded on that claim must
be dismissed as well. This leaves plaintiffs with an
award of 75% of their total damages on the
pre-application claims.
There is no evidence whatsoever for awarding
plaintiffs only 75% of their damages on the
pre-application claims for relief against DuPont. The
Court describes in detail the damages suffered by
plaintiffs in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law filed with this decision. There is no support in
this record for taking that total damage figure as
against DuPont and reducing it by 25%.
The Court's instructions were responsible for this
error. As there was no evidence supporting a separate
allocation of damages to the assumed duty claim, the
Court should not have left open to the jury the option
to make that allocation.
This analysis leads to an anomalous result. On the
one hand, the Court's dismissal of the assumed duty
claim requires it to strike the 25% of damages the jury
assigned to that claim. On the other hand, the Court is
powerless to increase the allocation of damages to the
pre-application claims from 75% to 100%, as that
would constitute an impermissible additur. See U.S. v.
4.0 Acres ofLand, 175 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.l999).
The Court does, however, have the authority to
grant a new trial as to damages if the verdict is inad-

equate as a matter of law. See 11 Wright, Miller and
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 2807 at p. 78
(1995). Moreover, erroneous jury instructions, as well
as the failure to give adequate instructions, are also
grounds for a new trial. Murphy v. City ofLong Beach,
914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir.l990). Here, both justifications exist for granting a new trial: The damages for
DuPont's pre-application conduct are inadequate as
discussed above due to the Court's erroneous instructions. For that reason, the Court will grant a new trial
as to DuPont only on the issue of damages.
While plaintiffs have not filed a motion for new
trial, the Court may grant a new trial on its own initiative "[n]o later than I 0 days after entry of judgment
... for any reason that would justify granting one on a
party's motion." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). No judgment
has yet been entered and so the I 0-day deadline has
not yet passed. Had plaintiffs' moved for a new trial,
the Court would have the authority, as discussed
above, to order a new trial due to inadequate damages.
Thus, the Court has the authority to grant a new trial
on a ground not raised by the parties.
The Court considered giving DuPont the option of
agreeing to an additur as an alternative to a new trial.
However, the Court's research indicates that the Court
has no authority to condition the grant of a new trial in
that manner. See 11 Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal
Practice & Procedure supra § 2807 at p. 86.
The new trial will be limited to issues of damages
as all liability issues have been settled and vvill not be
retried. See Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513 (9th
Cir.1994) (granting new trial as to damages only). The
Court has the authority to grant such a partial new trial
when "the issues of damages and liability are not so
interwoven as to require a new trial on both." See Lies
v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.l981).
Here, the issues of damages and liability are not interwoven and so a new trial on all issues is not required.
*7 Of course, certain damage claims which were
foreclosed by the Court's pretrial and trial rulings may
be re-opened and subject to reconsideration. The
Court would envision the new trial on damages as to
DuPont on the bellwethers to be folded into the upcoming trial on damages with the BLM. One notable
difference between the re-trial of the bellwether's
damage claims and the trial of the non-bellwethers'
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claims is that the former will involve damages only
while the latter will be a trial of specific causation and
damages. See In Re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Lit.,
292 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir.2002).
\Vhile the jury's allocation of damages is flawed,
their allocation of fault is fully supported by the record. The jury allocated fault 60% to DuPont and 40%
to the BLM. The Court sustains that fmding and it will
not be retried.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision
above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion for judgment as a matter of
law or for new trial (docket no. 1644) is GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is granted to
the extent it seeks a(l) dismissal of the assumed duty
claim and (2) a new trial on the issue of damages only
as to DuPont. The motion is denied in all other respects.
D.Idaho,20 10.
Adams v. U.S.
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1248286 (D.Idaho)
END OF DOCUMENT
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Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
Case No. CV 09-02219
Plaintiff,
ORDER EXTENDING
DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS
DISCLOSURES

vs.
JACK J. STREJBICK, a single man, JACK
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipal corporation of the State of
fdaho, and its employee LOWELL J.
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer,
and DOES 1 - 20,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on Stipulation of the parties, and

good cause appearing therefor,
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It is hereby order that Defendants' Expert Witness Disclosures shall be

extended to October 21, 2011 .
DATED this

2. f{;;y of August,

2011.

District Judge

ORDER EXTENDING DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 2

Fl

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK )
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of )
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick,
)
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a
)
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, )
and its employee LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, )
City of Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1-20,)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. CV 09-02219

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER ON SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

This matter came before the Court on Defendants City of Lewiston and Lowell J.
Cutshaw's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 1 The Plaintiff was represented by
Ronald Landeck and Danelle Forseth, of the firm Landeck & Forseth. Defendants City of
1

The City subsequently filed a Motion to Strike Portions of Second Affidavit of John Block, Second
Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, Affidavit of John R. "Hank" Swift, and Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has several affidavits
before it on this matter. The Court has only considered relevant admissible evidence as it applies to the
pending motion fOI,summary judgment.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
1
ON SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Lewiston and City of Lewiston Engineer, Lowell Cutshaw, were represented by Brian
Julian, of the firm Anderson, Julian & HulL The Court heard oral argument on this
matter on August 9, 2011. The Court, having heard the argument of cow1sel and being
fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
A detailed factual background of this case is found in this Court's Afemorandum

Opinion and Order on Motionfor Summary Judgment dated September 14,2010. The
City's first motion for summary judgment was denied because a question of material fact
existed concerning whether Block reasonably should have discovered his claim against
the City prior to 2009. On August 5, 2011, the parties entered into a stipulation to
dismiss with prejudice Defendant Jack J. Streibick, individually and as the personal
representative of the Estate of Maureen Streibick. An order to this effect was entered on
August 8, 2011, leaving only the City of Lewiston and its employee, Lowell Cutshaw, as
remaining defendants (hereinafter referred to as "the City").
There are eleven claims of negligence against the City and Cutshaw. These
claims assert the City and Cutshaw breached a duty of care by:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

failing to notify and/or warn Block at the time he sought building
permits for 153, 155 and 159 and Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7 of Canyon
Greens No. 2 of earth movement that the City of Lewiston,
Cutshaw and others knew had occurred in 1999 within the area of
153, 155 and 159 and that such earth movement had neither been
eliminated nor properly abated in any manner;
failing to take any action to prevent, restrict or regulate
development within the area of 153, 155 and 159 until such earth
movement had been eliminated or properly abated;
failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155
and 159 be eliminated or properly abated by Streibick and/or
others prior to Block's purchase of the Property;
failing to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155
and 159 to Block without notice and/or warning to Block that such
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(v)

(vi)

(vii)

(viii)

(ix)

(x)

(xi)

earth movement had occurred in 1999 or without having
eliminated or properly abated such earth movement;
failing to require Streibick to complete the required storm water
improvements in 1994 for Palisades No. 4 subdivision and
approving and allowing Streibick' s construction of a storm water
detention pond within the area of 15 3 where the City of Lewiston,
Cutshaw and/or others knew earth movement had occurred in
1999, thereby contributing to the instability of soil in that area;
approving the plats of Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No. 2
without notifying and/or warning Block that earth movement had
occurred on 15 3, 15 5 and 15 9 in 1999 and had not been eliminated
or properly abated;
failing to require an approved design or plan incorporating
engineering standards applicable to the grading, filling,
compacting of soil, detaining of storm water and constructing of
residences on the property and failing to approve such a design or
plan and/or to require compliance with such design or plan prior to
any such improvements being allowed by the City of Lewiston,
Cutshaw and/or others and/or undertaken to eliminate or properly
abate such earth movement within the area of 153, 155 and 159;
failing to act with ordinary care to protect against the likely risks,
danger and adverse consequences from such earth movement the
City of Lewiston, Cutshaw, and/or others knew had occurred in the
area of 153, 155, and 159 in 1999;
failing to require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly
abate the dangerous condition caused by and/or existing as a result
of such earth movement in the area of 15 3, 15 5 and 159;
failing to supervise Streibick's development activities within the
area of 153, 155, and 159 between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing
concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a
dangerous condition and risk of harm; and
failing to inspect and/or make inadequate inspection of Streibick's
development activities within the area of 153, 155 and 159
between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such
earth movement and the creation of a dangerous condition and risk
of harm.

Complaint, at 14-15. In addition, Block claims the City and Cutshaw acted with gross
negligence with respect to the above claims. The City's second motion for summary
judgment, seeking summary judgment of the aforementioned claims, is currently before
this Court.
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SUMMARYJUDGMENTSTANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P.
56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must construe
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943, 945, 188 P.3d 885,
887 (2008); Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470, 472 (2005), citing
Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45,44 P.3d 1100 (2002).
'When a motion for summary judgment is "supported by a particularized affidavit,
the opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but
must set forth "specific facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Verbillis v.
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). A
"mere scintilla" of evidence or only a "slight doubt" as to the facts is insufficient to
withstand summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697
(2007); see also Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,238, 108 P.3d 380, 385
(2005).
Finally, the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact is on the moving party, and once this burden is met, it is incumbent upon the
non-moving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element. Meikle v. Watson,
138 Idaho 680, 683, 69 P.3d 100, 103 (2003); Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129
Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996).
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ANALYSIS
The City's arguments in support of summary judgment are divided into two
categories: First, the City argues that it is not liable under general negligence theories.
Second, the City contends it is immune from liability pursuant to provisions of the Idaho
Tort Claims Act (hereinafter "ITCA").

A. Negligence arguments
The claims against the City are based upon alleged acts or omissions by the City
which resulted in a breach of duty owed to Block. The City's motion for summary
judgment is granted based upon two of the four arguments presented to the Court.
1. Summary judgment is granted based upon the economic loss rule.

The City contends all of Block's damages constitute economic damages,
including repair and lost value on the homes at 153, 155, 159 Marine View Drive, lost
business damages, and lost value on six of the eight homes that were designated part of
Canyon Greens No. 2. The Canyon Greens No. 2 homes suffered no physical damage
related to slope movement. Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of

Motion for Summmy Judgment, Exhibit L, Affidavit of Terry Rudd, at 112-113. Because
all of Block's damages are economic, recovery is prohibited pursuant to the economic
loss rule.
The economic loss rule is discussed in great detail in Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc.,
141 Idaho 296, 108 P.3d 996 (2005).
Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery
of purely economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty
to prevent economic loss to another. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement
Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995); Tusch Enters.
v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41, 740 P .2d 1022, 1026 (1987); Clark v.
International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 336, 581 P.2d 784, 794 (1978).
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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The rule "applies to negligence cases in general; its application is not
restricted to products liability cases." Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,
197,983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999) (citations omitted). "Economic loss
includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the
subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value
and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps,
Inc., v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306,309 (1975).
On the other hand, "[p]roperty damage encompasses damage to property
other than that which is the subject of the transaction." !d.

!d. at 300, 108 P .3d at 1000. In order for the economic loss rule to apply in the case at
hand, the damages claimed must relate to "the subject of the transaction." The Blahd
Court referred to two cases which define "the subject of the transaction."
In Tusch Enterprises, a seller hired a contractor to level a hill to
prepare the area for construction. The seller participated in the site
preparation, hired a builder to construct a duplex on the site and sold the
duplex to a buyer. The buyer then discovered the duplex was damaged
because the foundation was defective. The buyer sued the seller and the
builder alleging negligence in preparing the foundation. This Court held
the economic loss rule barred the negligence claims because the damage to
the duplex caused by the defective foundation was purely economic.
Tusch Enters., 113 Idaho at 41, 740 P .2d at 1026. This Court later
explained in another case that it "considered the duplex itself, rather than
its construction, to be the subject ofthe transaction." Ramerth, 133 Idaho
at 197, 983 P.2d at 851.
In Ramerth, an airplane owner sued a repairman alleging the
repairman's negligent servicing and inspection of the airplane caused
damage to the engine and aircraft. The airplane owner argued the
economic loss rule did not bar his negligence claim because the subject of
the transaction was the repairman's services, not the engine or airplane
that was serviced. This Court rejected that argument and held the damage
to the engine and the aircraft were purely economic and therefore, subject
to the economic loss rule. 133 Idaho at 197,983 P.2d at 851. These cases
indicate the word "transaction," for purposes of the economic loss rule,
does not mean a business deal-it means the subject of the lawsuit.

!d. In Blahd, the plaintiffs' house was damaged because the foundation was settling. The
Blahd plaintiffs attempted to distinguish their case from the facts surrounding the
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property in Tusch Enterprises; however, the Blahd Court ultimately determined that both
the lot and the house comprised the "subject of the transaction".
Like the duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the Blahds' house is damaged
because the foundation is settling. The damage to the Blahds' house is
similar to the duplex damage in Tusch Enterprises, where this Court held
the losses were economic. The Blahds seek to distinguish their case by
noting the buyer in Tusch Enterprises did not sue the contractor who
leveled the lot and did not allege the property had been leveled
negligently. The fact that the buyer in Tusch Enterprises only sued the
builder and the seller is immateriaL It is the subject of the transaction that
determines whether a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the
status of the party being sued. The Blahds purchased the house and lot as
an integrated whole. Like the leveled lot and duplex in Tusch Enterprises,
the subject of the transaction in this case is both the lot and the house. That
being the case, the damages to the Blahds' house are purely economic and
the Blahds' negligence claims against the Smith Entities and Jones are
barred by the economic loss rule.

Id. at 300-301, 108 P.3d at 1000-1001. In the case at hand, the subject of the transaction
is the property developed by Block which is contained within the subdivisions, as well as
the houses built upon this property. Thus, the damages sustained by Block are purely
economic damages, similar to the facts of both Tusch Enterprises and Blahd.
The Blahd Court also considered an exception to the economic loss rule, based
upon whether there was a special relationship between the parties.
The term "special relationship," ... refers to those situations where the
relationship between the parties is such that it would be equitable to
impose such a duty. In other words, there is an extremely limited group of
cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a party's
economic interest. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. There are
only two situations in which this Court has found the special relationship
exception applies. One situation is where a professional or quasiprofessional performs personal services. McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of
America, 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976). In "\1cAlvain, an
insured expressly requested his insurance agent provide complete
insurance coverage on the insured's business inventory. The insurance
agent knew or should have known the amount of insurance that was
needed to completely cover the value of the inventory. A fire destroyed
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the inventory and the insurance coverage was insufficient to cover the
loss. This Court held:
When an insurance agent performs his services negligently, to the
insured's injury, he should be held liable for that negligence just as
would an attorney, architect, engineer, physician or any other
professional who negligently performs personal services.
Id at 780, 554 P.2d at 958.
The other situation involving a special relationship is where an entity
holds itself out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized
function, and by so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its performance
of that function. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. In Duffin,
the Idaho Crop Improvement Association was the only entity in Idaho
authorized to certify seed potatoes. The Association held itself out to the
public as having expertise in seed certification and induced reliance on
that expertise. The Federal-State Inspection Service also inspected seed for
diseases. A farmer relied on the Association's expertise and bought the
certified seed. Later, it was discovered the seed was defective and the
farmer suffered economic losses. This Court held a special relationship
existed between the farmer and the certifying Association because the
Association had "engaged in a marketing campaign ... to induce reliance
by purchasers on the fact that seed ha[ d] been certified." Id However, this
Court explained the special relationship exception did not apply to the
Federal-State Inspection Service because there was no evidence in the
record to "conclude that it ha[ d] actively sought to induce reliance on the
part of purchasers of certified seed." Id
Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001.

Block contends that the City owed him a duty as a result of a special relationship,
and that further, the City assumed a duty of care to Block. Block's arguments are
unpersuasive with respect to the economic loss rule. As explained in Blahd, there is an
extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a
party's economic interest. The first is MeA/vain v. General Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 97 Idaho
777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976), where the court found a special relationship based
upon an instance where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal services.
MeA/vain is distinguishable from the case at hand because nothing in the record indicates
MEMORANDUM OPINJON AND ORDER
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the City performed a personal service for Block. The purpose and intent of the Lewiston
subdivision ordinance establishes that the role of the City with respect to subdivisions is
not a personal service. The City's role is to provide for orderly gro\\-ih and development
ofthe City.

(a) The purpose of this chapter is to provide for the orderly growth and
harmonious development of the City of Lewiston, to insure adequate
traffic circulation through coordinated street systems with relation to
major thoroughfares, adjoining subdivisions and public facilities; to
achieve individual property lots of reasonable utility and livability, to
secure adequate provisions for water supply, drainage, sanitary
sewerage, and other health requirement; to insure consideration for
adequate sites for school, recreation areas, and other public facilities;
to promote the conveyance of land by accurate legal descriptions; and
to provide logical procedures for the achievement of this purpose.
(b) In its interpretation and application, the provisions of this chapter are
intended to provide a common ground of understanding and a sound
equitable working relationship between the public and private interests
to the end that both independent and mutual objectives can be
achieved in the subdivision of land.
Affidavit of Kari Rave ncroft in Support of Defendants 'Motion for Summary Judgment,
Exhibit D, Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, section 32-2(a), (b). Further, the record
indicates that Block hired engineers for the purpose of developing the property, thus, the
City engineer was working for the City, not working personally for Block.

In addition, this case is distinguishable from Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement
Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995) where an entity held itself out
to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing,
knowingly induced reliance on its performance of that function. There is no evidence in
this case that the City of Lewiston held itself out to the public as having expertise
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regarding a specialized function. Thus, no special relationship has been established
between Block and the City.

In summation, the case at hand is analogous to Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho
37, 41, 740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987) and Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,
108 P.3d 996 (2005). The economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic
losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another.
The losses claimed by Block are purely economic. Further, there is no special
relationship between Block and the City which creates an exception to the economic loss
rule in this case. Therefore, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, seeking
dismissal of all of Block's claims against the City, is granted.

2. The City did not owe Block a duty of care with respect to actions which
occurred on the property prior to Block's purchase.
The Complaint sets forth six allegations of negligence which occurred prior to
Block's purchase of the property.

Complaint,~

55 (claims designated (iii), (iv), (v), (ix),

(x), and (xi)). The City maintains that it had no duty to Block with respect to any alleged
acts or omissions which may have occurred when the previous owner possessed the
property.
The existence of a duty is a question of law. Twpin v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,
247,985 P.2d 669,672 (1999). The City asserts that until Block purchased the property,
the City had no more duty to him than it did to any other member of the public regarding
this property. The City relies on a Minnesota case, Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694
N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 2005) in support of its argument, based upon the "public duty rule."
Generally, a person has no common law duty to prevent a third person
from injuring another unless there is some kind of special relationship.
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Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 841; Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 315
(1965). Applying this principle to governmental torts in what is called the
"public duty rule" requires that a governmental unit owe the plaintiff a
duty different from that owed to the general public in order for the
governmental unit to be found liable. Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806. In
other words, a purely "public duty" -as opposed to a "special duty" -cannot
give rise to government tort liability. Id
I d. at 793. The Idaho Supreme Court relied on the analysis set forth in Radke for

purposes of determining whether the State has a duty to competently investigate a report
of child abuse in Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 16, 137 P.3d
397, 403 (2006)_2 \\''bile the case at hand is distinguishable factually from Radke and
Rees because the issues before this Court do not address the responsibility for protecting

abused and neglected children, the Minnesota application of the "public duty rule" is
instructive in the case at hand. With respect to the six claims listed above, the issue is
whether the City had a duty to prevent a land owner from causing injury to a future
purchaser. The City contends that it owed no duty to Block with respect to Streibick's

2

The Rees Court applied four factors for determining whether the government assumed
responsibility for protecting reportedly abused and neglected children.
There, the court noted under Minnesota law a statute alone could not create a special
duty; rather there must be additional indicia the governmental unit "has undertaken the
responsibility of protecting a particular class of persons[ ] from the risks associated with a
particular harm." Jd at 793. It then considered four non-exhaustive factors to determine if
the government assumed responsibility for protecting reportedly abused and neglected
children:
(1) Whether the governmental unit had actual knowledge of the dangerous
condition;
(2) Whether there was reasonable reliance by persons on the governmental unit's
representations and conduct (such reliance must be based on specific actions or
representations which cause the persons to forego other alternatives of protecting
themselves);
(3) Whether an ordinance or statute set forth mandatory acts clearly for the
protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole; and
(4) Whether the governmental unit used due care to avoid increasing the risk of
harm.
I d. at 794. Importantly, these four factors need not all be met for the Court to determine
that a duty exists, id. at 788, and they do not create a bright-line test. ...
Id. at 16, 137 P.3d at 403.
11
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

property any more so than it would to any other member of the public at large who might
have considered purchasing the property.
The City also relies on Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 34 P.3d 1069
(2001).
Udy's claims are in reality claims for negligent police protection for which
there can be no recovery absent a special relationship with the victim. See
Lundgren v. City of McCall, 120 Idaho 556, 557-58, 817 P.2d 1080, 108182 (1991). Cf Isabella County v. Michigan, 181 Mich.App. 99,449
N. W.2d 111 (1989) (state police officer who failed to report downed
traffic sign was not liable to motorist who was injured in collision with
that sign absent evidence of special relationship between officer and
injured motorist giving rise to duty on officer's part); Alderman v. Lamar,
493 So.2d 495 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) (no duty to decedent absent special
relationship to report or place upright a leaning stop sign causing fatal
automobile collision). Here, the record does not establish, nor does Udy
argue that he or his passengers were in a special relationship with Sheriff
Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may have been prevented
through reasonable law enforcement actions is insufficient to establish a
duty to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for SheriffRoskelley's
liability in tort.

!d. at 391, 34 P.3d at 1074.
Block has provided no evidence the City owed him a duty based upon a special
relationship between Block and the City. Similarly, the City does not owe a duty to any
person who may purchase land in Lewiston, from any current landowner, at a future date.
Absent a duty, Block's burden to establish negligence cannot be met. Therefore, the
City's motion for summary judgment with respect to claims of negligence when the
property was owned by Streibick is granted. 3

3

In addition to the two arguments above, the City also claims it had no duty to require Block obtain a slope
stability or geotechnical analysis of the property and that Block cannot show that any action or inaction by
the City caused Block's damages. Because summary judgment is granted based upon the foregoing
analysis, it is not necessary for the Court to set forth a detailed analysis on these arguments. Summary
judgment is also granted in the alternative, based upon the immunity provisions of the ITCA, set forth
below.
12
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B. Immunity Claims

In addition, the City relies on the ITCA to assert immunity from liability on the
Plaintiffs claims. This Court will address the City's immunity arguments for purposes of
granting summary judgment on an alternative basis to the analysis set forth above.
The ITCA "abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity and renders a
governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions."

Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d 330, 334 (1994). "The
purpose of the ITCA is to provide 'much needed reliefto those suffering injury from the
negligence of government employees.' The ITCA is to be construed liberally, consistent
with its purpose, and with a view to 'attaining substantial justice."' Rees v. State, Dept.

of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 19, 137 P.3d 397,406 (2006) (internal citations
omitted).
At summary judgment, a three step analysis must be followed when a Defendant
claims immunity pursuant to the ITCA.
First, we must determine whether "tort recovery is allowed under the laws
ofldaho." Harris, 123 Idaho at 298 n. 1, 847 P.2d at 1159 n. 1. This is
essentially a determination of whether there is such a tort under Idaho
Law. Czaplicki, 116 Idaho at 330, 775 P.2d at 644. Second, this Court
determines if "an exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged
misconduct from liability." Coonse, 132 Idaho at 803, 979 P.2d at 1163.
Finally, "if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the merits of the
claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment
entitle the moving party to dismissal." Id

Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10,15, 137 P.3d 397, 402 (2006).
The Defendants concede that negligence is a recognized tort in the State of Idaho;
however, the Defendants argue certain exceptions to liability under the ITCA are
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applicable in the case at hand. Summary judgment is appropriate based upon immunity
pursuant to the ITCA. Specific provisions are addressed individually.
1.

I.C. § 6-904B affords the City immunity from any claim which arises
from the failure to inspect property or issue permits.

The underlying basis for all of Block's claims against the City are based upon the
City's failure to inspect the property, or failure to require certain geotechnical studies as
a condition for the development of subdivisions, or issuance of building permits for the
properties. The City contends it is immune from liability pursuant to certain provisions
ofi.C. § 6-904B, which specifically provides immunity for actions arising out ofthe
issuance of permits, or failure to make an inspection. This statute reads in pertinent part:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and
without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct as
defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim
which:
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate,
approval, order or similar authorization.
4. Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an
inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the
property of the governmental entity performing the inspection.
I.C. § 6-904B(3),(4). The ITCA defines gross negligence and reckless, willful and
wanton conduct.
For the purposes of this chapter, and this chapter only, the following
words and phrases shall be defined as follows:
1. "Gross negligence" is the doing or failing to do an act which a
reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar responsibility
would, with a minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to
recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty
shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others.
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2. "Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person
intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating
unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a high degree of
probability that such harm will result.
I. C. § 6-904C(l ),(2). The immunity language within this statute is broad enough to cover
any claims of negligence which are based on issuance of building or other permits,
4

approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or not inspecting the property at issue. The
burden is particularly high for Block because "I.C. § 6-903(e) provides a rebuttable
presumption that any act of an employee within the time and place of his employment is
without malice or criminal intent." Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho
774, 784,215 P.3d 494, 504 (2009).
Nothing in the record before the Court establishes that the City acted with gross
negligence. Block relies upon the affidavit of Bud Van Stone to support his argument
that the City "acted unreasonably and failed to exercise reasonable care." Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment,

at 42-43. Nothing within Mr. Van Stone's affidavit asserts the City acted in a manner that
meets the definition of gross negligence set forth in the IT CA. Deposition of Bud R. Van
Stone. 5 There is no evidence a City employee acted, or failed to act, in a mat111er that

shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others. See I. C. § 6904C(J). Nor is there proof that the City intentionally and knowingly did or failed to do

an act which created unreasonable risk of harm to Block, and which involved a high
degree of probability that such harm would result, as contemplated by I. C. § 6-904C(2).
4

Block contends the case at hand is akin to a negligent supervision claim. See Sherer v. Pocatello School
Dist. No.25, 143 Idaho 486, 493, 148 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2006). The claim of negligent supervision in
Sherer addressed whether the school district negligently supervised school children and is distinguishable
from the case at hand.
5
See Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of PlaintifFs Objections to Defendant City's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit M
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Block cannot show, as a matter of law, that the City was grossly negligent, or engaged in
reckless, willful and wanton conduct.
Block's claims against the City are all based upon the City's actions with respect
to approving subdivision plats, and issuing building permits for the homes which were
damaged. These claims arise from a failure to inspect, a failure to provide information
during the administrative process, or failure to require certain actions as a condition of
issuing building permits. The claims against the City fall within the scope of immunity
set forth in I.C. §6-904B. Therefore, the City's motion for summary judgment is granted
on this alternative basis.

2. In addition, discretionary function immunity shields the City from
liability on all claims.
The City claims it is immune from liability pursuant to discretionary function
immunity exception of the ITCA. Discretionary function immunity is set forth at I.C. §
6-904(1).
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall
not be liable for any claim which:
Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental
entity exercising ordinary care, in relia.11ce upon or the execution or
performance of a statutory or regulatory function, whether or not the
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the
discretion be abused.
I.C. § 6-904(1). This exception to immunity applies to governmental decisions entailing
planning or policy formation. See Dorea Enterprises, Inc., v. City of Blackfoot, 144
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Idaho 422, 163 P.3d 211 (2007). 6 The Court must follow a two-step process for
determining whether this exception to liability is applicable.
The first step is to examine the nature and quality of the challenged
actions. !d. "Routine, everyday matters not requiring evaluation of broad
policy factors will more likely than not be 'operational.'" Ransom, 113
Idaho at 205, 743 P.2d at 73. Decisions involving a consideration of the
financial, political, economic and social effects of a policy or plan will
generally be planning and "discretionary." !d. "While greater rank or
authority will most likely coincide with greater responsibility for planning
or policy formation decisions; ... those with the least authority may, on
occasion, make planning decisions which fall within the ambit of the
discretionary function exception." !d. at 204, 743 P.2d at 72. The second
step is to examine the underlying policies of the discretionary function,
which are: to permit those who govern to do so without being unduly
inhibited by the threat of liability for tortious conduct, and also, to limit
judicial re-examination of basic policy decisions properly entrusted to
other branches of government. !d. at 205, 743 P.2d at 73.

!d. at 425, 163 P.3d at 214. 7
The claims against the City arise from the City's role of approving subdivisions
and issuing building permits. Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, enacted in 1997, applies to
subdivisions approval. This ordinance does not set forth a mandatory requirement for
slope stability analysis. 8 The City engineer is given discretion to determine whether a
slope stability analysis is required before a subdivision plat is approved. Aj]idavit of Kari

Ravencroft in Support of Defendant's }vfotion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D.

6

The issue in Dorea was whether the City of Blackfoot's decision to flush sewage lines was discretionary
or operational.
7
The Dorea Court affirmed the district court determination that the City's decisions regarding the flushing
of sewage lines was a discretionary function. The Dorea Court emphasized that the allocation of financial
and human resources to perform the myriad tasks of running the City are basic policy decisions properly
entrusted to other branches of government. !d. at 426, 163 P.3d at 215.
8
A historical review of the Lewiston subdivision ordinance is pertinent to this analysis. Prior to 1997, the
ordinance set forth mandatory requirements for when a slope stability analysis must be required. The
revisions made to the ordinance in 1997 substantially removed this language, and left discretion to the city
engineer to determine whether slope stability analysis would be required before a subdivision plat was
approved. Affidavit of Kari Ravencroft in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit
D.
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The changes in the subdivision ordinance which eliminated the requirements for
slope stability or geotechnical analysis fall within the category of "discretionary"
decisions, which are afforded immunity pursuant to I. C. § 6-904(1 ). These revisions
were the result of a determination that involved the consideration of the financial,
political, and economic effects of the ordinance. The city engineer is given the discretion
to determine whether a slope stability or geotechnical evaluation is necessary. Block
contends that the engineer's decision to require an evaluation is an operational decision
because it is a routine decision as part of the engineer's job, which does not involve a
consideration of the financial, political, economic and social effects of a policy or plan.
Block's argument is unpersuasive with respect to the city engineer's discretion on this
issue.
Decisions made under statutes and regulations which leave room for policy
judgment in their execution are discretionary. The decision making process the city
engineer follows is done pursuant to the ordinance, which leaves room for policy
judgment in its execution. A similar issue was discussed in Crown v. State, Dept. of
Agriculture, 127 Idaho 175, 898 P.2d 1086 (1995).
The growers seem to maintain that, under Oppenheimer Indus., Inc. v.
Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423,732 P.2d 661 (1987), only the
decision of whether to inspect is discretionary and that once that decision
has been made, the conduct of the inspection is "operational." Essentially,
it is the growers' position that publication of inspection results and
revocation of a warehouse license are responsibilities subsumed within the
inspection process. However, the growers' analysis overlooks the language
in Oppenheimer indicating that "decisions made under statutes and
regulations which leave room for policy judgment in their execution are
discretionary." Oppenheimer, 112 Idaho at 425, 732 P.2d at 663. Applying
that rationale to the present case, it is clear that the statutes governing
publication and license revocation are discretionary.

!d. at 181, 898 P.2d at 1092.
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The City's role in approving subdivisions and issuing building permits is based
upon city ordinances which leave room for policy judgment in their execution. This is
illustrated by the testimony of current city engineer, Shawn Stubbers. Mr. Stubbers
testified in his deposition regarding the factors which he has considered when deciding
whether a slope stability or geotechnical analysis should be required. 9
Q. Okay. Vv'nat were the elements that caused you to determine that the
subdivision required a geotechnical study?
A. It was kind of a, a growing list of things. What started my interest,
concern was the fact they wanted to go to septic systems, and in my
professional experience, septic systems would add additional water to that
potential fill area, which has the potential of causing slope failure. When I
went back then and reviewed their PUD agreement, that specific area of
the PUD agreement is caused out -- called out as having some site
limitations. So that was additional information that I used. And then I did
some research asking professionals in the area of what they thought about
it. They pointed me in the direction of Terry Howard's study that was
done. Once I reviewed that, saw that it called out septic systems as being a
bad mix with those areas, that having fill and septic systems together was
a bad mix, and that was the thing in my mind that said, you need to do a
geotechnical evaluation.

Second Affidavit of Ronald J Landeck in Support of Plaintiff's Objections to Defendant
City's Motionfor Summary Judgment, Exhibit L, Deposition ofShawn Stubbers, at 37.
In the case at hand, Le\viston City Ordinance 4177 gives discretion to the city
engineer regarding whether a developer will be required to obtain a slope stability or
geotechnical analysis. The authority is similar to that discussed in Crown v. State, Dept.

ofAgriculture, 127, Idaho 175, 181, 898 P.2d 1086, 1092 (1995).
The Court must also consider the second step of analysis in regards to the
discretionary function exception to immunity is applicable. See Dorea, 144 Idaho at 425,

9

Vv'hen being questioned on this issue at the deposition, Mr. Stubbers testified regarding his decision to
require that a developer obtain a geotechnical evaluation for a subdivision which is unrelated to this case.
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163 P.3d at 214. In determining that the City's decisions with respect to Block's property
are discretionary, it is noted that doing so permits those who govern to do so without
being unduly inhibited by the threat of liability and also limits the judicial re-examination
of basic policy decisions which are entrusted to the City.
All of Block's claims against the City are based upon determinations made by city
employees in the processes of approving subdivision plats or issuing building permits.
These determinations are made in reliance upon or the execution of regulatory function.
The actions of the City that Block complains of are those decisions which are
contemplated within the ITCA as an exception to liability under the discretionary
function exception. I.C. § 6-904(1). Thus, the City is shielded from liability on all of
Block's claims and the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is therefore granted
on this alternative basis

3. Plan or design immunity shields the City from liability on Block's claim
the City was negligent in approving the plats of Canyon Greens and
Canyon Greens No. 2.
In addition to the immunity provisions discussed above, plan or design immunity
is applicable specifically to Plaintiff's claim (vi), which claims the City was negligent in
approving the plats for the Canyon Greens subdivisions. I. C. § 6-904(7) provides
immunity to a governmental entity and its employees for claims which arise out of a plan
or design for construction to public property.
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall
not be liable for any claim which:
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the
highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan
or design is prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or
design standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design
or approved in advance of the construction by the legislative body of the
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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governmental entity or by some other body or administrative agency,
exercising discretion by authority to give such approval.
I.C. § 6-904(7). The City contends, in the alternative, it is immune from any claim
arising out of the acceptance and design of subdivision plat maps relating to Sunset
Palisades No. 4, Sunset Palisades No. 8, Canyon Greens, or Canyon Greens No. 2. The
general area in question was subdivided four times. At each of these subdivisions, a
stamped, engineered subdivision plat was submitted to the City, including roads, sewage
lines, and easements, storm drain lines and easements, and other public property.

Supplemental Affidavit ofStephen Adams in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Exhibit A, Deposition of Lowell Cutshaw.
There is no material question of fact that the subdivision plats were prepared in
substantial conformance with engineering or design or design standards in effect at the
time of preparation of the plan. Further, the subdivision plats were approved by the city,
as a governmental entity with authority to give such approvaL
Block contends design immunity is not applicable, on the distinction that this
statute only allows immunity for public projects such as highways, roads, streets, or other
public property. However, this argument is unpersuasive with respect to claim (vi).
Claim (vi) asserts that the City was negligent in "approving the plats of Canyon Greens
and Canyon Greens No. 2 without notifying and/or warning Block that earth movement
had occurred on 153, 155, and 159 in 1999 and had not been eliminated or properly
abated .... " Complaint, at 14 (claim (vi)). The approval or denial of a subdivision plat is
a public project that is analogous to the development of highways, roads, streets, or other
public property. Thus, in the alternative, the City is immune from liability for claim (vi)
pursuant to I. C.§ 6-904(7) and summary judgment is granted on this issue.
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CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff developed subdivisions known as Canyon Greens and Canyon
Greens No. 2, in Lewiston, Idaho. After the property was subdivided into lots, the
Plaintiffbuilt homes upon certain lots. Three of the homes built by the Plaintiff were
damaged as a result of earth settlement that occurred on the property. In 1999, there had
been landslide movement in the area where the subdivisions are located. The Plaintiff
was not informed of this slope movement by the City when the subdivision plats were
approved, or when the building and occupancy permits were issued.
The City has set forth several arguments in support of summary judgment. The
City contends that the claims should be dismissed pursuant to the economic loss rule,
which bars recovery for purely economic losses in negligence cases. The City also
argues there is no duty of care owed by the City to Block for actions which happened on
the property prior to Block's purchasing the land. In addition, the City claims immunity
from liability based upon provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Based upon the
foregoing analysis, the City's motion for summary judgment is granted.
ORDER
The Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.

Dated this

~

day of October 2011.

{!_4!3J

0

CARL B. KERRlCK- District Judge
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'/'

mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
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Landeck & Forseth
P.O. Box 9344
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,

)
) Case No. CV 09-02219

Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK J.
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY OF
LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the State of
Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW,
City of Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1-20,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)

)
)
)

)
COMES NOW, the above-entitled Plaintiff John G. Block ("Block"), by and through his
attorneys of record, Landeck & Forseth, Attorneys at Law, and hereby submits this Motion for
Reconsideration of this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I

10/28/2011 FRI 16:40
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Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This
Motion for Reconsideration is made on the grounds more fully stated in Plaintiffs Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second
Motion for Summary Judgment, including the inapplicability of the economic loss rule to
Block's claims, recognition of a duty of care the City of Lewiston and/or Lowell J. Cutshaw
owed to Block, and the inapplicability of the exceptions to liability as set forth in Idaho Code§§
6-904B(3),(4), 6-904(1) and (7).
This Motion is supported by the pleadings on file, and by the following documents
submitted contemporaneously herewith:
1.

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment

2.

Fourth Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck

DATED this 28th day of October, 2011.
LANDECK & FORSETH

Ronal¢ J. Landeck
Atto11j\eys for Plaintiff
'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man,

)
) Case No. CV 09-02219
)

Plaintiff,

) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
vs.
) OF MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
) ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK J.
)SUMMARYJUDGMENT
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of the
)
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY OF )
LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the State of )
Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, )
)
City of Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1-20,
Defendants.
)
)
Plaintiff John G. Block ("Block"), through counsel, hereby submits this Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration ofMemorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion
for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule ll(a)(2)(B), Block respectfully requests that
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this Court reconsider and withdraw its Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for
Summary Judgment that granted Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Order").
In its Order tllis Court granted the Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's
("City's") Second Motion for Summary Judgment based on its application of the economic loss
rule and recognized exceptions from liability based upon provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act
("ITCA"). Block asserts that this Court's application of the economic loss rule to bar his
negligence claims was in error. In addition, Block asserts that this Court's recognition of and
application of exceptions to liability based on provisions of the ITCA were also in error. Further,
Block asserts that there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding the City's negligence
and/or gross negligence with respect to its actions and/or omissions. Block's arguments are more
fully explained below.
The background facts in their most basic sense are that (i) a landslide occurred on
property contained within City limits and contained within a subdivision, Sunset Palisades No.4
("SP4"); (ii) the City knew and documented such landslide event in two separate file locations in
City records with the intent of addressing such landslide when future development of the
property occurred; (iii) the property at issue was proposed for development through various
subdivision processes including Sunset Palisades No. 8 ("SP8") completed before Block
purchased the property at issue, and Canyon Greens ("CG") and Canyon Greens No.2 ("CG2")
completed during Block's ownership ofthe property at issue; (iv) the City's subdivision
ordinance required staff to meet with each developer and identify any unusual problems and
determine if special studies were needed; (v) City staff met with Block and failed to warn or
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advise of the landslide occurrence either by not exercising ordinary care, or by failing to do what
reasonable person(s) in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would recognize as his or
her duty; (vi) Block developed the property exercising, at a minimum, ordinary care and in
compliance with all of the City's requirements, (vii) in an 2009 almost identical landslide/earth
movement event occurred that was the proximate cause of physical damage to Block's three
homes and improvements constructed at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive and within CG,
and Block was forced to demolish some of these structures at great monetary loss.
Some additional basic facts related to the situation described above are (i) at no time did
Block enter into a contract with the City either for the sale of goods or services; (ii) at no time
did Block enter into a contract to purchase anything more than the bare land on which he
constructed the homes and various other structures and that contract was with the Streibicks and
not the City; (iii) at the time of the City's n.egligent actions, Block owned only unimproved real
property; (iv) Block is seeking damages because this "other property," the homes and
improvements he constructed were damaged because of the 2009landslide; (v) Block is not
claiming compensation for damages to the unimproved real property he purchased from a third
party; (vi) the real property is still there.
The Court's application of the economic loss rule to bar Block's recovery of damages is
erroneous.
Ibe facts of Block's case are distinguishable from the facts of the cases cited by this
Court in its Order. The following cases were cited by the Court in its Order.
In Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d
3 06 (1975) the issues before the court were limited to (i) "whether a plaintiff may maintain an
action against a manufacturer, with which it is not in privity of contract, to recover economic loss
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on the ground ofbreach of implied warranty within the contract statute of limitations" and (ii)
the effect of plaintiffs failure to give a defendant adequate notice ofbreach ofwarranty pursuant
to the Uniform Sales Act. !d. at 352,356,544 P.2d at 310,314. The court did not thoroughly
consider the "economic loss rule".
The case of Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,983 P.2d 848 (1999) is also distinguishable
from Block's case. In 1995 Morris sold an airplane to Ramerth. !d. at 195, 983 P.2d at 849.
Ramerth later discovered that the airplane had certain defects caused by repairs improperly done
in 1992 by Hart. !d. at 195-96, 983 P.2d at 849-50. Ramerth and Morris sued Hart based on
negligence, negligence per se and breach of contract and sought damages for repairing the
defective airplane as well as lost profits. Id. at 196, 983 P .2d at 850. The district court granted
summary judgment dismissing the negligence claims based on a finding that the alleged damages
were purely economic. Jd. The court cited Salmon Rivers stating "economic loss includes costs
of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as
commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." !d. The court held
that the transaction was a sale and purchase and that the subject of that transaction was the
defective airplane, thus damages to repair the subject of that transaction, the defective airplane,
as well as commercial loss of profits from use ofthat defective airplane, was economic loss. !d.
at 197, 983 P .2d at 851. Thus, boiled down to the basics, Ramerth purchased a defective
airplane; the airplane was the subject of the transaction; the costs to repair or replace the
defective airplane were economic loss.
Also distinguishable from Block's case and cited by this Comi, is Blahd v. Smith, Inc.,
141 Idaho 296, 108 P .3d 996 (2005). The Blahds purchased a lot and house on a hillside. !d. at
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298, 108 P.3d at 998. The ground underneath the house began to settle and caused damage to the
house. Id. Peter and Kimberly Gysling had previously owned the lot and constructed the home.
Id. at 299, 108 P.3d at 999. The Blahds purchased the home from the Gyslings. Id. The Blahds

filed a complaint against several parties. I d. The district granted summary judgment on the
ground that the Blahds, negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule. Id.
On review, the Idaho Supreme Court stated "it is the subject ofthe transaction that
determines whether a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the status of the party being
sued. The Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated whole.... [Therefore,] the
subject of the transaction [was] both the lot and the house." Id. at 301, 108 P .3d at 1001.
Therefore, the damage to the Blahds' house caused by the house foundation settling was purely
economic and their negligence claims were barred against the Smith Entities (who improved the
lot) and Jones (who told the Gyslings that the soil was adequate for residential construction) by
the economic loss rule.Jd. at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001.
Also distint,ruishable from Block's case and cited by this Court, is Tusch Ente1prises v.
Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987). In Tusch, Vander Boegh was the prior owner ofthe

land and constructed three duplexes that were completed in early 1976.Jd. at 39, 740 P.2d at
1024. In March 1979, Tusch Enterprises purchased the land and duplexes from Vander Boeghs.
I d. at 40, 740 P.2d at 1025. Thereafter, Tusch Enterprises noticed damage to the foundation of

the duplexes.Jd. Tusch Enterprises alleged negligence on the part of the Vander Boeghs and
Coffin in the design and construction of the duplexes; however, because the only damages
alleged were lost rental income from the duplexes and property damage to the duplexes and
parking lot, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the negligence claim
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because such losses were purely economic losses. The court cited the Salmon Rivers court's
statement that "economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property
which is the subject ofthe transaction as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and
consequent loss of profits or use." Id. at 41, 740 P.2d at 1026. Thus, because Tusch Enterprises
suffered no personal injuries and no damage to property other than that which was the subject of
the sale and purchase transaction, being the land and duplexes, Tusch Enterprises' lost rental
income and duplex and parking lot damages were deemed economic losses and non-recoverable
in their negligence action. Jd. at 40-41, 740 P.2d at 1025-26.
Thus, all cases cited by the Court are inapposite to Block's case. Ramerth purchased a
defective airplane, the airplane was the subject of the transaction, the costs to repair or replace
the defective airplane was economic loss; the Blahds purchased a defective house and lot, the
house and lot were the subject of the transaction, the costs to repair or replace the defective
house and lot was economic loss; Tusch Enterprises purchased the lots, the duplexes and the
parking lots, the lots, the duplexes and the parking lots were the subject of the transaction, the
costs to repair or replace the defective lots, duplexes and parking lots were economic loss. The
facts in these cases cited by this Court are distinguishable from the facts of Block's case.
Block purchased four unimproved lots from Defendants Streibick; those four unimproved
lots were the subject of the transaction, any costs to repair or replace those four unimproved lots
is economic loss. However, Block has not alleged any such damage. The damage Block has
alleged is distinct fi-om any damage to those four lots which were the subject of his transaction
with Streibicks. At least one year after purchasing the lots, Block constructed homes, retaining
walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks on a portion of those four lots. These
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homes, retaining walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks are "other property" that
has suffered damage. This "other property" was not part of the subject of the transaction. Block
did not purchase the homes, retaining walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks like
Ramerth purchased an airplane, Blahds purchased a home and lot, and Tusch Enterprises
purchased lots, duplexes and parking lots. These four cases provide an incomplete analysis of the
issue before this Court in this case. The facts of Block's case are different, distinguish Block's
case from the cases relied upon by this Court and compel a different result.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently revisited the "economic loss rule" in Aardema v.
U.S. Dai1y Systems, Inc., 147ldaho 785,215 P.3d 505 (2009) and Brian and Christie, Inc. v.
Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 244 P .3d 166 (20 10).
In Aardema v. U.S. Dai1y Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785,215 P.3d 505 (2009) plaintiffs
tort claim arose out of the contract for a milking system.Id. at 790, 215 P.3d at 510. The Idaho
Supreme Court explained that "damage to person or property when the property is not the subject
of the transaction is recoverable under a negligence theory." Id. The Court observed that "it has
not defined the 'subject ofthe transaction,' instead relying on factual comparisons from previous
decisions." Id. at 791,215 P.3d at 511, citing Blahd, supra at 301. Its "clear pattern" in these
decisions has been to "implicitly" define the "subject of the transaction" by the subject matter of
the contract." Jd. The court continued by recanting its prior statement in Blahd, to the effect that
the word "transaction" refers to the "subject of the lawsuit," by clarifying that "if the subject of
the transaction is defined as the subject of the lawsuit essentially every claim would be barred by
the econom1c loss rule. Instead we read this overbroad language from Blahd to mean that the
underlying contract that is the subject of the lawsuit is the subject of the transaction." I d. at FN2.
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Thus, this Court's recitation on page 6 of its Order that for purposes of the economic loss rule the
word transaction means the subject of the lawsuit is in eiTor. Further, the court in Aardema
explained that the defendants' argument that the cows were the subject of the transaction was
strained and that only the milking machines were the subject of the transaction because the dairy
did not contract with any of the defendants for cattle. Therefore physical damage to the cows was
not economic loss.
Brian and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 244 P .3d 166 (20 10),

the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent decision analyzing the "economic loss rule," clmified
Idaho law and fully supports Block's right to pursue negligence claims against the City. In that
case, plaintiff owned a restaurant and a subcontractor, hired to perform electrical work,
connected signs that had been installed by a sign company to the restaurant building's electrical
power without inspecting the sign's wiring. The signs' wiring caused a fire that resulted in
substantial damage to the building and its contents. Plaintiff sued the subcontractor for negligent
performance of electrical work. The district court held that the restaurant's cause of action was
barred by the economic loss rule. Id. at 171-72.
In Brian and Christie, the Supreme Comi drew the "distinction between the recovery of
damages in tort for physical injmies to person or property and the recovery of truly economic
loss for breach of warranty or contract" as one which centers upon the "economic expectations"
of the parties. It quoted from Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784
(1978) in noting that "[t]he economic expectations of parties have not traditionally been
protected by the law concerning unintentional torts." Id. at 335, 581 P.2d at 793. This is the
underpinning of the economic loss rule, which is that parties enter into a transaction, through
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contract or wan·anty, concerning which a party's economic expectations are not met. That is not
at all the situation in Block's case. There was no contract or warranty with the City. There was
no economic expectation involved in the transaction involving Block and the City. The facts of
the Block case do not fall within the ambit of the economic loss rule.
As further support for this position, the Court in Brian and Christie states that the
definition of economic loss stated in earlier Idaho cases "does not apply in cases involving the
negligent rendition of services because such cases do not involve the purchase of defective
property." Block did not purchase the houses he built. Block did not purchase any property
from the City. Block had no economic expectations in connection with any transactions he had
with the City. The Court goes on to say that "[ d]amages from harm to person or propetiy are not
purely economic losses." Even though Block may have had aspirations for the his development

when entered into his real estate purchase with the Streibicks, his property damage occurred, as
alleged in his Complaint, as a result of the City's failure to warn of the landslide. This Court has
not concluded that Block has not properly alleged a common negligence claim against the City
for its failure to warn of this condition. Block alleges that the City's failure to warn caused him
damages. Under these circumstances, at the very least, Block's alleged economic loss "is
recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or property." Id. citing Dz{{{zn, supra
at 1007, P.2d at 1200. The Brian and Christie Court emphasized that their concern 1s "with the
duties imposed by the law upon the defendant with respect to the plaintiffs business not with the

duties imposed by the constructions contract." Citing Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co.,
99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P .2d 997, 1003 (1978).
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This then is the major erTor this Court has made by broadly applying the economic loss
rule where, in reality, the rule is severely limited by circumstances of each case and those
circumstances, in this case, do not give rise to the application of the rule. There is a duty
imposed on the City of Lewiston under law to warn Block of the known dangerous condition on
his property. The City of Lewiston did not use ordinary care and in fact was grossly negligent of
its duty to avoid injury or damages to Mr. Block in his development of this property. The City is
liable for those damages and the economic loss rule does not bar recovery for those damages
and, even if it did, because those damages are also recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to injury
to property, all economic losses are recoverable in the negligence action. Brian and Christie,
supra at 172.
There is no further Idaho Supreme Couli case law citing to either of these two very recent
cases; however, the U.S. District Court ofldaho recently discussed the Aardema case in 0 Bar
Cattle Co., v. Owyhee Feeders, Inc., 2010 WL 2652289 (June 30, 2010). The 0 Bar court
addressed the issue of the economic loss rule in relation to jury instructions. The court explained
that the economic loss rules operates to segregate damage claims between the tort law and the
contract law and that "the Idaho Supreme Court has chosen to draw the line between these two
potentially overlapping systems of law on the basis of (1) whether the loss claimed relates to the
subject matter of the transaction and (2) whether the loss claimed includes property damage." ld.
at *1.

In regard to the subject of the transaction, the court noted that the Idaho Supreme Court
has interpreted the subject of the transaction by the subject matter of the contract. Id. at *2. In
applying that definition the court found that the underlying contract was a bailment agreement
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whereby defendants would keep, care for, feed, water and medicate plaintiffs cattle. As such,
the subject of the transaction was the bailment agreement and the deceased cattle were property
other than that which was the subject of the transaction. Jd. Thus, plaintiffs negligence claim
was appropriate. Id.
In regard to the property damage, the court explained that even if the Joss claimed related
to the subject matter of the transaction, a plaintiff may still recover damages under a negligence
theory if they have suffered property damage. I d. at *2. The court relied on the Oppenheimer
case in which the Idaho Supreme Court drew a distinction between prope1iy that had been
destroyed and property that had been reduced in value. The court noted "[i]t is clear that the
Idaho courts have drawn a clear distinction between property damage and economic loss based
around the destruction of property [and that as] long as a plaintiff claims actual damage and not
just loss of use or value, they may seek damages under a negligence theory." !d. at *3.
In Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 423,732 P.2d 661
(1987), Oppenheimer contracted with Bolen Cattle Co. to care for several head of cattle. Id. at
424, 732 P.2d at 662. Bolen a1legedly rebranded the cattle and sold them. Id. A state deputy
brand inspector inspected the converted cattle prior to sale. Id. The trial court ruled that
Oppenheimer's claims against the State Brand Board failed to state a cause of action in tort
because they were based upon economic damages. Id. at 425, 732 P.2d at 663. The Idaho
Supreme Court noted that Oppenheimer was not alleging mere economic damage. ld. at 426, 732
P .2d at 664. The court found that Oppenheimer suffered the loss of its property due to the
negligence of the deputy brand inspector. !d. Thus, Oppenheimer had a cause of action against
the deputy brand inspector.
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There does not appear to be any Idaho case law relating specifically to the facts of
Block's case, where "other property" was added to real property that was the subject of a
transaction and it is this "other property" that suffered physical damage. However, the United
States Supreme Court has stated that for purposes of applying the economic loss doctrine the
"product" is limited to that which the manufacturer originally placed in the stream of commerce
through the product's sale to the initial user, but that equipment added to the product after the
product was sold to the initial user was not part of the product itself but was "other property" and
that physical damage the product causes to "other property" is recoverable. Saratoga Fishing Co.
v. JM Martinac & Co., 117 S.Ct. 1783 (1997). If the land Block purchased is designated as the

"product" and the "other property" not necessarily equipment, but homes, walls, garages,
driveways, fences, etc. are added to that product, or land, and then that product or land causes
physical damage to the other property such damage should be recoverable.
Block clearly suffered physical damage to "other property" and therefore property loss.
The City building official observed the following damage to 153 and 159: severe foundation
damage, structural cracks inside sheetrock, warped floors, walls that had moved out of
alignment, windows that had broken because of movement of the walls and a gas line separation.
John Smith Depo. 39:19-25, 40:1-2. Furthermore, Block had to demolish an entire house (153)
and demolish the basement of another (159), which is complete property loss, property which is
no longer in Block's possession. John Block Depo. 286:5-7,287:5-7,22-25, 288:1-25.
Thus, Block asserts that this Court was in error in applying the economic loss rule to
Block's tort claim against the City for failure to warn, a duty imposed by law not one imposed by
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any "transaction," and that at the very least there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Block suffered property damage other than that which was the subject of any "transaction."
This Court failed to apply the appropriate summary judgment standard in granting Defendant
City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c). "Upon a
motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party." G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P2d 851 (1991). All
reasonable inferences which can be made from the record shall be made in favor of the party
resisting the motion. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P2d 1022 (1987) (emphasis
added). An inference adverse to the nonmoving party may be drawn if it is the only reasonable
inference. Christensen v. Idaho Land Developers, Inc., 104 Idaho 458, 660 P2d 70
(Ct.App.1983) (emphasis added). If the record contains conflicting inferences or reasonable
minds might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment motion must be denied. G&lvf

Farms, 119 Idaho at 517, 808 P2d at 854. "All doubts are to be resolved against the moving
party[.]" Id.

This Court failed to construe the exceptions set forth in the ITCA appropriately.
Under the ITCA, liability is to be the rule with certain specific exceptions to be closely
construed. Sterlingv. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211,214-15,723 P.2d 755,758-59 (1986); Reesv. State,

Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 137 P.3d 397, 143 Idaho 10 (2006). In addition, the purpose of the
Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) is to provide much needed relief to those suffering injury from the
negligence of government employees. Rees v. State, Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 137 P.3d 397,
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143 Idaho 10 (2006). This Court in its construction and application of the specific exceptions to
liability under the ITCA not only failed to construe the exceptions closely, rather it construed
them broadly, placing the burden on Block to counter the City's assertions of immunity.
Block's main argument is that the City should have told him, as someone with the status
of a developer/builder on property within the City limits and over which the City had regulatory
authority, that he was building on the site of a former landslide of which the City had knowledge
and a duty to disclose.
Given the City's concession that negligence is a recognized tort in the State ofldaho, the
Court erred by failing to properly apply the 3-step analysis at the summary judgment stage and
concluding that the provisions of the ITCA asserted by the City, including LC. §§ 6-904B(3) and
(4), 6-904(1) or 6-904(7), provide immunity to the City for their negligent acts. Order at 13.
The City's duty to Block.
In Rees v.ldaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006) the
Idaho Supreme Comi considered whether the Idaho Department ofHea1th and Welfare and its
employees could be liable for negligently investigating a reported case of child abuse. I d. at 13.
The district court granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court explained that
when reviewing a motion for summary it engaged in a three step analysis. First, whether tort
recovery is allowed under the laws of Idaho. Second, does an exception to liability under the
ITCA shield the alleged misconduct from liability. Third, whether the merits of the claim entitle
the moving party to dismissal.
Under the first step, the court noted that the parties agreed that the Department owed no
general duty to Tegan thus the issue was whether Idaho law recognized a special duty of care in
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this instance. "Determining when a special relationship exists sufficient to impose an affirmative
duty requires an evaluation of the 'the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the
law to say that particular plaintiffis entitled to protection."' Jd. at 15, 137 P.3d at 402 citing
Coghlan, 133 Idaho 3 99, 987 P .2d at 311. The court cited to the "public duty m1e" a rule of non-

liability and stated that an exception to this exists when a duty is owed to individuals rather than
the public only and this approach accorded with Idaho law referring to Coghlan. I d. at 16, 13 7
P.3d at 403. The Coghlan case involved the Idaho Supreme Court determining that a disttict
court's grant of a motion to dismiss regarding duty was in error and remanded for further
proceedings because the court found sufficient inferences that the University of Idaho defendant
and the sorority defendant had assumed a duty of care to the plaintiff. "A duty can be created if
one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to
perform the act in a non-negligent manner." Id. at 400, 987 P.2d at 312. The court referenced
allegations that supported an inference in favor of plaintiff that the university defendants
assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard the plaintiff from bad acts of which it
had knowledge. Id. And further the sorority defendants took actions which constituted
unde1iakings sufficient to create a duty to act in a non-negligent manner. I d. at 402, 987 P .2d at
314.

In examining this, the court applied a fact-intensive test as set out in a Minnesota case. Id.
There, the court noted that a statute alone could not create a special duty and there had to be
additional indicia that the government has undertaken the responsibility of protecting a particular
class of person from the risk associated with a particular harm. I d. It then considered four
non-exhaustive factors:
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1. Whether the government had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition
2. Whether there was reasonable reliance by persons on the government's
representations and conduct (such reliance must be based on specific actions or
representations which cause the person to forego other alternatives of protecting
themselves)
3. Whether an ordinance or statute set for mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a
particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole; and
4. Vv'hether the government used due care to avoid increasing the risk ofhann.
The court explained that these four factors need not all be met for the Court to determine
that a duty exists and they do not create a bright-line test.
Applying those factors in Block's case, the subdivision ordinance sets fotih mandatory
acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole. In
regard to whether the City had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition (i.e. the 1999
historic landslide), there is no question it had actual knowledge because two memos were placed
in City records by the City Engineer. Regarding reliance, Block reasonable relied on City staffs
statements and conduct in his preapplication meeting. Regarding the fourth factor, whether the
City used due care to avoid hann to Block, clearly there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the City exercised due care in their actions as set forth in the affidavits of John Block,
Eric Hasenoehrl, Bud Van Stone and John ("Hank") Swift previously submitted. The Court has
ened by concluding that the City did not owe to Block a duty to competently perform its services
as set forth in the subdivision code and to warn Block of the previous landslide on his real
property because of the special relationship created once Block met with City staff as part of the
subdivision process.
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Idaho Code § 6-904B does not afford the City immunity for Block's claims which a1ise from the
City's issuance of permits and/or failure to inspect because, at a minimum, there is a genuine
issue of material fact whether the City acted with gross negligence.
Idaho Code § 6-904B provides immunity to a governmental entity and its employees
while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal
intent and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct for any claim which:
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate, approval,
order or similar authorization.
4. Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an inadequate
inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the property of the
govemmental entity performing the inspection.
Gross negligence is defined as "the doing or failing to do an act which a reasonable
person in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum of
contemplation, be inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and
that failing that duty shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences of others." I. C. §
6-904C. Block adamantly disputes this Court's assertion that "[n)othing in the record before the
Court establishes that the City acted with gross negligence." An examination of the foliowing
facts demonstrates that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the City acted with
gross negligence.

1. Eric Hasenoehrl, a licensed professional civil engineer, testified that the City did not act
reasonably in approving the subdivision plan for Canyon Greens knowing that a landslide
had occurred previously in that same area. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 566:9-24.
2. Mr. Hasenoelu·l also testified that the City acted with deliberate indifference to the
harmful consequences of its action by approving the subdivisions. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo.
567:6-24.
3. Mr. Hasenoehrl also testified that the City acted with gross negligence by failing to warn
Block and approving the subdivisions. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 568:1-25.
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4. Mr. Hasenoehrl testified in his deposition that a licensed engineer working for the City of
Lewiston has an obligation to bring forward those things that have potential hann and to
take action so that the information is used and addressed in the future. Eric Hasenoehrl
Depo. 462:8-22,472:1-5.
5. Mr. Hasenoerhl also testified that the City should disclose every piece ofinfonnation that
is necessary for the orderly and safe development of property. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo.
480:20-25, 481:1.
6. Chris Davies, a licensed professional engineer, and the current City Engineer, testified
that if the City knows information it "should tell people about it. That's our job." Chris
Davies Depo. 21:15-24. Mr. Davies also explained that ifhe had known about the Tim
Richard Memorandum he would have passed it on to a potential developer. Chris Davies
Depo. 20:3-11.
7. John Smith the current City building official has testified that issuance of a residential
building pennit on a lot unsuitable for development would be outside his authority and
that he would "be negligent in [his] duty to issue a permit". John Smith Depo. 18:24-25,
19:1-9. Mr. Smith further testified that he does not have authority to issue a residential
building pennit for a lot that the City knows in within an area of landslide activity. John
Smith Depo. 19:18-23.
8. Shawn Stubbers, a licensed professional engineer, testified that the City in reviewing a
subdivision has a duty to bring information forward to a developer. Shawn Stubbers
Depo. 47:11-17.
9. Fonner City Public Works Director Bud Van Stone testified that the placement of Tim
Richard's memorandum into the SP No.4 files was done in the nonnal course of business
so that the City would use such for future reference. Bud Van Stone Depo. 46:12-25,
47:1-8.
10. By failing to warn John Block at time of subdivision of Canyon Greens and Canyon
Greens No. 2 and upon issuance of building pem1its for 153, 155 and 159 and the Canyon
Greens No. 2 lots, the City acted unreasonably and failed to exercise reasonable care. It is
part of City staff's job to review every single document that was relevant to a subdivision
or re-subdivision. Bud Van Stone Depo. 52:4-9.
11. If City staff failed to research every development, subdivision or re-subdivision
submitted for approval then they "wouldn't have been doing their job[.]" Bud Van Stone
Depo. 53:21-25, 54:1-3.
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If this Court construes the facts most liberally in favor of Block, a trier of fact could
conclude that the City had a duty to warn Block of the landslide and that by failing to wam
Block that he was about to develop and construct residential housing on the site of a former
landslide the City showed deliberate indifference to the risk of serious hann that could result
from such actions. It is not within the province of this Court on a motion for summary judgment
to take this factual determination out of the jury's hands. The Idaho Supreme Court addressed
this issue inS. Griffin Const., Inc. v. City a_(Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181,16 P.3d 278 (2000) where
it concluded that the district comi had ened by granting summary judgment on an issue of gross
negligence because genuine issues of material fact existed.
This Court's language stating that the "immunity language within this statute is broad
enough to cover any claims of negligence which are based on issuance of building or other
permits, approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or not inspecting the property at issue" is in
enor given the Idaho Supreme Court's direction that such exceptions must be construed closely
or narrowly rather than broadly. Rees, supra. In addition, this Court's language stating that the
"burden is particularly high for Block," in regard to Block proving malice or criminal intent is
disconcerting. Block has never alleged malice or c1iminal intent and further, any "burden"
imposed by the ITCA should not be "particularly high" for a plaintiff injured by wrongful act of
the govemment and/or its employees. Rather, any "burden" must be construed in favor of Block
as set forth in the appropriate summary judgment standard of review.
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Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) does not afford the City immunity for aU of Block's claims.
Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) provides immunity from liability for a govemmenta1 entity and its
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or
criminal intent for any claim which:
Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the govemmental entity
exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a
statutory or regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid,
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perfonn a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a govemmental entity or employee
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused.
The regulatory function and discretionary function clauses ofi.C. § 6-904(1) represent
two different types of actions that might be ilmnune under the ITCA, but the same test applies to
each. Rees, 143 Idaho at 20, 137 P.3d at 407. However, if a govemmenta1 employee fails to
exercise ordinary care while carrying out either function then this exception would not afford
immunity. Id. "Under Idaho law whether a government employee exercised ordinary care is
normally a factual question best left to the jury." !d.
The City failed to exercise ordinary care in carrying out its regulatory function or at a Il1inirnum
there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the City failed to exercise ordinary care.
The Subdivision Ordinance states, in part, in Section 32-9 that "in carrying out the
purposes of the preapplication process, the subdivider and the city shall be responsible for the
following actions:
(1) Actions by the subdivider. The subdivider and/or his agents shall meet with
the city at the preapplication conference ...
(2) Actions by the city.... Inspect the site or otherwise determine its relationship
to streets, utility systems, and adjacent land uses, and identify any unusual
problems with regard to topography, utilities, flooding or other condition ....
Review and discuss with the developer the potential need for special studies,
which may include but are not limited to traffic, soil, slope stability, wetlands,
foundations or other studies that may be required as a result of site conditions,
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and the implications of the findings of those studies, if required. The
requirement of said special studies shall be detennined by the city engineer.
Lowell Cutshaw Depo., Exhibit 32.
Tim Richards, a licensed professional engineer and fonner City Engineer has testified
that when the City memorialized the 1999 landslide in two separate files the intent was that such
information would be available at the time of future development. Tim Richards Depo. 44:8-12.
In addition, Mr. Richards has testified that "[t]he files or the system was used by the city to pass
along institutional knowledge." Tim Richards Depo. 34:11-16. Warren Watts, a licensed
professional engineer has testified that the City has a duty to review records and files as pari of
its subdivision process. WaiTen Watts Depo. 92:2-16. The City conducted a preapplication
meeting with Block regarding CO. CITE. The City failed to search its records and locate the
memorandums related to the landslide prior to attending this meeting and thereafter. CITE. In
addition, Mr. Watts has testified that the City has a duty to warn or notify a developer of
conditions or instability on property that the developer is planning to develop. Warren Watts
Depo. 89:4-22. Eric Hasenoehrl, a licensed professional engineer has testified that at no time did
the City notify or warn him of the information the City possessed in its files regarding the
landslide in the area ofCG and C02. Affidavit ofEric Hasenoehrl p.,

~.John

Block, the

Plaintiff, who developed CO and CG2 has testified that at no time did the City notify or warn
him of the information the City possessed in its files regarding the landslide in the area of CO
and C02. Affidavit of John Block p. , ~. Based on this evidence in the record there is certainly a
genuine issue of material fact whether the City exercised ordinary care in conducting its
regulatory functions.
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The City failed to exercise ordinary care in carrying out its discretionary function or at a
minimum there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the City failed to exercise ordinary
care.
A failure to warn is a decision made solely by an individual and "does not require an
evaluation of financial, political, economic and social effects. \Vhile it is hopefully not a routine,
everyday decision, it nevertheless involves the exercise of practical judgment and not planning or
policy fonnation. Thus, the activity appears to be 'operational'." Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho
484,488, 903 P.2d 73,77 (1995). See also, Hunter v. State, Dept. of Corrections, Div. of
Probation & Parole, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002) (The method in which the department

warned the probationer's employer regarding his conviction did not involve consideration of
financial, political, economic or social effects.) The City's failure to warn Block of the landslide
was operational, just as in Brooks, the decision was made solely by individuals and did not
require an evaluation of financial, political, economic and social effects. It involved practical
judgment and not planning or policy formation.
With respect to the issue of a geotechnical evaluation, although the primary decision to
modify the Subdivision Code to allow the imposition of such a requirement is to be decided on a
case-by-case basis, in this case, this issue could still result in the imposition of liability for the
City's failure to exercise due care in the "operation stage" ofthis decision. See, e.g., October 4,
1995, Idaho Attorney General Guidance to the Executive Director of PERSI. (In regard to PERSI
investment decisions the attorney general stated "The investment decision is still afforded the
'discretionary function' immunity, but the negligence in failing to exercise due care in the
'operation stage,' i.e., not conducting a title search or obtaining title insurance, may result in
liability.") This is analogous to the City's decision regarding a geotechnical evaluation in this
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case. The City's negligence in failing to exercise due care in the 'operation state,' i.e., failing to
review the specific infom1ation related to this particular site which would have indicated that the
proposed development was on the site of a recorded landslide and then failing to require
additional studies, including a geotechnical evaluation, should result in liability. There is
certainly a question of fact whether doing these things was a failure to exercise due care in the
"operation state''. Warren Watts, a licensed professional engineer has testified that the City
should have required a geotechnical evaluation when the property was subdivided in 2005.
Warren Watts. Depo. I 13:18-24. In addition, John "Hank" Swift a licensed professional
geotechnical engineer has testified that the City had a duty to prevent development in the area of
a landslide. Hank Swift Depo. (September 14, 2011) 228:15-17.
This Court's analysis and application of I. C. § 6-904(1) makes the exceptions to liability set forth
in I.C. §§ 6-904B (3) and (4) moot and is incorrect and overly broad.
This Court states that:
All of Block's claims against the City are based upon detem1inations made by city
employees in the processes of approving subdivision plats or issuing building
permits. These determinations are made in reliance upon or the execution of
regulatory function. The actions of the City that Block complains of are those
decisions which are contemplated within the ITCA as an exception to liability
under the discretionary function exception. I. C. § 6-904(1 ). Thus, the City is
shielded from liability on all ofBlock's claims and the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment is therefore granted on this alternative basis.
This Court should have construed the statutes to give effect to the intent of the legislature
and give effect based on the whole act and every word therein, "lending substance and meaning
to the provisions." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist., 142 Idaho 804, 134 P.3d 655
(2006).
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This Court's application of the exception to liability provided in Idaho Code & 6-904(7) was
erroneous because that exception cannot apply to Block's failure to warn claim.
Idaho Code § 6-904(7) provides i1mnunity from liability for a govemmental entity and its
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or
criminal intent for any claim which:
Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways,
roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in
effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of
the construction by the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some
other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give
such approval.
This Court states that the exceptions to liability provided in Idaho Code § 6-904(7) apply
to Block's claim (vi). Order at 20. Claim (vi) states that the City and/or Cutshaw breached a duty
of care by approving the plats of Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 without notifying
and/or warning Block that earth movement had occurred on 153, 155 and 159 in 1999 and had
not been eliminated or properly abated. Again, the Court interprets Block's claim too narrowly
and interprets the exception to liability broadly in contrast to Idaho Supreme Court precedent.
Block's claim (vi) is essentially a failure to warn claim. Block's claim is that the neither
the City nor Cutshaw notified or warned him at any step along the way during the subdivision
process related to Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No. 2 and prior to their approval, that on
such propetiy a landslide had previously occurred of which the City knew and had record of.
In addition, the Court's statement that the "approval or denial of a subdivision plat is a
public project that is analogous to the development ofhighways, roads, streets, or other public
property" is incredible. Order at 21. By its plain language, the application of I. C. § 6-904(7) is
restricted to "a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets,
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bridges, or other public property." Clearly, the Administrative Plat for Canyon Greens was not a
plan or design for construction of highways, roads, streets, bridges or other public property.
Keltic Engineering prepared the Administrative Plat for Canyon Greens which was accepted by
the City of Lewiston and recorded on February 15, 2006. Hasenoehrl Affidavit July 13, 2010,
p.~

6. In accordance with the Subdivision Code Section 32-7, Administrative Plats have "no

public improvements required, all property fronts upon an improved, publicly dedicated
street[.]" Karl Ravencroft Affidavit. Canyon Greens was an Administrative Plat. Stubbers Depo.
14:4-10. An engineered set of plans is not required for a subdivision, engineered sets of plans are
required for utilities and roadways and major grading performed by the developer. Watts Depo.
I 09:23-25, 110:1-3.
Further, Black's Law Dictionary defines "public property" as "[s]tate-or communityowned property not restricted to any one individual's use or possession." Black's Law
Dictionary, 2nd Pocket Ed. at 564. Public property is exempt from taxation. Idaho Canst. Art.
VII, § 4. There is no right to use public property for private purposes. Tyrolean Associates v. City
o..fKetchum, 100 Idaho 703, 604 P .2d 717 (1979). Former City Engineer, Tim Richards, testified

that the property at issue was private property. Tim Richards Depo. 50:1-4.
The plain language ofthis statute only provides immunity with regard to plans or designs
for public projects (i.e., highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property). See, State v.

1-!ammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 10 P3d 1285 (2000) (overruled on another point of law) ("Courts
commonly construe statutory language by applying the legal maxim of noscitur a sociis, noting
that a word is known by the company it keeps.") Idaho courts have considered this immunity in
cases concerning public property. See Brown v. City ofPocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P3d 1164
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(201 0) (homeowner suffered damage from City road construction project and alleged negligent
planning and design of a city road); Lawton v, City ofPocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 886 P2d 330
(1994) (negligent design of a city street intersection); Morgan v. State, Dept. of Public Works,
124 Idaho 658, 862 P2d 1080 (1993) (negligent design of state office building where a bHnd man
sustained injuries when he stepped backwards offloading dock located in

office building);

Bingham v. Franklin County, 118 Idaho 318 (1990) (condition of public road).

Therefore, Block respectfully requests that this Court reconsider and withdraw its finding
that the exceptions to liability set forth in I. C. 6-904(7) apply to this case and in particular
Block's claim (vi).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court withdraw its
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment and for the reasons
set forth above, thereby issue a subsequent Order denying in full or in part the City's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this 28th day of October, 2011.
LANDECK & FORSETH
\

pt

' (j-.(£t~.I

c\.

Ronald J. Landeck
Attc/meys for Plaintiff
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